

# I.G. Starinov. Pass unseen.

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Ilya Grigorievich Starinov and the editors of the almanac "Vympel" thank the veterans of special forces units of the KGB of the USSR "Vympel" for help in publishing the almanac.

I would like to express special gratitude

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Without them this book would never have  
been possible.

Ilya Starinov.

## Editor column

Dear reader!

In the spring of 1997, the Vympel Almanac brought to your attention the book of Ilya Grigoryevich Starinov "Notes of a saboteur".

Memoirs of I.G. Starinov, who is now in his ninety-ninth year, attracted the attention of the public here in Russia and many observers abroad. During 1997-1998, the editorial office systematically received phone calls from readers: when will the second book be released?

I.G. Starinov, overcoming all difficulties and obstacles, worked hard on his archive and other sources, checking the authenticity of events, the correctness of his judgments and conclusions. His harsh assessment of the actions of I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukova, K.E. Voroshilov and others on the preparation and leadership of the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War are justified by the huge sacrifices of our people and sound like a warning and a fair lesson to the current leadership of Russia.

If we want to save our Motherland, we need to help the President and the government to realize the full depth and danger of the strategic overstretching of the country, restore social contact with the armed forces, become accountable to the people, transform the style and structure of the country and the army in the new geopolitical situation, and overcome the stagnation leading to an explosion in military reform.

Offering the reader the second book of reflections of the oldest partisan-saboteur I.G. Starinov "Delayed Action Mines", the editorial board believes that the reader will once again return to the first book, carefully read the second and look at the past of their fathers and grandfathers who did not return home from the war with new eyes.

Be careful, reader, you still have a lot ahead of you!

Editorial Board of the Almanac "Vympel".

## INSTEAD OF THE PREFACE.

### God of sabotage.

Yes, that's exactly how - "God of sabotage", Yugoslav newspapers characterized Ilya Grigoryevich Starinov when he visited this country in August 1967. Starinov was then met by his friend and student, a national hero

Yugoslavia Ivan Harish, hosted by Josip Broz Tito, his book *Mines Awaiting Their Hour* was translated into Yugoslavian, which sold a very solid circulation of 200 thousand ... Sadly, the historical memory of the Yugoslav people turned out to be much less sclerotic than ours.

Even a brief enumeration of the events that fill the long biography of Ilya Grigorievich Starinov is impressive. He was born on August 2, 1900 in the family of a railway worker. It is not known who he would have become if it had not been for the revolution that stirred up the whole country, but it seems to me personally that he would have found his way even then. And it is unlikely that this path would be very different from the one actually traveled. After all, no matter how the country is called, no matter what system is proclaimed in it, there must always be people who will defend it. The revolution was inevitably followed by the Civil War and Ilya Grigorievich was mobilized into the Red Army. He fought honestly, was wounded, and after the end of the war he chose to remain in the armed forces. In 1922 he graduated from the school of military railway technicians, in 1935 - from the Military Transport Academy. All this, probably, is not so interesting, as it was expressed earlier, to the "general reader", but it is necessary. It was at this time that a special type of troops appeared in the Soviet armed forces, to which Ilya Grigorievich devoted his whole life - sabotage and partisan units. Starting from the mid-20s and until 1933, such units were as important a part of the country's defense as the "Stalin Line" - a strip of fortified areas. In the event of an enemy invasion, the enemy army would find itself, with such a defense system, as if sandwiched between the URs and the Red Army, on the one hand, and the partisan saboteurs operating on the enemy's communications, on the other. Ilya Grigoryevich was engaged in the preparation of saboteurs along the line of the IV (intelligence) Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. (At the same time, he also had to train a number of leaders of the European "labor movement", among which were, for example, Alexander Zavadsky, Wilhelm Pick, Palmiro Togliatti, Andre Marty ...)

Simultaneously with the training of personnel, he improved sabotage means. The PMS designed by him (Starinov's train mine) subsequently found wide application during the fighting in Spain and the Great Patriotic War. According to the report of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, this mine ranked first in popularity and effectiveness.

In 1936, the Spanish Civil War began. The Soviet Union provided the Republican government of Spain with military assistance both in equipment and specialists, while at the same time taking the opportunity to test its military methods and concepts in a real combat situation. In the case of the sabotage-partisan war, the Soviet methodology fully justified itself - the reconnaissance group, to which the military adviser Ilya Grigoryevich Starinov was seconded, by merging with the same small sabotage detachments, turned into the 14th (partisan) corps. Almost all Spanish sabotage units were thus united into a single whole, inflicting heavy blows on the fascist invaders. So, for example, Starinov and his sabotage groups managed to destroy the headquarters of the Italian aviation division, blow up a large railway bridge without penetrating it, and during the Brunet operation in July 1937, cut off the enemy troops of the Southern Front from the troops of the Madrid Front.

In November 1937, Ilya Grigorievich surrendered his duties and returned to his homeland in the midst of the "Great Purge". Many people with whom he trained saboteurs were arrested and shot on charges of preparing "bands" to overthrow the Soviet regime. Only thanks to the intercession of the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov did Starinov survive. (I may be mistaken, but it seems to me that Kliment Efremovich defended him, first of all, because he himself was involved in the preparation of the so-called "bands". If you "surrender" everyone, then sooner or later they will come for you.) Instead GULAG number or a bullet in the back of the head, Ilya Grigorievich received the rank of colonel. He was not promoted again in rank. 61 years as a colonel is probably a record in the domestic armed forces.

Then there was the Winter War with the Finns of bad memory. An enemy sniper - the same saboteur as those who were trained by Starinov - wounded him in the arm, providing disability. But Ilya Grigoryevich did not even want to think about leaving the army.

So he remained in the ranks - an invalid. He could no longer shoot from a rifle, and it was not necessary - paradoxical as it may seem, but in the four wars he had gone through, he never saw that he had killed a man. I only heard the echoes of the exploded mines.

And, finally, the Great Patriotic War. Ilya Grigoryevich took part in the preparation and conduct of the guerrilla war from its first days - as head of a special school, commander of the 5th separate engineering brigade, whose miners operated behind enemy lines, head of the Higher Operational School, assistant head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement for sabotage and deputy chief of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, again, for sabotage. At the same time, the sabotage service at the Ukrainian headquarters, created on his initiative and under his leadership, contributed to a sharp increase in the effectiveness of the actions of partisan saboteurs. At the very beginning of the war, Starinov managed to destroy the headquarters of the enemy's 68th infantry division in Kharkov with an explosion of a radio-controlled mine, led by its commander, Lieutenant General Georg von Braun.

xxx

This is briefly the content of "Notes of a saboteur" [1]. The book that you are holding in your hands, according to the author's intention, forms a single whole with it and begins where the previous one ends - during the transition of Ilya Grigorievich from the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement to the Polish one. In addition to memoirs, the book includes a historical study "Missed Opportunities", where the author, using a lot of factual material, shows from his own experience the development of the partisan movement during the Second World War in the Soviet Union and European countries.

One detail that is fundamental to understanding this study should be noted here. Ilya Grigorievich, in assessing partisan actions and their organization, proceeds from the fact that they should not be amateur performances, but organized operations carried out by partisan-sabotage formations. This point of view is not the only one; Thus, during the war, the Allies noticed that it was not partisans who were operating in our rear, but ~~practically~~ <sup>practically</sup> military units, understanding by partisans primarily the masses of the people who were fighting against the invaders, as was the case, for example, in Abyssinia captured by Italy and a number of other countries. Not being an expert on this issue, however, I want to note that here we are dealing with an eternal dispute about the advantages of military and insurgent partisanship. As the history of local conflicts of recent decades shows, both of these forms of partisanship continue to exist to this day, not intending to die out.

In the same Yugoslav newspapers, where Ilya Grigoryevich Starinov was nicknamed the "God of sabotage", they wrote about him: "twice Hero of the Soviet Union." The Yugoslavs simply could not understand how such a man, a man of legend, and not a Hero. But, as you know, "the Soviets have their own pride."

Ilya Grigorievich, alas, is not a Hero. And as you can see, he will remain a colonel forever. Well, there is no other such colonel and never will be.

Alexander Dyukov.

"The successful course of our offensive operations was supported by heroic actions of the partisan forces of the Soviet Union, which have been terrorizing its rear for more than three years." respite to the enemy, destroying enemy communications and

"The command of the enemy troops had to practically create at the rear that large forces of troops were distracted. This is second front to fight on with the partisans, the general state of the German front had a significant impact on the outcome of the war. and ultimately to

Zhukov G.K. "Memories and Reflections". M. 1971. S. 658.

## **PART I. PARTISANS GO WEST.**

### **Chapter 1. Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement.**

In the midst of the deployment of partisan struggle in 1944 in neighboring countries, the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement (USHPD) actually turned into an international one. In those April days, we summed up the results of the sabotage service of the Ukrainian headquarters led by me. The number of sabotage over the year of its activity has increased more than 10 times. If in 1942 Ukrainian partisans derailed 202 trains, and in the first half of 1943 - more than 500; then for the second half of 1943, when the sabotage service was created, about 3 thousand. Their number could have been much larger if there were enough explosives.

It is probably superfluous to say that, due to the specifics of the war on the Eastern Front, the enemy faced the problem of supplying active troops with an extremely acute problem. The army of many millions was constantly in need of replenishment with manpower, military equipment, ammunition, fuel and lubricants and other types of military equipment. The spatial scope of operations required a constant expansion of the scale of operational-strategic transportation and ensuring their safety. For these reasons, the main lines of communication of the Nazi army, especially the railways, became the main targets for partisan strikes.

In the first months of the war and in the winter from 1941 to 1942, the partisan movement faced a number of difficulties due to the destruction of the system of partisan activities, but even in such extremely unfavorable conditions, partisan activity greatly disturbed the enemy. A number of directives and orders of the fascist command paid special attention to the protection of communications of the Wehrmacht, contained numerous recommendations for the protection of railway lines and station facilities. It should be noted that in the winter of 1941-1942 partisans blew up 224 echelons and burned about 650 bridges. It was still far from the scope of 1943,

but the Wehrmacht, unfamiliar with partisan resistance, such pinpricks were very unpleasant. The partisans, on the other hand, lacked almost everything, from qualified miners to explosives ...

In the spring of 1942, the Soviet command took measures to increase the effectiveness of the partisan struggle. By the Decree of the State Defense Committee (GKO) dated May 30, 1942, the Central and regional headquarters of the partisan movement were created, the main task of which was to "destroy the enemy's communication lines." Obviously, this task was impossible without the widespread use of sabotage, the effectiveness of which largely depended on the presence of special units in the partisan detachments and their correct use.

Fully aware of this, the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement in mid-August 1942 approved the measures of A.N. Saburov [2] to create 25 sabotage groups in his unit, each of which was tasked with systematically organizing sabotage on the sections of railways assigned to them. This approval was expressed, among other things, in the proposal to the commanders of other partisan formations to organize the same groups.

On the whole, the activities carried out by the USHPD contributed to the intensification of sabotage, however, the fight on enemy communications did not yet have a scope that met the tasks set. In fact, partisan actions did not have a significant impact on the disruption of the transport communications of the Wehrmacht.

The current situation was explained by a number of reasons. Firstly, by this time in the USHPD, as well as in a number of other headquarters, there was no special department for the timely analysis and generalization of sabotage actions of partisans, the development of tactics and techniques of sabotage, and setting specific tasks for the formations. Secondly, in 1942, the headquarters could not organize a regular supply of partisans with mines and explosives. Thirdly, the training of specialists in guerrilla warfare at the USHPD special school did not yet meet the growing needs of the detachments. Fourthly, the issue of the position of sabotage units in the structure of partisan formations was not resolved, and some commanders underestimated the importance of sabotage on enemy communications.

In the plans of the Soviet command for the summer campaign of 1943, great importance was attached to operations on the Wehrmacht's lines of communication. Therefore, the UShPD developed a combat plan for the partisan detachments of Ukraine for the spring and summer of 1943, which included measures to disable the most important railway junctions, large railway and highway bridges. In accordance with this, in April 1943, a technical (i.e., sabotage) department took shape in the UShPD. At the same time, the post of deputy head of the UShPD for sabotage was introduced, which I had to occupy since May.

The technical (sabotage) department was entrusted with the tasks of developing plans for sabotage operations, the forms and methods of their implementation, combating enemy opposition in organizing sabotage acts, designing and improving technical means, developing instructions and instructions for all types of sabotage work, monitoring the storage of mine-blasting property in warehouses and bases.

After some time, the UShPD formalized the legal status of the partisan special services. In accordance with the order of the head of the UShPD dated July 14, 1943, the heads of the special services were mandatory approved by the UShPD and were directly subordinate to the commander of the partisan formation.

Thus, by the middle of 1943, the UShPD basically carried out a set of measures aimed at centralizing the management of sabotage operations. The organization of a "technical" department in the Ukrainian headquarters, the creation of special services and sabotage units in partisan formations and detachments raised the sabotage activities of partisans to a new level, and contributed to an increase in its effectiveness.

The guerrilla war on the territory of Ukraine was ending. The deputy for sabotage could only sum up the results and train personnel for work abroad. The central headquarters dealt with the affairs of partisans operating not only in

the unliberated regions of the Carpathian Ukraine, but also in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania. He supervised the training of personnel for partisan operations in these countries, armed and supplied them, maintaining constant contact with them.

The Ukrainian school of the partisan movement successfully operated. At school, we focused on training commanders and highly qualified specialists capable of conducting combat operations not only on Soviet territory, but also far beyond its borders. The significance of this work was manifested in the ever greater effectiveness of the strikes inflicted by Ukrainian partisans, especially on communications. Partisan detachments and formations acted more and more in concert. Mainly because radio communication was established between them.

Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians and representatives of other nations studied at the school. They came to the school in different ways: some from the Red Army, others came from detachments previously formed behind enemy lines.

## **Chapter 2. Meeting with Zavadsky.**

On the twentieth of April 1944 - I don't remember the exact date - Timofei Amvrosievich Strokach[3] - the head of the school - asked me to come in on urgent business. He was not alone. A man in the uniform of a Major General of the Polish Army was sitting at the desk.

- Meet, - said Strokach. - Colonel Starinov - Deputy Commander-in-Chief Troops of the Polish Major General Zavadsky.

We shook hands. Zavadsky had a friendly face with fine features, blue eyes, neatly trimmed curly hair.

"The Polish headquarters of the partisan movement is being created," said Strokach. - It is necessary to decide how to help the Polish comrades.

It was necessary to help first of all with instructors and equipment. This is what was discussed...

As a matter of fact, the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, Ukrainian and Belarusian partisans have been helping the Polish comrades for a long time. In the special school of the USHPD, headed by Pavel Aleksandrovich Vyhodets [4], by the spring of 1943, volunteers from Poland were already studying together with volunteers from other countries of Eastern Europe. In September 1943, for example, A.F. Fedorov [5], having established contact with the units of the Army of the People in the Lublin Voivodeship, handed over to them a significant amount of weapons. Closer to winter, our headquarters sent nine transport aircraft with weapons and ammunition to these detachments.

On the territory of Poland, mixed Polish-Soviet partisan detachments arose independently, which enjoyed the support of both Belarusian and Ukrainian partisans. And in February 1944, the 1st Ukrainian Partisan Division P.P. Vershigory [6], which made a raid through four Polish provinces, and the partisan unit of Major General M.I. Naumov [7], who made a dash to Sandomierz, helped the inhabitants of Polish villages and cities to create their own partisan detachments, shared weapons and explosives with them, taught them how to undermine enemy echelons.

During the conversation, I noticed that Zavadsky is well versed in mine-subversive actually, and asked if he had ever fought in Spain.

- No, I didn't, - Zavadsky remarked in Russian with a slight accent. - But I had to learn mine-blasting. And the teacher was good. It's just a pity he doesn't want to recognize former students! His blue eyes beamed with a smile.

I stared at my interlocutor in bewilderment. But God forbid, I couldn't remember anything. Nothing!

- And allow me, pan captain, to myself ... - Zavadsky said cheerfully, extending his hand palm up, as if he wanted to accept some object. And suddenly... Suddenly there was a lingering smell of the June foliage of the forest near Moscow, the rumble of dray carts burst through the open window along the cobblestones of the street descending to the Skhodnya River. Dozens of cadet faces appeared before my eyes, and among them - a very young, with delicate features, the face of the foreman of the training group. The foreman loved to do everything with his own hands!

- Thirty third! School of Sverchevsky! [8] - escaped from me.

- Remembered, finally! - Zavadsky smiled broadly. - Yes, ten years have passed. Like Dumas.

Strokach looked from me to Zavadsky, from Zavadsky back to me, tore a piece of paper out of his notebook and held it out:

- Please, Ilya Grigorievich.

- And ... why, Timofei Amvrosievich? - Write

immediately, who was not taught. And the one who does not appear is your student!

He and Zavadsky laughed.

"Well, business is time, and fun is an hour," Strokach interrupted. - Let's discuss which of our workers and instructors can be sent to the headquarters of the partisan movement in Poland.

We discussed several candidates. Among the first were the names of the former chief financial officer of the Higher Operational School for Special Purposes (VOSHON) Alexei Semenovich Egorov, the commander of the "Red Landmine" detachment, Vyacheslav Antonovich Kvitinsky, Platon Voronko's friend Alexander Romanovich Kuznetsov, Ivan Nikolaevich Kondrashov, the head of the technical department, whom I brought with Voronezh Front (1943). And the last ... The last candidate was mine. He named her Zavadsky. It was completely unexpected. Both for me and for Strokach.

"The Central Committee of our party and the command of the Polish Army are earnestly asking, Comrade General," Zavadsky said insistently, "command Colonel Starinov to the Polish Headquarters of the partisan movement, at least temporarily. Just let him get the job done.

Strokach shook his head.

- You can't solve such a question with a kondachka. I will report your request to the Central Committee of the CP(b)U. Yes, and Comrade Starinov is not a sin to ask how he views the transition to the Polish headquarters.

- If we are talking about a temporary business trip, I agree. "I'll talk to the Central Committee," Strokach repeated. The next day,

Timofei Amvrosievich reported that, despite his objections, the Central Committee decided to satisfy Zavadsky's request and send me to the Polish headquarters of the partisan movement.

And suddenly I didn't want to go anywhere. I did not want to part with my thoughtful and attentive boss. With such an excellent comrade as the head of the communications department, Colonel Efim Mikhailovich Kosovsky, the head of the technical department, Ivan Nikolaevich Kondrashov, and his deputy, Sergei Vasilyevich Gridnev.

But what can you do? Issue resolved!

- You will receive a new appointment in Moscow. At the same time, I will ask you to fulfill several of our orders," Strokach said. - And now it remains for me to thank you for your work at the headquarters and wish you success.

- Thank you, Timofei Amvrosievich. I'd rather stay. - Nothing. Hope the trip doesn't drag on.

Strokach's assumption did not come true: the "business trip" dragged on.

### **Chapter 3. The Polish headquarters of the partisan movement.**

The Polish headquarters of the partisan movement was then stationed northwest of the city of Rivne. Fifteen detachments organized in the USSR, numbering 1875 people, equipped with all the necessary property and radio equipment, passed into his subordination.

Not far from the headquarters was the Polish school for the training of partisan personnel.

Alexander Zavadsky, as deputy commander-in-chief of the Polish Army, was at the location of the army headquarters, more than a hundred kilometers west of the headquarters of the partisan movement. The first time I came to introduce myself to Zavadsky as the chief of staff, he looked tired and exhausted. His legs were swollen, and to reduce their swelling, he put them on a stool. Despite his fatigue, a fire of cheerfulness burned in him.

- Difficult! he said. - For many years the people were turned against the Soviet Union.

The figure of a priest flashed through the window.

- The slanderer is coming again, - Zavadsky threw.

The adjutant who came in reported that the priest was asking to be received.

- Ask, - Zavadsky agreed wearily.

Tall, portly, with an excessively reddish, obese and tender face  
The priest entered, crossed himself, muttered something incomprehensible.

Zavadsky invited him to sit down.

The shepherd sat down and forced out a touching smile and said in Polish:

I don't want to disturb you, but I have a very urgent matter.

- Pan colonel does not understand Polish and he will not interfere with us, - answered Zavadsky.

The priest nodded in agreement.

- Wait a minute, but for now look at the album of the Polish army, - suggested to me by Zavadsky.

While I was looking at the pictures, the priest complained about the atheists and asked them to calm down. He spoke for a long time.

- Well, a Jesuit, - Zavadsky remarked after the departure of the priest.

Lunch was served. We continued to discuss issues related to the organization of the partisan struggle and the situation on the territory of Poland, about the Akowtsy[9] and about the Polish Army.

While working at the Polish headquarters of the partisan movement, I was involved in the development of a plan of action for the Polish partisans, and then focused on logistics and training of sabotage and airborne groups.

Not only Polish, but also Polish-Soviet partisan detachments operated on the territory of Poland. In addition, Soviet prisoners of war poured into the units of the People's Army. The work of sheltering and sending yesterday's slaves to partisan detachments was carried out by special committees for helping Soviet prisoners of war, created by the Polish Workers' Party.

One of the largest partisan formations operating on the territory of Poland was a well-armed brigade under the command of Ivan Nikolaevich Banov. By the time the Polish Headquarters was created, it controlled almost the entire territory from Brest to the Vistula. Its detachments inflicted significant blows on the enemy, forcing him to allocate significant forces for counter-fighting, directing them primarily to guard communications. In February 1944, our partisan unit under the command of the illustrious Vershigora crossed the border of Poland.

It passed all over Poland through the Rzeszowskie and Lubelskie voivodships, crossed the Warsaw and Bialystok provinces and left the territory of Poland. The appearance of our partisan detachments in Poland and the material assistance of the Soviet Union to the detachments of the People's Army increased the scope of the partisan struggle there.

- Tight us without the help of the Soviet Union, said Zavadsky. Sometimes the Akovites not only do not fight against the Nazis, but sometimes help them in operations against the Ludova Guard and partisans. And the Nazis continue to destroy the Poles.

After a conversation with Zavadsky, we, with a group of workers from the operational department, headed by I.N. Kondrashov sat down to draw up a plan for the deployment of partisan struggle in the occupied territory of Poland.

The plan was developed, approved, but the enemy made his own adjustments to it.

The situation behind enemy lines in Poland by the summer of 1944 had developed pretty confusing.

At the beginning of June, about three thousand Polish and Soviet partisans concentrated in the Janovskie forests of the Lublin Voivodeship, including formations and detachments of Chepiga, Shangin, detachments of Prokopyuk, Karasev, Nedelin and Vasilenko, numbering about 1800 people.

The German command began to concentrate regular troops with the task encircle and completely destroy the partisan detachments in the Lublin region.

On June 8 and 9, fascist forces accumulated in the area of Yanovsky and Lipsky forests, outnumbering the total number of partisans by ten times and having a huge advantage in armament.

By June 14, the Nazis managed to surround our troops. However, on the night of June 15, with a concentrated blow, the partisans broke through the enemy ring and entered the Solskaya Pushcha. It didn't come easy. The partisans suffered heavy losses, during these days the commander of the partisan unit V. Chepiga died. A new attempt by the Germans made in Solskaya Pushcha was also unsuccessful. By the evening of June 23, partisan detachments left the second ring and launched attacks on enemy rear lines in other areas.

Soviet military pilots provided us with great help. The ammunition, weapons and food delivered by them inspired the partisans and helped to repel the attacks of the enemy.



On June 6, our allies finally opened a second front. But, either it was expected for a very long time, or for other reasons, the opening of this front did not impress us.

The driver of my car, Don Cossack Pavel Volodin, having learned about the opening second front in Europe, said:

- When you need to fight, then you can't find a trace of them, and now they are rushing to Germany for trophies.

Special school.

While working at the Polish headquarters of the partisan movement, I continued to conduct training sessions at the school of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement (it was located nearby). Her boss was P.A. Native. It was a well-organized school where experienced miners passed on their knowledge to volunteers from other countries.

The study included theoretical and practical training. The school had all the necessary teaching aids on issues of organization, tactics of guerrilla warfare, visual aids on disrupting the work of the enemy rear, as well as memos, instructions, instructions and layouts, various fuses, locks and mines.

When training new partisans and improving their skills, we used materials from a survey of the results of actions.

For example, P.P. Vershigora, during a raid on the Vistula and San, put Major S.V. Kalnitsky problem[11]:

- Destroy the pumping station at the Gorynets station, where steam locomotives were refueled, leading trains to the front along the Rava-Russkaya-Lvov line.

- Will be done! Major replied clearly.

After reconnaissance, Kalnitsky, together with his partners Ivan Tyulyakov, Kostya Egorov and Leonid Kozhanov, appeared in the room of the station duty officer and took over the duty. Ivan Tyulyakov immediately ran to the water pump to install automatic mines. At that moment, the lights of the arriving train flashed.

- It's literal! the duty Pole warned anxiously. - Close the semaphore! -

Kalnitsky ordered him, and he obediently carried out the command.

As Kalnicki expected, the driver stopped the train in front of a red traffic light. The daredevils managed to mine the pumping station and the rail track, on which the letter train arrived.

- Open the semaphore! - ordered Kalnitsky to the duty officer. The Pole on duty confidently opened the semaphore and turned to the group commander:

- Wait, sir, neh their cholera tisne, swab of the damned. I'm following you. - And went.

The locomotive gave a whistle and, picking up speed, moved to the Toronets station. Soon explosions were heard. Automatic mines were torn under the train, and the pumping station was blown into the air.

The results of the preparation at school were brilliant. We used all the instructions prepared in the Ukrainian school in the school at the Polish headquarters of the partisan movement.

Teaching was conducted by experienced instructors - lieutenants Prokofiev and Sokolov, who were trained at the Higher Operational School for Special Purposes and later headed the sabotage service in the partisan formations of Ukraine.

Old Guard.

At a Polish school, I met acquaintances of the International Brigadiers - an engineer by training, a former corporal of the Polish Army Henryk Torunczyk, who illegally got from Lodz to Spain in early 1937. A tall brunette, Torunchik fought on the Madrid front, then on the Aragonese, participated in

tragic battle near Huesca, in an offensive operation near Brunete. At the Battle of the Ebro River, he became chief of staff of the battalion.

Before Spain, Heinrich Torunczyk went through a practical wrestling school in Poland. Thanks to his abilities and unbending willpower, he managed to get a higher education. He also tried to study as an officer, but he was expelled from school as "unworthy of moral and political qualities." This was under Piłsudski[12]. After completing his military service, he was arrested for communist propaganda.

I saw him again at the end of April 1944, when he entered the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement with a letter from Karol Świerczewsky, who asked for help. It is with great pleasure that we complied with this request. We met at school like old friends.

I also met a second "Spaniard" at school - Leonid Efimovich Rubinshtein, who also fought in the ranks of the International Brigade, under the command of Świerczewsky. In 1933, Leon participated in the operation to disrupt the celebration in honor of Piłsudski at the Lodz Philharmonic. Eleven brave lads entered the festival. One of them turned off the light in the hall. Others scattered leaflets and released doves. One of the pigeons with a red flag landed on a frame with a portrait of Piłsudski. The police examined young people leaving the Philharmonic and easily found traces of a dove under Leon's jacket.

Leon has been in jail. Then he emigrated to France, studied there, and when the war began in Spain, he fought against Franco as a battalion commander.

And here I am again Rubinsteinchik. We remember the past. We speak Russian. Let's switch to Spanish. I also understand Polish. There is something to remember. I also had to act in Spain together with the Poles. Hardy and brave people.

At school, I met many old acquaintances who studied in the first partisan schools. Among them is the partisan group of Vyacheslav Antonovich Kvitinsky, the former commander of the "Red Landmine" detachment in the formation of A. Grabchak Buyny. Kvitinsky selected for himself brave people of various specialties. If the commander of the future brigade, successfully operating in

Poland and Czechoslovakia, which derailed more than a dozen enemy trains, blew up over 100 enemy vehicles, were only 24 years old, many of the miners of his group were not even 18 years old.

Kvitinsky, an artilleryman by profession, was surrounded. Trying to get out, he ended up with the partisans. He quickly understood the power of mines, became an enthusiast for sabotage behind enemy lines, and grew into a talented guerrilla brigade commander.

I also met another colleague here - Alexander Stepanovich Efimov. He became a partisan in 1942, when he was barely twenty years old. By the nature of his service, he was supposed to be in our rear, and he rushed to the rear of the enemy. Tall, thin, unhurried, thoughtful, he met the partisans and "fell ill." He showed his courage behind enemy lines in the Caucasus in the winter of 1943. In February 1944, he reached V.P. Chepigi, becoming his deputy for sabotage.

It was hard for this unit in Poland. In the Yanovsky forests, it came under the blow of the enemy's punitive operation. The commander is dead. Sergeant Efimov with a group of fighters escaped from the encirclement, went out to his own and, despite not knowing the Hungarian and German languages, began to prepare for the transfer to the rear of the enemy on the territory of Hungary, then fought in Czechoslovakia.

At school I met two Yegorovs. One - Mikhail Alekseevich - tank commander, who was captured on June 29, 1941 in Minsk when leaving the encirclement. He took the first opportunity to escape and made it safely to his troops. He was trained in a special school and more than once performed combat missions, first at Vershigora, then at Fedorov. After the connection of the partisans A.F. Fedorov with the Soviet troops, achieved a direction to the school to Vyhodets. He managed to get to Slovakia, where he acted in a unit under the command of Dibrova,

having successfully carried out several difficult operations to destroy bridges and undermine military trains.

Aleksey Semenovitch Egorov embarked on the path of partisan struggle, changing the position of the chief finance officer of the school to deputy commander for sabotage of a large unit.

I also met a young energetic demolition worker Alexander Romanovich Kuznetsov at school. He became a partisan at the age of seventeen, graduated from a special school in Moscow and participated in the fighting behind enemy lines in the Moscow, Smolensk, Kalinin and Oryol regions.

Together with Platon Voronko, he was sent to a unit under the command of S. Kovpak[13]. In the 2nd battalion of the formation, he trained 38 demolition men. During the Carpathian raid he was wounded, later he was evacuated to our rear. After recovering, he taught cadets at the school.

Bandera.

I encountered Bandera [14] while still working at the Polish headquarters. In the western regions, near Rovno, where the headquarters was located, despite the advance of the Soviet Army, they continued to operate.

Who are Bandera? No matter what they say today, Bandera - an organization of Ukrainian nationalists - were essentially German agents. Because of them, in the West of Ukraine, before the arrival of large partisan formations of Kovpak, Fedorov and Begma[15], there was no partisan war. Only these partisan formations, despite the fact that the people were morally suppressed by Bandera, managed to clear the western regions of Ukraine from Bandera gangs and invaders. Here the detachment of Grabchak (Buyny) played a very important role. His militants infiltrated the OUN - UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), they knew their "wire" right up to Munich and Cologne.

The rural population lived in constant fear. Bandera came at night, taking food from the villagers, ostensibly for the partisans, but in fact handing them over to the Germans.

The struggle of the OUN-UPA with the Red Army and Soviet partisans greatly facilitated the life of the Nazi invaders and was the most effective form of cooperation between the nationalists and the invaders throughout the war. The clashes with our Army initiated by the nationalists began from the first days of the war. In July 1941, the infamous Nachtigal Battalion, which was part of the invading army, distinguished itself in the battles near Vinnitsa. In August of the same year, with the permission of the Germans, a detachment of "Bulbovtsy" was formed to fight Soviet partisans and encircled Red Army soldiers. In September, it was put forward as a priority task to clear the territories occupied by the Germans from "Bolshevik agents", that is, partisans. In 1942, the nationalists launched a campaign to discredit the Soviet and Polish partisans in the eyes of the population. With the creation of the UPA in the fall of 1942, the armed struggle against partisans became systematic[16].

In 1943, the UPA was headed by Bandera. From that moment on, the name Bandera was assigned to the nationalist detachments.

On April 19, 1944, an informative meeting of the heads of counterintelligence departments of the German Army Group "South" was held, at which preliminary results were summed up and prospects for cooperation with Bandera were determined. Speaking at the meeting, the head of the Abwehrkommando 101, Lieutenant Colonel Lindhard, stated with satisfaction that the intelligence materials coming from the UPA are both extensive and quite valuable, that Ukrainian nationalists in joint military operations with the Wehrmacht have shown themselves to be a reliable ally. The UPA detachments, he concluded, "provided us invaluable services in some political situations." Colonel Zelinger, head of the Abwehr team 202, highly appreciated the cooperation with Bandera. Without Bandera, he stressed, the successful activities of his team would be simply impossible. Only the head of the Abwehrkommando 305 criticized the well-established allies. He pointed out that massive

the murders of Polish specialists by Bandera "damage the economic interests of Germany." [17]

Let's imagine what scale the killings of the Poles had to take, so that the leaders of the Abwehrkommandos - punitive detachments, who were by no means meek lambs, became worried! From 1943 to 1944, 80,000 Poles, including women and children, were slaughtered in Volhynia alone. Bandera's order of February 19, 1944 ordered "to eliminate the Polish traces so that there are no signs that someone could ever live there." They killed Bandera and Ukrainians, for whose independence, as they often say now, they fought. It is known that only during the period from 1944 to 1945 they killed 30 thousand people. Among them are people of various professions and beliefs, adults and children, men and women [18]. And this is at the end of the war!

The fight against Bandera did not end even after the Victory. Already after the war, I was returning from Germany, being the deputy head of the Department of Restoration Work N\_20 of the Ministry of Railways. Having crossed the border of Poland, in the evening I was going to go further, but the border guards stopped me.

- Dangerous!

I spent the night at the commandant's office, but could not sleep, as the border outpost was raised several times a night in alarm: there were either arson or shelling from the OUN. Later, I still had to face Bandera, but more on that later.

New business trip.

The engineering support of the actions of the partisans, led by the Polish headquarters, depended on the supply of weapons. It's all about the planes. And they were few. This was a problem throughout the war.

While punching the planes, I accidentally met with the head of the Soviet military mission in Yugoslavia, Lieutenant General Nikolai Vasilyevich Korneev, who at the beginning of the war was the chief of staff of the Twentieth Army, in the zone in which we set up barriers. General Korneev offered me to go to his mission. I reported to Zavadsky. He tried to dissuade me, but then agreed.

The war was drawing to a close, and I really wanted to visit the Balkans, where the conditions of the struggle were more difficult, and the mountainous terrain was somewhat reminiscent of Spain.

- Probably, we will not see each other before the victory, I expressed my assumption to my friends. I did not know then that I would never see Efimov, but I would meet Sasha Kuznetsov in Romania (he recently died in Izmail).

#### **Chapter 4. In Romania.**

##### **Chief of staff.**

In August 1944, I was appointed Acting Chief of Staff of the Soviet Military Mission under the Supreme Commander of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOLA). Head of the Soviet military mission N.V. Korneev was in Moscow at that moment.

It was decided that Marshal Josip Broz Tito [19] with part of his headquarters would be temporarily stationed in the Romanian city of Craiova liberated by the Soviet army. The Military Mission of the Soviet Union was supposed to be located here.

The first echelon of the Soviet military mission took off on 8 September. Together with us, the chief of staff of the rear of the Red Army, Lieutenant-General M.P. Milovsky. The collections were short. We took off at 9.00, and at 18.00 we landed in Bucharest. Before the overthrow of Antonescu [20], German planes were based at the airfield. Leaving the capital of the former ally, the Germans "thanked" him - they bombed the airfield.

After refueling the plane, we continued our journey and at 19.50 we were in Craiova, the center of the rich agricultural province of Romania.

It seemed that the war passed by Romania. No cards, lots of men military age on the streets.

Our first task was to find premises for the headquarters of Marshal Tito, for all the services of the Soviet military mission and prepare for their arrival. All issues could not be resolved in Craiova, and the next day Milovsky and I flew to Constanta to the head of the rear of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Shebunin. They took off at dusk. Despite the fact that the lights on the radio masts were not lit, we landed safely.

Shebunin and Shebunin agreed to allocate the necessary material resources for the mission, including cars, fuel, food and left for Bucharest.

General Milovsky.

During the two days that I spent with Mikhail Pavlovich Milovsky, I had a completely new idea about the home front workers. I used to always I saw in them only quartermasters.

Slightly below average height, stocky, always clean-shaven and neatly dressed, General Milovsky, nowhere wasted even a minute in vain. Lively interested in everything. He was especially attracted by the state of agriculture in Romania. We visited villages and estates with him. The landowners - almost all the military - generals, colonels, majors and even captains. Many lands belonged to King Mihai[21].

When our troops passed by the estates or when they entered them to procure food and fodder, the guards scattered. If we were allowed, then as a rule in the case when the forces were equal. But when our car arrived at the estates guarded by the company, the Romanians did not let the soldiers in without a representative of the Romanian authorities. Characteristically, the guards of the estates of King Mihai were very poorly dressed. Worn uniforms, sandals with torn soles or even wooden ones. In the premises of the soldiers

there are bunks without bed linen. In the residences of Mihai - portraits of the king and his mother, and again - bunks and benches. Hominy and tasteless soup served as food.

- The landlord king is rich, and his soldiers are undressed! the driver joked. The poverty of farm laborers and peasants was striking. From early morning, the entire able-bodied population worked in the fields. In the villages remained old, but small. School-age children also worked in the fields.

The richest country of Romania: a wonderful climate, fertile land, oil. In big cities - luxurious mansions-palaces, which France could envy, and along with this, amazing poverty. Marble and mirrors, paintings and carpets in the houses of the rich, earthen floors and fleas in the houses of the peasants. The children of the nobility received a higher education, knew two or three languages, and held command posts in the army and administration. The children of the poor, especially girls, remained illiterate.

At first, the peasants, as soon as they saw our cars, timidly hid. A few days later, when Soviet cars appeared in the villages, children poured out into the street like peas and asked for a ride. The peasants complained about the landlords and gendarmes. This is how our friendship was born.

Bucharest.

It was beautiful hot weather. Harvest is collected. Only later cultures were seen in the fields.

We were in Bucharest. We stopped at the Roshiori de Veda airfield. It was one of the largest airfields in Romania, which we planned as a base for aviation providing assistance to the people's liberation forces in Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia.

Here, General Milovsky discovered large warehouses of wheat and flour, as well as a sugar warehouse. With his help, I received from the head of the automobile troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, General Yermilov, the vehicles we needed and at the same time an outfit for gasoline.

- We'll have to call in Ploiesti, get gasoline, - I said to the sergeant - the head teams of drivers assigned to the Mission.

- What are you, Comrade Colonel! Why go to Ploiesti when we have it at our base in Bucharest!

- I have a receipt order in Ploiesti, not in Bucharest, - I answered. - Outfit for two tons and a half. They won't let you go without clothes!

The sergeant smiled slyly and said:

- Let's take three tons for the fortress. Gasoline will always come in handy.

We went to the "base" in a large estate where our drivers lived. Its manager at one time lived in Bessarabia for a long time and knew Russian well. During the flight of German troops from near Bucharest, in one night he cleared a Romanian warehouse with fuel and lubricants, the guards of which fled. According to him, he "saved important military property from destruction by the enemy."

When we arrived, it turned out that the barrels of gasoline were gone. Boss team of drivers found the manager and asked where the barrels had gone.

- I hid it in the basement so that the drivers of other cars would not take it away.

When gasoline was received, one of the drivers asked him:

- Where did the pigs, turkeys and chickens disappear from the yard?

"Yours came and took everything away," the manager answered, and somehow his face changed.

- And what did ours come with, - the driver did not let up - the former driver of the state farm "Giant" Sergeant Vasily Grigoriev.

- On two large trucks. - It can be

seen directly to the pigsty, - Grigoriev helped him. - Yes Yes!

Directly to the pigsty, and they took everything, - the manager confirmed. - Well, that's it.

There is a proverb: "Lie, but know the measure." Without us, not a single car passed into the yard, and the pigs were stolen. You can see it in the tracks.

The manager didn't have an answer. In the absence of drivers, he he gave the livestock for safekeeping to farm laborers and peasants.

Truce.

On September 12, 1944, an armistice agreement was signed in Moscow with Romania, which regulated the presence and activities of our troops on its territory. This agreement provided for the participation of the Romanian armed forces in the joint struggle against Nazi Germany. Newspaper sellers shouted the news, offered newspapers for the next day. Therefore, I often confused the numbers and days of the week.

The Romanian government was obliged to conscientiously comply with the terms of the armistice. However, most of the Romanian officers and generals behaved disloyally towards the Soviet Army. Many of them, having come out against Nazi Germany, hoped that at the same time they would be able to suppress the movement of the broad masses of the people in Rumania, while preserving the old bourgeois-landlord order.

King Mihai and his "mother" essentially "adhered" to the uprising of patriotic forces, which swept away the dictatorship of Antonescu. Under pressure from the popular masses, the king went to break with Germany, but the reaction did not lose hope for the help of the Western allies.

The Romanian army, with the support of the population, workers' squads, began hostilities against the Nazi troops in their country and inflicted significant losses on them, while thousands of enemy soldiers and officers were taken into captivity.

In the general staff, most of the officers knew Russian, and therefore I could talk to them without interpreters. There are many words in Romanian that are the same as Spanish, and I understood something from their conversations.

Aerodrome.

And here we are, with a representative of the headquarters of the rear of the front, negotiating with a Romanian general on the question of our use of the Romanian airfields in Craiova and Roshiori de Veda. The general is still young, although his hair has already thinned. He asks for what purpose we need the premises.

- The goal is the same - victory over fascist Germany. -

Unfortunately, everything is busy now. We will think about what can be released, and tomorrow we'll give you an answer.

- Mister General! We have already inspected the premises and hope that you will agree to vacate these warehouses and one hangar. - And I show the objects on the airfield map.

- They're half empty.

The general's face changes. Still would! We inspected all the structures without his consent.

- Fine! I agree with the Chief of the General Staff," he answered unfriendly.

- Mister General! No time to wait. We start work tomorrow. The general's forehead was perspiring.

- Fine. Today I will issue an order to allocate you premises at the airfields. - And he smiles wickedly.

A portrait of King Mihai hangs alone above his head, and next to him is a stain from the portrait of Antonescu that was taken down.

Before leaving, I asked the general a question:

- Tell me, Mr. General, how did it happen that German aircraft bombed the capital of her former ally from the airfield provided to her in Bucharest.

He thought for a moment and then

said: - The situation was difficult for Romania, but our king, as soon as the conditions were created, boldly turned his weapon against the Nazi troops. Everything was prepared in secret. The coup was impossible before the encirclement of German troops in Bessarabia, otherwise the Germans would have occupied Romania. Even in the face of the Soviet offensive on August 24, German troops under the command of General Gerstenberg launched military operations against the garrison of the capital and tried to arrest the king. But the Romanian units detained enemy reinforcements in the Ploiesti region and saved Bucharest.

In fact, as I already knew, the German command refused to capture Bucharest due to the rapid advance of the advancing troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which reached Ploiesti on August 20, and entered the Romanian capital on August 31. When I told the general about this, he reluctantly admitted that the Soviet troops helped the Romanians. Then the conversation turned to the eternal friendship of our peoples and the meanness of the militarists.

- The wise policy of King Mihai, - continued the general, saved Rumania from robbery. The king did not allow the Nazis to destroy the Jews. If Romania had resisted Hitler at the beginning of the war, it would have been occupied and all its material resources would have been used by Germany.

- Of course, - he continued, - Antonescu brought a lot of harm and suffering to the Romanian people, but he could only reduce the share of Romania's participation in the war, no more, - the general finished his explanation.

- It's all in the past. Now we must work together to put an end to the common enemy, - said General Milovsky.

While we were talking, the general's adjutant brought all the necessary papers. We said goodbye.

On the way to Craiova we again passed numerous estates. The main parts of the Soviet troops were already far to the north and west. Only a small garrison was based in Romania to provide communications.

The pro-fascist administration still remained in place, and numerous Romanian units remained. They were led by the same landlords in the spirit of hatred for the Soviet Union.

In connection with the work of our aviation in the interests of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, I often visited the airfields and saw that the "royal" orders reigned there, which were before the arrival of the Red Army. Once before our very eyes a Romanian officer hit a guilty soldier in the face. We couldn't resist and walked over. The lieutenant, as if nothing had happened, saluted us.

"How dare you hit a soldier, and even in our presence," I turned to him.

He smiled cheekily and replied:

The soldier didn't follow orders.

We succeeded in removing the officer from the airfield.

Our intercession evoked a twofold reaction: although the commander of the unit, although he transferred the officer somewhere, and allegedly imposed a penalty on him at the direction of the head of the Romanian garrison, he began to look at us even more askance. The soldiers were full of friendliness.

I managed to witness the following scene. One day, in the center of Craiova, we stood waiting for a signal from a traffic controller who blocked the traffic. Suddenly there was an automatic burst. The Romanian officer fell. It turned out that our Red Army soldier was passing by him, who did not salute him, the colonel hit the Red Army soldier. The traffic controller saw this and, having fired a line at the Romanian colonel, she continued to work calmly.

Vassiliou's house.

In order to get the necessary premises, I had to turn to the Romanian authorities: the commandant and the Police Department. When, accompanied by one officer, I appeared or left these institutions, little attention was paid to me. I had to take two partisan submachine gunners, dressed in the uniform of the Red Army, with stars on their caps, to accompany me. The Romanian authorities have become more pliable.

We looked after the mansion of the former Minister of the Interior of Romania, the war criminal Vassiliou. His wife and servants lived in the mansion. The guards consisted of policemen and, despite the presentation of a warrant from the civil authorities, did not let us in. I decided to go with one of the officers of the Mission to the Police Department.

While working in one of the departments of the headquarters of the Ukrainian military district, I had some idea of the Romanian police: cruel, treacherous, consisting of physically strong and rude men. But they were no longer the masters in the city.

We entered the police chief's office. Carpets, cleanliness and silence... Was afternoon, the rays of the sun penetrated through the open windows.

Tall, moderately obese, in a civilian suit, the chief of police smiled obsequiously when we introduced ourselves as officers of the Red Army air defense unit (this is how we disguised our Mission in Romania).

I stated the essence of the matter, and the obsequious smile on the face of the chief was replaced by a grimace.

- Without instructions from Bucharest, I have no opportunity to let you into Vassiliou's house. He has been arrested, there has not yet been a trial, and I am instructed to protect his wife.

- But we need this house to ensure the air defense of the city, -  
I said.



- I am ready to provide you with another and even more, - said the chief of police.

- But the position of Vasiliou's house is the most convenient for us. - I can't do anything without instructions from Bucharest, cut off the chief of police.

- And you contact your boss, and get the sanction you need, - I advised.

- I beg you to take another house and leave Madame Vasiliou alone. I can't call Bucharest because I've already been instructed to guard Mrs. Vasiliou...

Opposite me, on the sidelines, stood a tall man in a police uniform, who entered with us. I decided not to continue the argument. In this house, the chief of police still felt like a master. How the police department was guarded, we have already noticed. But the fact that the chief of police was in civilian clothes indicated that outside of the department, he does not feel at ease in uniform.

- Fine. We ourselves will request Bucharest, and now we are ready to inspect the house you offer, - I agreed.

- I will send our representative with you. He pressed one of the many buttons on his desk. Another tall policeman flew into the office. The chief of police angrily gave him an order and turned to me:

- I ordered to show you two houses.

The chief's representative, another cop and off we went look at houses. They were good, but worse than Vasiliou's mansion.

Looking around the second house, I told a fighter from the Tishchenko team to go to Mission, took three or four more submachine gunners and arrived at Vasiliou's house.

On the way back, we stopped at Vasiliou's house, where there were already four submachine gunners from Tishchenko's group.

"Order to open the gate," I sent through an interpreter to the representative of the chief of police.

"I have no right," he replied.

- Then we open in your presence ourselves. And if the guards resist, we will remove it and you will be responsible.

Looking at the well-armed and determined submachine gunners, the representative The police ordered to open the gate and we entered the yard.

Together with the police and the future widow of a war criminal, they began to inspect the house.

In the living room hung a large family portrait of the royal family and the former owner of the mansion, General Vassiliou. The king looked much younger and more virile in the portrait than when I saw him up close. His main quality was arrogance. His mother's face bore the stamp of Jesuit cunning.

In the semi-basement, adapted for a garage, we found a luxurious Buick given to the Minister by King Mihai. The car was taken. I must say that a lot of excellent cars were hidden in the city. In pursuit of the vehicles we needed, the partisans also took the car of the commander of the Romanian army corps stationed in Craiova.

The driver was released, but he found out that the car got into our garage. The corps commander called me about this, I promised to return the Mercedes to him, but asked him to help me find another car. What he did.

Characteristically, the partisans and I traveled freely to the location of the headquarters of the Romanian army corps, located on the territory of the military camp. But the corps commander did not go anywhere from the military camp without a strong guard.

How many times we invited him to our Mission, but he always found a reason for failure.

Pilots.

At the Ambassador Hotel, I learned that more than 100 captured American pilots had been liberated by our troops. I met with some of them. They looked good, were well-fed, which cannot be said about ours. And I would like to dwell on this in particular.

I remember a case when Soviet pilots were shot down over Romania during a raid on military installations. The pilots managed to land successfully and even assemble in full strength, but they were not familiar with the actions behind enemy lines, they did not know how to get food, hide, and, moreover, conduct guerrilla warfare. When they went out for food to the village, they were seized. In most cases, the crews of our planes shot down by the enemy were caught by local police and fascist detachments of the Iron Guards.

American pilots, having Romanian and other money in their hands, as well as maps that showed the locations of partisan detachments in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece, successfully left for the partisans. Therefore, compared to ours, so few American pilots were captured, although many more American aircraft were shot down.

By the way, we must not forget that in Bucharest during the war there were large Ford workshops for repairing cars. They repaired German military equipment even when the United States was at war with Germany.

## **Chapter 5. In Yugoslavia.**

The first task after my appointment was the preparation of work in Craiova. I was already familiar with the history of the partisan movement in Yugoslavia. From the first days of the occupation, the people here were preparing for the fight. The popular masses warmly responded to the call of the Communist Party, which became the organizer of the people's liberation struggle headed by Josip Broz Tito. Tito had solid partisan training, understood that the fight against the invaders could be effective only with the support of the people, and also if the resistance was well organized and started.

suddenly.

The German attack on the USSR hastened the preparation of an armed uprising. Already on June 27, 1941, the Main Headquarters of the People's Liberation Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia was formed, headed by Tito.

On July 4, the Central Committee of the CPY decided on an armed uprising. On July 7, organized and trained partisan detachments suddenly attacked the invaders in Serbia and liberated a significant territory from the invaders. On July 13, an uprising broke out in Montenegro simultaneously throughout the territory. The Italian invaders lost about four thousand people, and almost the entire region was liberated.

More difficult, but also with the participation of Russians, events developed in Slovenia and Croatia. It must be taken into account that at that time the Germans were trying to carry out their blitzkrieg in the USSR, and the troops of the Red Army, suffering heavy losses, retreated with battles, not recovering from a surprise attack. By the fall of 1941, the Nazis had concentrated an 80,000-strong army in Yugoslavia, but they could not liquidate the partisan detachments. The struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia was hard. Only the courage and bravery of the partisans, the broad support of their people and the competent military leadership of the partisan forces frustrated all attempts by the enemy to suppress resistance. I'll tell you more

a little bit later.

NOAU.

During the course of the war, the partisan forces became the mighty People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOLA).

Defending the liberated territory, NOAU, together with partisan detachments, conducted combat operations in enemy-controlled territory, inflicting damage on the enemy, mainly with mines for various purposes.

Partisan detachments and the NOAU were created in very difficult conditions. The occupiers were assisted by armed Serbian Chetniks and Croatian Ustashe. The royal government that fled the country also hampered the strengthening of the NOAU. Nevertheless, the USA and England, and especially the USSR, helped the NOA with weapons and mines and explosives.

During the period in question, the NOAU numbered about 400 thousand people and consisted of 15 army corps (50 infantry divisions) and 2 operational groups, 16 separate infantry brigades and 130 partisan detachments. At the same time, the number of divisions ranged from 2 to 12 thousand people. NOAU did not have enough weapons, especially artillery.

## **Chapter 6. Conversations with Tito.**

In mid-September 1944, Marshal Josip Broz Tito arrived in the city of Craiova.

I've heard a lot about him. They talked about his courage and authority. Tito is one of the few major party workers who directly acted behind enemy lines.

Tito was wearing a marshal's uniform. He looked rather young and energetic, but it seemed to me that he was dissatisfied with something.

He got out of the car, not paying any attention to those who were nearby people, and went to his place.

Later, I was introduced to him by the leader of our Military Mission. Strongly shaking my hand, Tito spoke in Russian.

- Finally, I see you with my own eyes, Rudolfo! (I was known under this pseudonym in Spain). - I hope that our joint work will be useful. By the way, you can contact your friend Ivan Harish.

He invited me to his apartment. We went up to the second floor where he lived with his wife and kids. Previously, the palace in which Tito was located belonged to a high-ranking Romanian official who fled with the Germans.

This mansion was guarded by employees of the so-called "tens" - the one that guarded Stalin and his associates. Later, when Tito found out about this, he was clearly puzzled.

I saw how Tito was weary of the Chekist unit assigned to him under the command of Stalin's deputy head of security. Tito's comrades-in-arms, whom I knew from the war in Spain, complained to me that ours, even on the territory of Yugoslavia, continued to protect Tito in such a way that it was possible to get to him only after passing through the Soviet guards. Tito experienced such isolation hard and at a meeting in Zagreb, in August 1967, recalling this, he said that only by getting rid of our guards could he save Yugoslavia from the forced collectivization that Stalin imposed on him.

In the future, we met in the office without an interpreter. Tito spoke Russian well, as he lived and studied in Russia.

xxx

In private, Tito became simple. He did not let me feel the difference in ranks. He was keenly interested in the peculiarities of the partisan struggle in those mountainous regions in which I happened to operate.

Once in one of our conversations, Tito spoke negatively about the activities leadership of the Romanian and Hungarian Communist Parties. His sharpness amazed me.

- You can not lead the fight, sitting in Moscow. You won't get victory on a silver platter. It was necessary to organize bases in the mountains and direct all activities from there. There are such mountains in Bulgaria, and in Romania, and in Czechoslovakia.

After waiting a little, I dared to remark:

- But, Comrade Marshal, your people are fighting against the invaders, while Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia were betrayed by their governments and the Germans were there not as occupiers, but as so-called allies.

- Don't say that, Colonel! German troops entered Romania as occupiers on October 12, 1940, just 38 days after Antonescu came to power and the fascist dictatorship was established. And on March 1, 1941, German troops entered Bulgaria. Only after Germany occupied Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and forced the capitulation of the allies in the West, only then did she attack Yugoslavia and Greece simultaneously on April 6, and two months after the defeat of these small countries left to their own devices, she attacked the Soviet Union ... - He paused and continued, - Half a month after the attack on the Soviet Union, in early July, we in Yugoslavia had already raised the people in an armed uprising in order to pull back part of the Nazi hordes for ourselves.

We understood that the outcome of the war depended on the results of the battles on the Soviet-German front, and therefore we hurried to help you with our actions behind enemy lines. What were others doing during this time? They shouted about devotion to the cause of the fight against fascism, called for the fight and ... sat abroad, and the people were left to themselves, secondary leaders who acted, looking back at those who were sitting in comfortable hotels!

So it turned out that the Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians and Slovaks did not take part in the struggle against the fascist hordes, but in the war against the peoples of Yugoslavia who had risen to the armed struggle. There were also traitors in our country - Chetniks, Ustashe and others, but we isolated them.

What struck me about Tito was his knowledge of the situation behind enemy lines. I had to be present when he was informed about military operations. He asked questions or gave directions as if he had just been there himself. He also knew the staff very well.

When at one of the meetings I told Tito about the Tishchenko group (we will talk about it later), he remarked:

- I look at your partisans and rejoice. Wonderful warriors. He got up from the table. - And now, as an employee of the headquarters of the partisan movement, tell me, would it not be better to have the headquarters of the partisan movement not in Moscow, not in the rear of the Red Army, but in the rear of the enemy? After all, your partisans occupied such vast areas, completely liberated from the enemy, that entire states, like Albania or Belgium, could be accommodated there. That's where the headquarters of the partisan movement would be.

- We had regional headquarters there, operational groups of republican headquarters, and finally, underground regional party committees.

- Why underground? Tito was surprised. - You have one communist party in power, and behind enemy lines there are such vast areas occupied by partisans that there is no need for them to risk going underground. Yes, it is more difficult to lead from the underground. You can't take a radio station with you underground.

- Underground we call regional committees behind enemy lines, but in fact they are located in the territories liberated by partisans, where Soviet power has been restored. Members of the regional committees do not hide their party affiliation to the partisans and the population. Almost all of them are commanders and commissars of formations or detachments.

- I thought that your regional committees, like in Bulgaria, were hiding in the cities. We had our own partisan underground in the cities, but the leadership was taken out of the cities to the mountains and placed at the head of partisan detachments, and then parts of the People's Liberation Army, Tito explained.

Edward Kardelj entered the marshal.

- I hope I didn't disturb you.

- No! Colonel Starinov and I are talking about partisan warfare, reminiscing about internationalist partisans. After all, the Yugoslavs also fought a partisan struggle in Spain, they are participating in a partisan war in France, and the Soviet partisans, together with our eagles, fought in Poland, Romania, and are now operating in Czechoslovakia and in the occupied territory of Yugoslavia.

The Soviet partisans performed especially well in Slovakia. There they played the role of a detonator. There were explosives: the people and the army were against the treacherous pro-fascist government, and when Soviet partisans began to arrive in Slovakia, explosions began, the people rebelled, and the army also rebelled.

- Wonderful uprising! exclaimed Kardelj.

"Comrade Starinov told me," Tito continued, "how they retained experienced cadres of partisans for military operations in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary.

I admire the raids of Soviet partisans, their attacks on enemy communications, and their struggle behind enemy lines abroad is not only admirable, but requires deep study and mastering of experience.

xxx

In my work, I had to meet a lot with the chief of staff of the NOAU, General Arso Iovanovich. He was an exceptionally charming and efficient man. Unlike Tito, who allegedly did not notice the Soviet military guards, Arso Iovanovich greeted them. My contact with Arso Iovanovich was very pleasant for me, and I quickly resolved all the issues that arose.

Vrsac.

Shortly after the liberation of the eastern regions of Serbia, Tito, together with the part of the Supreme Headquarters of the NOAU and our Military Mission, moved to the territory of Yugoslavia in the city of Vrsac. It was a clean little town in which many Germans lived before the war, but by the time we arrived there were none left.

In Vršac I first saw the regiments of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, disciplined, combat-ready, although poorly dressed. And the commandant of the city generally walked in torn shoes.

The divisions of the NOAU - yesterday's partisans - had the most diverse weapons: Italian, English, Bulgarian, Romanian, German. Some had rifles, carbines, others had submachine guns, machine guns and mortars, but lacked ammunition. By the diversity of weapons, it was easy to imagine the sources of its replenishment: trophies, the remnants of the weapons of the regular army of Yugoslavia and the help of the Soviet Union and allies.

On October 20, 1944, our troops, together with units of the Yugoslav army, liberated Belgrade.

The inhabitants of the capital, the soldiers of the NOAU and the fighters of the Soviet Army rejoiced at the victory. It is impossible to forget the toasts in honor of the Soviet soldiers, heartily picked up by those present "the Russian warriors lived", "the Red Army lived".

Friendship between our peoples and the Yugoslav peoples had deep roots, and the Soviet troops were given all possible assistance.

If we needed premises, they were provided at the same time, with the maximum amenities for that time. We felt at home in Yugoslavia.

If it was necessary to mobilize the population and the command turned to the local residents, then, as a rule, they gathered much more and much earlier than the appointed time. They worked selflessly.

It is difficult to describe the truly exciting picture that arose on the streets of the cities and villages of Yugoslavia when Soviet soldiers appeared. Greet them

the entire population went out. Even in small towns and villages, people filled all the streets.

Passing units of the Soviet Army were showered with flowers by the people. As soon as the column of our troops stopped, the hospitable Yugoslav population surrounded the fighters and commanders, they shook hands, hugged and kissed their hands, girls and children presented flowers, often decorated with flowers weapons, military and transport cars.

- Friend! Friendly! - the Yugoslavs exclaimed so soulfully that it was felt great meaning of these words.

The children expressed their joy especially vigorously. During the Nazi occupation, they harmed the Nazis in every possible way, and now they vied with each other to help Soviet soldiers in caring for military and transport equipment.

At the end of October 1944, I happened to be present at a meeting that spontaneously arose in the area of the construction of a ferry across the Danube near Belgrade. Commanders and political workers of the Soviet Army and Yugoslavs spoke at the rally, who greeted our soldiers in a mixed Serbian-Russian language and swore to fight the enemy until complete victory. The rally ended with the singing of Soviet and Yugoslav songs. At the same time, the local population sang "Katyusha".

After the rally, in conversations with the local population, not for the first time, I had to hear phrases such as:

- The Soviet Union is a brother and will not let us be offended.
- There are 200 million of us with the Russians, and no one can defeat us.
- Russia is our Slavic mother!

And involuntarily remembered an old Yugoslav proverb. "God is in heaven, Russia is on earth." What else can be added here?

Many Yugoslav patriots showed portraits of Lenin that they had preserved during the Nazi occupation of the country.

Help from allies.

How well the Yugoslavs treated us, so coldly towards the Americans and the English.

It is characteristic that the American and British command often prevented us from rendering assistance to the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOAYU), putting up all sorts of obstacles so that we could not deliver weapons and ammunition through the bases located on the territory they occupied.

At first, they supplied Mihailovič and his Chetniks, who were essentially fighting the partisans. D. Mikhailovich was even appointed Minister of War by the emigrant Yugoslav representation in London. But when the British realized that the latter had no prospects, and with the help of the Chetniks they would only discredit themselves before the Yugoslavs, they began to help the Yugoslav People's Liberation Army. They dropped a large amount of explosives on it, which made it possible to carry out large-scale operations to destroy the communications of the invaders, gave a certain amount of food, even uniforms, but poorly supplied with small arms, and even more so with artillery weapons. They wanted to have not a strong NOAA, but partisan detachments capable of obtaining intelligence data and committing sabotage.

By supplying the Yugoslavs with a large amount of explosives, the Allies sought to carry out with the hands of the Yugoslavs a much larger amount of destruction than was necessary to disable communications. And indeed, many railroads and highways, destroyed by the Yugoslavs themselves and American aircraft, were out of order for such a long time that some of these sections had to be restored later by our troops, and the Yugoslavs could not restore some of the road lines for 3-5 years after end of the war.

The Anglo-American allies, in helping the NOAJ, pursued far-reaching goals - to make the national economy of the country as dependent as possible on outside help.

The negative attitude of the Yugoslavs towards the Allies was largely due to the barbaric air raids on the Yugoslav cities. These bombings inflicted damage on the population, the national economy of Yugoslavia, and almost did not harm the enemy.

One fact testifies to the coldness of the attitude. In November 1944 I went to the airfield in Zemun. The townspeople who were on it, who liquidated the destruction, stormily welcomed the Soviet people. The American representatives who arrived with us were literally ignored by the local population, although they were taller. Not a single hello to them.

A spokesman for the US Military Mission commented:

- You are blood brothers. Slavs. And we helped them and you. You and the airfield  
We arrived in an American car.

Belgrade.

After the liberation of the Yugoslav capital, Tito with his headquarters and our Military  
The mission moved to Belgrade, Here we are located in the royal palace.

The rooms were overly luxurious. Ex-queen and members of the royal  
the surviving families were self-supporting.

In the first weeks after the liberation of Belgrade, there was a shortage of food, there was not enough  
coal, electricity, transport actually did not work. The government was unable to take any effective action.

Tito had to work in a very difficult environment. The war on the liberated territory and behind enemy  
lines was combined with the work to establish a new Yugoslavia, and then there were internal undercurrents  
- the so-called allies, who at first helped the enemies of the new Yugoslavia, who fought against the people  
with weapons in their hands, and then began to help the king and his proteges seize power in the country.

Tito worked both early in the morning and late at night. That is why he may have seemed unsociable to  
many.

Ivan Harish.

The last time I saw him was at the end of October 1937, when I was leaving for my homeland.

In the spring of 1939, the Spanish Republic fell. Almost all of her army was captured, with the exception  
of the 14th partisan corps. The main part of it went to the territory of France, where it was interned. A small  
part sailed to Algeria and ended up in the USSR. Among them was the commander of the 14th partisan corps,  
already Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Ungria. He found me. But I could no longer help him, and the commander  
of the famous corps, instead of improving his knowledge, began to work as a mechanic at the Kharkov Tractor  
Plant. When I first met Domingo in 1940, I asked about Ivan's fate.

"Probably in the camps in France, where almost all the brigades of our corps went," replied the former  
commander.

During one of our meetings with Tito, I asked about the fate of the adviser and instructor of the sabotage  
brigade of the 14th partisan corps of the Spanish Republican army, my former translator Ivan Harish.

A joyful smile shone on the marshal's face:

- He became famous for his sabotage. He was even nicknamed Ilya Gromovnik for  
the number of enemy trains and bridges blown up.

- This restless strong fellow, - I noticed, - derailed more than a dozen enemy trains in Spain, and I do not know of a single case that, having gone on a mission, he did not complete it. I would like to meet him.

- It's very simple. We have an airfield. Fly there. In the meantime, exchange radiograms with him.

Ivan Harish commanded a special sabotage formation and essentially performed the duties of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief for sabotage. I contacted him by radio.

In general, a strange thing happened: I left with General Korneev in order to work behind enemy lines, but they left me to act as chief of staff. Only once I was able to break out behind enemy lines to meet, but Harish could not arrive at the airfield.

The birth of a novel.

Back in Vrsac, I was informed that several people who called themselves Ukrainian partisans had been detained. They were disarmed when they arbitrarily occupied the mansion and transmitted encrypted radio messages. The group commander - Tishchenko asked to arrange a meeting with T.A. Strokach.

I needed to check if they were really partisans. Entering the room where they were kept, I saw well-fed, well-fed people. The thought that they suffered hardships could not come to mind, so the doubts of the military were understandable to me. However, among them were people whom I am well

knew.

It turned out that the group was thrown into Hungary. Five Russians were to link up with two Hungarians. However, the Hungarians did not show up for the gathering. The Russians did not know either the language or the locality, but they had three years of experience in partisan struggle. Seven hundred kilometers passed through the rear of the enemy in the form of Red Army soldiers.

The first day we sat in the woods. No one was looking for them, but the locals did not give them away. At night we decided to go to Yugoslavia. They knew about the advance of the Red Army.

Explosives and mines were taken away. They went out to the road, set up an ambush. A truck was driving in the opposite direction. He was stopped. They stripped the drivers, took away their documents, tied them up and took them aside. Before dawn, the drivers were not ordered to identify themselves. The car was full of sausages. No one was looking for them on the road - a deep rear. We arrived at the railroad. The passage was not guarded by anyone. We drove a little, and returning to the crossing, laid two time bombs, which were supposed to explode in 3-4 days. Let's go further. The mountains began. They pulled everything they needed out of the car, including sausage. The car was thrown down a slope.

We spent the night again in the woods. Bypassed the village. They went out on the road and again began to catch the car. Lucky this time too. They seized the car. Not everything fits here. I had to get another one. Having connected the passengers and selected the documents, we moved south. The next railroad crossing was again mined.

They did not notice the chase, although they knew what they were looking for. Rescued MZD. Very smart mines. They exploded when the group had already caught a cold. A day or two, and if necessary, even a week, trains passed through them, and they all waited, and when the train flew down a slope, the group was already where no one thought to look.

There were guards on the roads. I had to walk in azimuth. Products ran out, and explosives diminished.

We went to the village to the landowner. They said that a red landing had landed. They demanded ten sheep. Leaving the village, the sheep were dismissed, leaving one.

A month later, they finally reached Craiovo, where the Red Army was operating. Here they were taken.

The questions were endless. I asked:



- Tell me, when did you have a harder time behind enemy lines: at the beginning of the war on your own territory or in 1944 in Romania?

- Of course, the beginning of the war turned out to be the most difficult, also because the enemy was experienced and strong, and we had neither experience nor knowledge. Many perished. It's a shame to remember how at the beginning of the war they were partisans in the rear: they didn't know methods and techniques, they didn't have equipment.

There were many commanders in the detachments who had left the encirclement, but even they did not know how to operate behind enemy lines.

Most importantly, there were people everywhere who wanted to help. "Oh, if we were so

prepared at the beginning of the war, as before being thrown into Hungary," said Falkov, "then on our territory we could have beaten the enemy in the first weeks, mine roads and derailed trains, and then the Germans would have had a lot of forces divert to the protection of communications. That would be stronger than the second front. But at the beginning of the war, we did not have the necessary skills and means and were chasing individual policemen, and trained punishers were chasing us.

- Of course, we understand that we did not plan to fight on our territory, - added Tishchenko, - but, unfortunately, we had to. At the beginning of the war, many specialists appeared among the partisans, but there were no commanders who would know partisan tactics, sabotage equipment, and they were exactly what they needed. For the first time they appeared only a year and a half later.

The phone rang and the conversation ended.

The next day I received a radiogram from Strokach:

"Greetings to Starinov. Tell me where you are and what you are doing, how and for what purposes you want to use Tishchenko, I repeat, Tishchenko? I am interested in southern Hungary, I repeat, Hungary. your contribution to the cause of the partisan movement of other countries that we started. I shake hands. I am waiting for an answer. Strokach. 11.00. 22.9.44".

By this time, I had exceptionally great opportunities to send a group to Hungary both by plane and through the front line, which had large gaps.

However, I could not fulfill Strokach's request. Some workers from Beria's households showed special "vigilance" towards this group.

"Comrade Colonel, who gave you permission to keep these saboteurs on our mission and feed them without a certificate," a certain Gavrikov addressed me mysteriously.

- You know that they were thrown behind enemy lines by the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement. We need to help them get there. Here is Strokach's radiogram, and I showed it to Gavrikov.

- And why didn't they immediately go "as intended" to Hungary, but ended up in our rear and just at the location of our mission?

- Mistake and failure of landing, - I answered.

- We cannot have a radio transmitter from unknown people near our headquarters people," said Gavrikov irritably.

- That is, as unknown! I personally know the whole group, and some of them even taught. Strokach also confirms this.

- It does not interest us. I received instructions to pick up the radio station," Gavrikov interrupted me.

The receiver was again taken away from the partisans, and it was impossible to throw them away without means of radio communication. I turned to higher authorities. It turned out to be more reasonable and allowed to leave the group at the headquarters of the Soviet military mission in Yugoslavia. This combat-ready group, numbering only 7 people, was in fact the only real force that the mission had.

We fought with them together. It was the main backbone of the headquarters. Tito loved them very much. He kept wondering how they walked through Hungary without knowing the language.

What happened to them, what I experienced, later formed the basis of the novel, which I wrote in the days of enforced "idleness" much later[23].

"Russian" battalion.

Despite the fact that Yugoslavia is located at a distance of many hundreds of kilometers from the borders of the Union, many of our citizens fought the enemy on its territory. Many of them, driven away by the German invaders to hard labor, as well as servicemen of the Soviet army who were captured by the enemy, fled from camps located in Austria and northern Italy, went to the territory of Yugoslavia, knowing that units of the People's Liberation Army and partisans were operating there. squads.

The population of Italy and Yugoslavia in every possible way helped Soviet citizens who had escaped from fascist captivity, and brought them to the location of partisan detachments and units of the NOAU.

There were also Russians in the units of the NOAU, who at one time left Soviet Russia as officers of the White Army.

Once I met a former officer of the Kornilov regiment. In 1919-20 we fought in different camps: I was in the Red Army, he was in the White Army. Together with Wrangel, he was evacuated from the Crimea and settled in Yugoslavia. During the Second World War, the Germans began to form units from the former White Guards. They called him too. At first, Lieutenant Pyotr Svechin agreed, but on reflection, he went to the partisans, and his wife became the owner of a safe house. After the war, he kept the Red Star of the Partisan as a relic. I was at his apartment. In a vase he kept the Russian land.

I was especially interested in the actions of the "Russian" battalion under the command of Anatoly Ignatievich Dyachenko. A.I. Dyachenko, studied at the Kharkov partisan school with Maxim Konstantinovich Kochegarov, participated in the partisan struggle in Ukraine. After the detachment was scattered in an unequal battle, Dyachenko tried to go to the rear of the Red Army, but he was captured, and he found himself in a prisoner of war camp in Italy.

He and the group managed to escape. Dyachenko's experience and knowledge were very useful. In early 1944, he commanded a Russian partisan battalion as part of the 18th shock brigade of the NOAU. This battalion grew from a company to 400 people, replenished by the same fugitives. In addition to rifles and machine guns, he was armed with light and heavy machine guns, anti-tank rifles, company and battalion mortars.

The news about the affairs of the Soviet (Russian) battalion spread not only throughout the Slovenian Primorje, but also beyond its borders. As part of the 18th brigade, he successfully carried out raids even in the northwestern regions of Italy.

The experience of the actions of the Soviet partisan battalion, which grew into a shock brigade on the territory of Yugoslavia and Italy, showed how great were the opportunities in the fight against the enemy in his rear[24].

Receptions.

A real disaster for me was the receptions hosted by the Military Missions of England, the USA, the USSR. What was the preparation for these receptions worth alone. I'm not talking about how it was necessary to be clever in order to drink less.

I drank little and only when it was no longer possible to refuse at all, resorting to various tricks to drink mineral water instead of alcohol.

In Belgrade, at one of these banquets hosted by Tito, I found myself with Churchill's son, who kept wondering that I didn't drink vodka. First toast. I drank less than half a

glass and immediately topped up with mineral water. The second toast I washed down with diluted vodka. Then he poured more mineral water into the glass.

- Colonel! Everyone drinks vodka, cognac and wine. You combine and evade your civic duty. You see, I drink my glass completely, - said Randolph Churchill.

- I drank my norm, - I answered. - What

for scores, it would be hunting, - he answered and immediately poured vodka for himself

and me. To my left sat the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Mission, Major General Melnikov, calm in the most difficult conditions, charming, sensitive and knowledgeable chief. One could learn from him tact in dealing with foreigners. I poured him a glass of mineral water, and then exchanged with him. I don't know if he noticed, but Churchill didn't. Who else was weary of receptions was the chief of the Supreme Headquarters

of the NOAU, General Arso Iovanovich.

- Today again reception and again a sleepless night! he complained somehow.

I had to work a lot with Arso Iovanovitch, since both of us were chiefs of staff. We needed to know the situation behind enemy lines better than anyone, develop plans of operations, provide assistance with material resources, and compile summaries of reports.

To Moscow.

In mid-November 1944, Lieutenant-General Nikolai Vasilievich Korneev, the head of the mission, and I were recalled to Moscow. In Yugoslavia, we made a big mistake: Korneev handed over part of the property seized by the army to Tito's headquarters. This was reported to the right place. So my stay in Yugoslavia was short. Korneev and I were left without work.

I left Belgrade for Budapest, choosing such a route in order to travel along places where partisans are most active.

A few years after the war (1948), a period came when Stalin accused Tito of treason. The repressions began. I was saved from possible grave consequences only by the fact that Tito did not have time to reward me then.

Returning to Moscow, I entered the disposal of the Intelligence Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense. The head of the Department did not even talk to me after our "miss". I was called to the Main Personnel Department. Here I was received by Marshal Philip Ivanovich Golikov[25], who was also dissatisfied with our work.

- Not following the exact directives, you show excessive haste.

It was the end of November 1944. Our troops liberated the entire Soviet Union.

- Where should I send you? You late. All positions are filled. You have nothing to do with guerrilla warfare. Here, you understand, staffs are reduced. There is a request from the main road administration for experienced miners who should be engaged in mine clearance in the rear of our troops. In short, our troops passed, and a large number of German mines remained in the rear. They keep exploding and dealing damage. So organize yourself such a team and go to the disposal of the chief of the road troops.

So, in the late winter of 1944, he was appointed to the Main Road Directorate of the Soviet Army to organize mine clearance of roads in Germany to Kondratiev Zakhar Ivanovich (Head of the Road Transport Directorate).

## **Chapter 7**

### **Mine war.**

The war in Spain showed the exceptionally high efficiency of the use of mines for various purposes behind enemy lines. As a result of carefully thought-out and appropriately secured operations, the enemy was inflicted significant damage with virtually no losses for the saboteur partisans. Being

Head of the Central Research and Testing Range of the Red Army in 1938-1939, I paid great attention to minefields on the railways and their clearance. To this end, experimental work was carried out to improve mine-explosive means and their installation, to neutralize the mines of a potential enemy. At the training ground at that time, there was a backbone of miners-objectors, such as Barkar, who created a special mechanism for the in-line undermining of rails. At the same time, the means for mining by troops and partisans were improved: anti-train mines, coal mines, etc. All this was very useful to us later.

As our territory was liberated from the enemy, the mine war intensified. The Nazis mined tracks, bridges, station devices, other railway facilities, as well as the blockages they made and even open approaches to important objects. At every step of our soldiers, especially those who restored communication routes, danger lay in wait. The enemy set ingenious mine devices against Soviet saboteurs, and then against trains. The clearing of mines from the liberated railways and the nearby strip of barriers set up by the enemy became one of the most important tasks.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, mine clearing of railway sections was carried out by the miners of the units that restored them. To do this, with the transition to wartime states, mine-blasting platoons (MPV) consisting of 28-36 people were created as part of the track and bridge battalions, and miners' squads consisting of 8 people appeared in battalions of other specializations.

However, already the first months of the war showed that full-time miners were not enough to successfully solve the tasks of mining and demining railways. Therefore, at the beginning of 1942, emergency mine-blasting platoons or squads were created in almost all railway units. They almost doubled the composition of the mine-blasting units of the railway troops.

In the Main Directorate of Military Restoration Works (GUVVR), the Directorates of Military Restoration Works (UVVR), and the Directorate of the Railway Brigade, the departments of obstacles dealt with mine clearance. They included very experienced specialists who improved mine clearance methods, compiled descriptions of the device of various samples of German mines and fuses, and developed methods for their neutralization. All this greatly helped the miners of the units to understand the secrets of enemy mine equipment. So, for example, the head of the obstacles department of the UVVR-3 military engineer of the 2nd rank V.S. Onufriev and his deputy captain P.A. Frolov, who gained sapper experience in October 1941, developed instructions for mining and demining railways, which became a guide for miners of other fronts. On its basis, the GUVVR developed the "Instruction on the technique of mining and demining railways", which was published and sent to the railway units in 1943.

The work of a miner.

The work of a miner is special. It comes with a lot of risk. Lack of skill, disregard for the rules of demining led to serious consequences. For these reasons, in just one month in the autumn of 1943, 50 sappers were lost in clearing only railway sections.

Let us illustrate this with the work of minelayers who gained sapper experience in our school of the Operational Training Center (OTC) in 1941. Captain Yu.V. Aksenov, as part of a mine-blasting platoon of the 60th railway battalion, cleared steel lines from August 1942 until Victory Day. "The Nazis," he recalled, "retreating, they burned everything, and what did not burn, they blew up and mined. There was enough work for sappers ..."[26].

Even on extremely destroyed hauls, bridges, and stations, the enemy laid mines in order to make the restoration work as difficult as possible. The subgrade was mined, even the right of way. The enemy heavily mined the railways in the area of the forward edge of his defense. A large number of various mines with "surprises" were installed on the approaches to bridges, near various structures, on the roads leading to them.

On the stretch of the railway Liozno - Vitebsk, Yu. Aksenov and his comrades-in-arms had to carry out mine reconnaissance and clear the approaches to the pipe under the railway bed. The task was complicated by the fact that the site was in full view of the enemy. As soon as the sappers appeared on the embankment, mortar shelling began. Therefore, the sappers worked in a plastunsky way. First, they made a passage, neutralized anti-personnel

mines and reconnoitered the pipe. No significant damage was found. We tried to listen to the sounds of the clock mechanism of a delayed action bomb. Complete silence. And yet, the miner's flair and all previous experience suggested: the mine should be nearby, the Nazis could not leave the structure intact, without a "surprise".

From above, it is impossible to dig above the pipe, the Germans are on the alert. We decided to open it from the side, from the north side, where it was more difficult for the enemy to notice the sappers. For three days, the five of them hollowed out the frozen, strong as steel, earth. Finally, a well appeared, sheathed with boards, in which the sappers found two anti-tank mines and three boxes of tol. Aksyonov carefully defused the head fuse, then the side fuse, but the third one, the bottom one, had to be carefully considered. He ended up with a trap designed for sappers. However, our soldiers coped with it. The railroad track in this place was saved.

In the winter of 1942-1943, fascist German troops began to use delayed-action mines (MDM) for mining railways, which were installed mainly at artificial structures, behind bridge abutments and on the approaches to bridges, in embankments near culverts, in the necks of stations and in various station structures, as well as in the subgrade on hauls and stations.

In early March 1943, our units drove the enemy out of Vyazma. The technical intelligence team, commanded by officer A. Butenko, on the orders of the commander of the 1st railway brigade, Colonel A.S. Dugin, arrived at this large railway junction to determine the extent of its destruction.

During the examination, it was found that at the Vyazma station and in its vicinity all the buildings were destroyed by the Germans. "This picture amazed us," recalled retired colonel A. Butenko. "There was silence all around, only broken glass crunches underfoot, and the wind whistles in the ruins. Sooty chimneys stand lonely. ".

In the middle of the night in the area of the former station there was a dull roar. In the morning, military railway workers found a fresh funnel with a diameter of about 4 meters on one of the tracks. "The question arose: where did it come from," writes A. Butenko, "there were no planes in the Vyazma region at night. The front went west. They concluded that a delayed-action mine had exploded. the main tool for detecting mines cannot be used. The spring frosts have forged the ballast to the strength of concrete. The mine detector is also useless: there is too much metal on and around the tracks."

By noon the sun came out and it got warmer. The snow and ice melted right before our eyes. And then experienced sappers noticed that in some places the surface of the ballast sank and, with all the precautions, set to work, began to dig hollows to detect mine devices. Suddenly there was an explosion. Above one of the pits a black column of earth arose, fragments of rails and sleepers flew into the air. Two sappers were killed.

At the site of the explosion, the fighters found a figured piece of brown plastic. It was part of the hull of a mine never seen before. We started working again. They worked with triple attention: loosening the soil with knives, raking frozen clods of earth with their hands. A few hours later, miners removed a mine with a clockwork in a plastic case and about 20 kilograms of explosives. A neutralized enemy mine of a completely new design with a report on what had happened was immediately sent to the brigade headquarters. As it turned out later, the Nazis set up quite a few such ingenious traps. A way to deal with them was found in a timely manner. Note that the Germans, thank God, did not have such

moderators, like M. Feinberg's moderators, created at the beginning of the war and widely used by us, starting with the Kharkov barrage operation.

Most of the detected time-delay mines had a 231-day-hour mechanical fuse. Chemical fuses were used less frequently, however, in order to make it difficult to clear mines, German sappers used hand grenades, tension fuses, grating igniters and other devices. The magnitude of the MZD charges ranged from 50 to 2500 kg. As charges, not only various explosives were often used, but also aerial bombs, artillery shells, anti-tank mines and other ammunition.

Bridge over Torop.

Senior Lieutenant N. Potaturkin had a chance to meet with a mine in which a chemical fuse was installed in the winter of 1943. And it happened  
So.

The blow of our troops was unexpected and swift. In a hurry, leaving weapons and equipment, the Nazis retreated. They did not blow up the bridge over the river Torop. But the sappers, walking in the head of technical intelligence, understood that the enemy could mine it. This confidence was strengthened when they learned from local residents that just before the retreat, the Nazis were carrying out some work on the bridge.

The commander of the scouts, Senior Lieutenant N. Potaturkin, decided to find out the situation on the bridge. And so, together with four fighters, he carefully examined every meter of the bridge, every depression: needless to say, the Germans knew how to carry out hidden mining. Therefore, we had to work with extreme caution. The main thing is to check the supports. The officer was tied with a rope and lowered down, right onto the ice. There were no charges under the first pillar. He examined the second, third ... And finally, he found what he was looking for. Half a ton of tola was stacked in boxes under the central support. No fuses were found anywhere. This made me happy. Potaturkin carefully lifted the first box. There doesn't seem to be any wires. So it's just explosives. Carefully, as the most expensive thing, moved it. The main thing is not to rush. And suddenly he noticed a gray smoke crawling out of the cracks, so harmless and peaceful in appearance. "It was as if I was overwhelmed with heat," recalled retired colonel N. Potaturkin, "a chemical fuse! How did I not guess right away, now it's too late. A few more seconds and ... No, it's too early to give up. We must act. fuse. A melting metal plate is running out. Another second - and the circuit will close. But there was no explosion: I managed to disconnect the fuse."  
"

Then, in the winter of 1943, for the successful clearance of the bridge over the river Torop Senior Lieutenant N. Potaturkin was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

MZD German sappers installed, as a rule, in vertical wells, and the quality of the installation depended on specific conditions. With advance preparation, they were installed in wells up to 4.5 meters deep with a small cross section and carefully masked.

For better camouflage, MZDs were often installed at the destroyed abutments of bridges, in bomb craters, and in the wreckage of destroyed structures. Particularly good camouflage was achieved when mines were laid until the site was destroyed, and in some cases, using a two-tier arrangement of mines.

As instantaneous anti-train mines, the enemy used anti-tank mines installed directly under the rails. In many cases, such mines, to increase their destructive effect, were connected by a detonating cord with a powerful explosive charge located, for example, behind the back wall of bridge abutments. Such clumsy laying of mines by the Germans was a wonderful gift to our miners: it was simply impossible not to find such mines.

In order to defeat saboteurs penetrating enemy railways, "surprise" anti-personnel mines were used in many areas.

Until 1943, in most cases, each MPV cleared the site of its battalion, and after that it was used for other work. This led to the maximum use of the miners' forces, since at that time the neighboring battalion

could not fully deploy the recovery work due to the fact that his rep met with a very large amount of demining work. Yes, and the preparation of the MPV for the upcoming demining was carried out poorly due to the fact that during the preparatory period the platoon was distracted by other work.

Therefore, it was necessary to reorganize the organization of mine clearance work on railway sections. At the beginning of 1943, the management of mine clearance work was concentrated at the brigade headquarters. For the period of the offensive of our troops, all full-time MPVs or most of them were reduced to non-standard demining detachments and transferred to the operational subordination of the brigade barrier service department, which directly supervised the demining of the entire brigade section. The head of such a detachment was usually one of the officers of the barrier service. The department of the barrier service planned mine clearance in advance, distributed areas between the MPVs, and, if necessary, carried out maneuvers with available forces, which ensured the search for minefields and individual mines, their neutralization or destruction, and the cleaning of various explosive objects.

The preliminary training of the miners contributed greatly to the improvement of demining work. On the eve of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, a meeting of officers-miners took place in Moscow, similar meetings were held in brigades and departments of military restoration work of the fronts.

Mine fields.

The knowledge gained was very useful when, at the end of the summer of 1943, the railway battalions met with massive minefields. So it was in the area of the rivers Northern Donets, Mius and Sambek. The mines were laid by German sappers in early spring and by the summer they were overgrown with thick grass, which made it difficult to find them.

Particularly tight deadlines were set for the elimination of minefields near the bridge over the Sambek River. Its restoration delayed the movement of trains throughout the section. Therefore, four battalions of MPVs were allocated at once for its clearance.

The sappers searched for mines, moved crawling or on their knees, cutting tall grass with knives and scissors, and then felt, checking every square decimeter of the area. An attempt to burn the vegetation failed - the juicy young grass did not ignite. The methods of mass decontamination of the minefield - harrowing, rolling with rollers - also turned out to be ineffective. The same lush vegetation prevented the use of mine detectors. The organization of work was simple: each platoon received its own area for demining, and in the platoon, each pair of miners was cut into strips 2-3 meters wide. Thus, over 4 thousand mines were removed from the bridge within 6 days.

Miners of the 23rd railway brigade also found themselves in similar conditions, which from September 4 to 15, 1943 cleared the Voroshilovograd-Rodakovo section. The railway track in this area crossed four combined minefields of our troops and three minefields of the enemy.

Just like on Sambek, the mines were overgrown with grass, the wire and fuses were rusted and became invisible. Mine clearance was also complicated by the variety of mines used.

Therefore, before the start of work, a commander's reconnaissance was carried out. In the course of it, the officer set the size of the minefield, its direction, the mining scheme, and the type of mines. Based on this data, the miners were assigned tasks and objects for mine clearance were assigned.

The first to advance were two or three miners, who neutralized the mine tension line. The most experienced sappers came second, who searched for mines with antennae. They carefully sorted through the grass with their hands and, having examined a meter strip, expanded it to 20-30 meters. In densely overgrown places, the grass completely fell out. The found mine was put on the fuse and was indicated by a pole. After making sure that in a certain area all the mines were fixed, they proceeded to pull them off

cat. The sappers worked hard and in 10 days neutralized 10,300 different mines. And they did not suffer losses.

On average, the rate of demining reached 6 kilometers per platoon per day. In areas where there were no minefields, the platoon moved at a speed of 15-10 kilometers. The minefields of the defensive lines significantly delayed the miners. In such cases, 2 kilometers of the path were cleared of mines within 5-10 days.

#### Mine reconnaissance.

Work on continuous demining was preceded by mine reconnaissance. It has always been carried out during the liberation of long railway sections in order to establish the general volume and nature of mining, as well as in order to take advantage of the remaining unmasking signs of mine laying sites. Often, mine reconnaissance was carried out by miners from technical reconnaissance teams. In these cases, they had constant communication with the commanders of mine-blasting platoons. But usually the MPV allocated a team of 4-5 sappers to conduct mine reconnaissance.

They carried out reconnaissance in the following order: the senior team walked along the axis of the path and inspected the upper structure of the path, the subgrade, kept records, applying mileage, to which he tied the discovered minefields.

At the same time, he directed the movement and work of the rest of the reconnaissance miners, who moved at a certain distance from the subgrade, terrain. Local people were interviewed while residents. Their reports were often of great help inspecting objects, both railway workers and in determining the boundaries of minefields.

The work of the platoon to clear the path and the right of way was carried out as follows. One squad moved along the railway track and two - on the sides in the right of way, including communication lines. Each section was divided into three sections. The first of them searched for mines and their designation, the second neutralized them, and the miners of the third link collected, counted, and, if necessary, destroyed the mines. The strip examined by one miner did not exceed two meters. In the department that examined the railway track, miners were specially allocated to search for mines with train locks.

The search for delayed-action mines - MZD was especially carefully conducted. Specially assigned groups of experienced sappers inspected the subgrade, control ditches, trenches and pits were dug in places where the MZD could be installed. Often, the surveyed areas were subjected to control running.

In some cases, when it was not possible to eliminate all mines due to snow cover or for other reasons, as well as when mines exploded in already checked areas and objects, they were re-cleared.

#### Forcing the Dnieper.

Difficult tasks of demining railway facilities were completed during the crossing of the Dnieper. The railway troops reached it at 7 points from 13 railway directions. In all these areas for mine reconnaissance and demining, up to 80 MPVs were concentrated.

But contrary to expectations, on the approaches to the Dnieper, the enemy used tactical mining much less. Special railway mining was carried out more widely. So, on the approaches to Zaporozhye, behind the abutments of the destroyed bridges, powerful land mines were found, connected by a detonating cord to anti-tank mines installed as train mines.

The miners-guardsmen in the Pologi-Zaporozhye direction, without leaving the advanced units for a kilometer, worked in the zone of the enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire. They entered Zaporozhye on the day of his liberation. Darnitsa was liberated by the evening of September 29, 1943, and on the morning of the 30th the miners of the 19th



the railway brigade was already demining the Kyiv railway junction. Within its boundaries, 87 "surprise" mines and 10 anti-tank mines, more than 600 overhead charges and about 100 land mines were removed. During the repeated search for mines using specially trained dogs, no elements of mining were found on the territory of the Kyiv Knot.

With a more complex mining system, sappers met at the Zaporozhye node. Here the enemy used a significant amount of special railway mining. On 11 bridges of the junction, train mines were found, consisting of a land mine installed behind the abutment and an anti-tank mine installed under the sleeper and connected to the landmine with a detonating cord. The mines were carefully camouflaged and were discovered only during a second inspection[27].

The enemy often used elements of non-removability and other "surprises" when mining. So, when a trench was torn off near one of the bridges, an anti-tank mine was found under a sleeper. When trying to neutralize it, the sappers found that in addition to the element of non-removability from the live fuse, a detonating cord went into the body of the embankment. Having carefully dug it out, the miners found an explosive charge behind the abutment, which was also equipped with an anti-recovery element. After that, the miners checked all the surviving and destroyed artificial structures and found 10 more similar installations.

A sapper's mistake in clearing a mine could have cost him his life. Dozens a mine that he did not find on the railway could cost lives.

In March 1943, the 3rd separate railway bridge battalion of the 26th railway brigade was preparing to restore the strategically important railway bridge across the Osugu River.

First of all, the MPV of the battalion took up the matter, which, by the way, had previously participated in the demining of the Rzhev-Vyazma railway section. The platoon examined the entire territory in the area of the bridge, the battalion's deployment sites, the ways of transporting equipment and materials, while dozens of land mines were discovered and neutralized, including especially powerful ones, with charges weighing up to a ton or more, several hundred different mines. Two large land mines were found and neutralized in an embankment near the bridge. Careful searches of other results did not give.

The bridge was large - with a total length of 88 meters and a height of 22 meters. It was put out of action by blowing up the span and partially destroying the heads of both coastal abutments. As a result, the opening of the bridge turned out to be cluttered with the remains of a metal span, blocks of stone and ice. Therefore, restoration work began with clearing the channel.

"March 20, 1943 was good, clear weather," recalls a former military engineer of the third rank, commander of the unit restoring the bridge across the Osugu River, P.M. , reports of successes on other fronts, the recent awarding of orders and medals to 39 personnel for the early restoration of the bridge over the Vazuza. Near the bridge were almost all the soldiers of the battalion. At that moment, a powerful explosion thundered.

When the smoke cleared, those who were on the elevated bank from the side of the village saw a terrible picture: instead of the opposite bank abutment, only the remains of the foundation, concrete blocks, granite blocks lying in shapeless heaps were visible. The clods of frozen earth turned black on the slopes of the embankment, on the bank, and on the ice near the bridge. Overturned and sunken, the pile driver was lying on the ice.

Dozens of motionless or writhing bodies lay on the ice and along the banks of the river. Hundreds of others, as in a disturbed anthill, rushed in different directions. There were groans, cries for help.

The personnel immediately after the incident was removed from the bridge area. And soon after that there was an explosion at the second abutment. None of the people were hurt by it.

In total, on that day, the battalion lost an entire company in terms of the number of dead, wounded and heavily shell-shocked. And this is not counting those who refused to be hospitalized with injuries.

Considering the problem of land mine explosions at Osuga, it is necessary to dispel the naturally arising bewilderment that the miners, despite a thorough survey of the area, did not find land mines. There is no reason to doubt their integrity. The fact is that the Germans, blowing up the bridge, skillfully disguised the places of mining, with a heap of granite blocks and clods of earth. The mine detectors could not detect the danger either, because the land mines were not only laid in the embankment at great depth, but also hidden behind the back walls of the abutments.

In 1943, the 26th railway brigade accounted for 22% of the MZD neutralized by the railway troops. 91% of them were found by unmasking signs, 7% - by a fragment of control trenches and 2% - by the testimony of local residents[29].

Most of the MZD were placed by the enemy on the approaches to preserved and partially or completely destroyed artificial structures, in the necks of stations, under the foundations of service and technical buildings, which they destroyed after mining.

In total, during the war, the enemy installed 347 MZDs at railway facilities. Of these, 281 were found and neutralized, which amounted to approximately 80%. Moreover, in some areas, for example, Orel-Krichev, the number of detected MZDs reached 100%. At the same time, in other areas, the percentage of their detection was significantly lower. So, out of 114 MZD installed by the enemy on the railway sections of the Western Front, only 62 MZD (55%) were neutralized, 11 (10%) were destroyed and 41 (35%) worked. This result worried the leadership of the railway troops. To assist the sappers of the railway workers of the Western Front, experienced officers-miners of the barrier service of the department of the railway troops and the Military Transport Academy went out.

The quality of demining depended not only on the training of the personnel of the MPV, but also on their equipping with demining equipment. And they weren't perfect. The main tool for searching for mines was a probe - short, medium and deep. Mine detectors were mainly used in clearing the right of way and slopes of the subgrade. But there were not enough of them, and food came to them irregularly. In May 1944, departments of dogs of the mine detection service were included in the headquarters of the MPV bridge railway battalions. Well-trained dogs made it easier to find mines. In many cases, they found mines and charges placed at considerable depths.

In a word, there were significant shortcomings in the equipment of mine-blasting platoons (MPV). Many of them did not have the cars put on the report card, which delayed their movement to the demining facilities. Means of mechanization for excavation of unexploded aerial bombs, MZD and fragments of control trenches, and scalping of the terrain were completely absent. Miners spent a lot of time and effort on these laborious works.

During the war, it became clear that the detachment system for organizing mine clearance had a number of shortcomings. The dual subordination of the MPV to the battalion commander and the head of the detachment complicated the management of their activities. The supply of MPV with all types of allowances was difficult due to separation from their battalions, and the detachments did not have regular supply units and their own transport. The lack of radio equipment did not provide modern information to the senior commander about the mine clearing.

Various methods have been used to search for train mines on railways. In Zaporozhye, for example, for the first time on the Southern Front, jacking of the upper structure of the track was used. For this, a team of 4-6 people was appointed, which, with the help of jacks, raised the track by 16-20 cm. After that, the bed under the sleeper was carefully examined and felt. Anti-tank mines placed under a sleeper were found without much difficulty. As soon as the sleeper was raised, the miners easily noticed the head of the fuse or the wooden block of the intermediary. But they were not satisfied with this and carefully examined the entire area of the base under the sleeper and, upon detection

any violation of the ballast layer was carefully excavated. This method turned out to be very effective and was recommended by the "Instruction on the technique of mining and mine clearance of railways."

Demining of brigade sections began "from the head" or on a broad front, depending on the pace of liberation of the sites, the operational situation and other conditions. More often, the method of working on a wide front was used, providing a higher rate of clearance. The method of working "from the head" was used relatively rarely, for example, at low rates of advance of our troops. With any of these methods, they tried to assign for mine clearing, if possible, the area that was allocated to his battalion for restoration.

It should be noted that even before the offensive of our troops, the miners carefully studied the railway lines that were to be cleared. So, for example, it was when our troops were preparing to force the Dnieper. At this time, the miners of the 1st Guards Railway Brigade and the 15th Railway Brigade were monitoring the enemy in the area of their objects from the front line. Such observation, as well as the study of information from technical intelligence and scouts of rifle units, made it possible to obtain information in advance about the location of minefields and their density. And the miners of the 5th separate bridge railway battalion, together with the scouts of the rifle regiment, crossed the Dnieper under the cover of night and carried out reconnaissance of minefields.

#### Women miners.

By the way, women also walked through the minefields in the ranks of sappers. "I was drafted into the railway troops in a difficult time for the Motherland - in the summer of 1942," war veteran Vera Antonovna Belokon told about herself. ... And so, having got into the 9th separate railroad battalion, she was appointed to the position of a medical instructor, she was delighted: finally, I can truly contribute to the fight against the hated enemy. It was not easy, but I knew that it was necessary. wounded railroad soldiers: scouts, miners, railway workers, bridgemen. I also decided to learn how to neutralize various land mines, I became a miner "[30].

Vera Belokon walked around with a bag filled to the brim with medicines and bandages. In between work, I read newspapers to the fighters. Tried to learn sapper business. "She tried to work with us," D. Ilyin said. "She managed to neutralize four mines on the railway bridge near the Sluch River. Of course, she suffered fear. But we helped her as best we could."

Vera Belokon became a miner-master after such an incident. It was near a small river in Ukraine. The railway bridge is destroyed. The platoon had to split up. Some of the people, having moved to the other side, began sapper work. It soon became clear that the enemy had carried out continuous mining on this section of the highway. We decided with the help of probes and mine detectors to first determine the boundaries of the fenced area and only then proceed to mine clearance.

Corporal Belokon watched the sappers. It was quiet, the sun was sinking towards the horizon, lengthening the shadows. And suddenly there was an explosion. Faith raised her head. This is on the left, apparently with a "cat" they neutralized some kind of land mine. The girl began to wait for privates Gavrin and Denisov to appear from the shelter behind the embankment, where the explosion had thundered. The cloud of earth and smoke settled, and the soldiers were not visible. She noticed that the miners working to the right began to glance anxiously in the direction of the explosion, and hurried there.

Soon Vera distinctly heard the groans of the wounded. "Hurry to them," a thought flashed. "But there are mines everywhere!" Overcoming the feeling of fear, the medical instructor rushed for the probe. Then I started making the passage.

And here is the mine. Her antennae stick out predatory from under the camouflage layer. Carefully working with a knife, she removed a layer of earth and sod. I inserted a pin into the hole in the fuse checks, unscrewed it. Now further...

Later, when Vera was asked if she was afraid, if she thought that her every inaccurate movement threatened with death, she could not answer this question. Young woman

I thought about the wounded, about how to help them faster ... Having "removed" six mines and, having made a passage, rushed to them, began to quickly bandage the wounds.

After this incident, she became a full-time miner. By the end of the Great Patriotic War, it had 100 various explosive objects neutralized on railway communications. After the Victory, Vera married her comrade-in-arms, Lieutenant A.E. Faydu, returned to school, raised two sons[31].

During the offensive, the partisans facilitated mine clearing for the railroad workers. They reported on the places of installation of their mines and on the work of the enemy miners on the arrangement of minefields on the approaches to the railway track, in the danger zone and rubble.

All of the above applies, first of all, to ensuring the offensive of our troops. In addition, in 1945-1946 after the war, I had to deal with the extraction of the surviving disguised MZD in the conditions of the active operation of nationalist gangs. In fact, there was a situation similar to the beginning of the 1920s, when on the territory of one's own country one had to fight against an actively operating enemy, not excluding the possibility of the installation of anti-train or car mines by nationalists. It was impossible to create a solid defense in the zone of operations of Bandera. To some extent, the situation that has arisen can recall the years of the war, so to speak, on the contrary: it was necessary to protect the railways just as the Germans had protected them in their time. However, such a comparison is not entirely legitimate, since one had to deal with banditry in peacetime. Indeed, there are some similarities between guerrilla warfare and partisanism, but it is limited only to the borrowing of some guerrilla methods by political banditry.

Since, as mentioned above, it was impossible to organize a solid defense against Bandera, it was necessary to return to the methods tested in the 1920s. We not only cleared mines, but at night set up booby traps at the approaches to stations and water pumps. In the morning, of course, these mines were removed or brought by disconnecting from the power supply to a harmless state. These methods have been quite effective.

Working in the 20th Directorate of Military Restoration Works, we improved the methods and means of clearing possible unknown mines. On the minefields, we used a tractor that shook these rubbles. At the same time, the mines exploded or became harmless. In addition, we also used specially trained dogs, about 20 in number. It was just right to reward them for their ability to find mines: most of the bandit mines were discovered by them.

## **Chapter 8. In Germany.**

Before I fly to Germany, Z.I. Kondratiev tried to appoint me the head of the road troops of the front, commanded by Marshal R.Ya. Malinovsky[32]. When I appeared at the disposal of the front, it turned out that General Vostrukhov[33] - the head of the rear - without coordinating this with the authorities, appointed someone else to the same position. It turned out bad. They gave me a car and I went back to Moscow. It was the beginning of 1945. I reported to Kondratiev.

Zakhar Ivanovich, we once studied together, was very happy that I came to his department. I was immediately enrolled in the road administration with the salary of the chief of staff, which I had in a military mission. And he offered to allocate people to me for training, so that I would deal with the issues of demining on communications in the rear of our troops. (Already in Germany, in the liberated territories).

I cannot fail to mention here that we flew to Germany via Warsaw. Then I saw how Warsaw was destroyed! So, perhaps, Stalingrad did not suffer either.

I gathered my saboteurs, who specialized in mining, and we engaged in demining, found dogs and began to train them to detect mines.

With this team at the beginning of 1945, I arrived at the 1st Ukrainian Front, commanded by Marshal Ivan Stepanovich Konev[34]. He knew me since Kalininsky

front, learned and was amazed, so to speak: "Are you still a lieutenant colonel? You were a lieutenant colonel in 1942, and now you are already 45th. Many are already generals."

We started clearing mines on the routes that needed to be driven. The work was very difficult.

The Germans installed time bombs, and mines with charges of naval bombs. They turned sea mines into MZD and installed them on highways, near small bridges or viaducts, installed them so that they could not be bypassed. It was very difficult to find them. The Germans put them a little. But anti-tank and anti-personnel was unmeasured.

Our miners - experienced specialists - not one of them was blown up. The Germans did not install such non-removable mines as ours. They were amenable to extraction, we removed them quite easily, and this greatly helped our road troops to ensure constant and uninterrupted movement on the roads. I must say that the Germans also provided assistance in mine clearance.

In general, in Germany, the people did not resist the arrival of our army. It was accepted normally, which cannot be said about Poland, on whose territory representatives of the Home Army operated, and about Western Ukraine, where Bandera was in charge.

Every time I was amazed how the Germans, together with our troops, restored the railways: they worked very well and together. The economy was recovering intensively, and it was easy for us to work.

There was even such a case. We are going - me, the driver and orderly Valuykin. The night is already and suddenly we see five people walking. And our car broke down. Although we were armed, we stepped aside (suddenly they were bandits). The Germans have arrived. We commanded: Hands up! They offered no resistance. I studied German for seven years, but spoke badly. Still, somehow he explained that he needed help to bring the car to the first settlement. They are actively involved. The driver drove, and the Germans very actively helped to drive the car one and a half kilometers to the village where we stopped. In the morning the car was fixed. That's how it was in Germany.

Then I was sent to demining Berlin. I also cleared mines from Potsdam, which, unlike Berlin, is well preserved. We were looking for mines in those buildings where our soldiers were supposed to be located.

One operation was carried out by us in Breslau, where the German garrison was surrounded by forty thousand. The Germans dropped ammunition from parachutes to them. The encirclement area was small and several parachutes fell into our position. I looked at what can be done with them. I decided to offer to deliver this ammunition to the Germans, but only in such a way that they would essentially become booby traps. Reported to Konev. He seized on this idea and gave the command that these parachutes should be given to us. We worked on the bags, turning them into mines. I was able to evaluate the results of this operation after the fall of Breslau.

I have seen a lot in Germany. I saw charred corpses in Hitler's bunker. I saw Chemnitz and Dresden destroyed by the Allies. The destruction caused by the allies amazed me. It was destroyed without military necessity, with the sole purpose of preventing the city from falling into the hands of the Soviet Union. I regarded it as a terrorist act. The same can be said about Chemnitz.

I was a witness to the high cost of taking Berlin. It was difficult for me, a saboteur, to understand, since our commandment is to protect people. In our case, the ace decides, not the crowd.

Victory Day.

The idea that the Victory is close has not left me since the beginning of April, after representatives of partisan formations under the command of A.S. appeared in the area. Egorova, V.A. Kvitnitsky, A.M. Sagelenko, P.A. Velichko, P.V. Tkanko, who passed through the rear of the enemy for more than one hundred kilometers from the end of the summer of 1944. These illustrious partisans, having united with the Red Army, were the harbingers of the imminent surrender of the Wehrmacht, whose units, defending themselves against the advance of our units, hurried to the West to surrender to the Allies.

The partisans did not arrive on their own, but in captured vehicles.

On April 30, our troops joined with the allies on the Elbe River, where we hurried with our detachments to clear the banks of mines. On the Elbe, I happened to meet with the Americans at the very end of April or at the beginning of May. It was a friendly meeting, hugging. It was very exciting, to say the least.

Finally, May 9 was declared the day of the Great Victory. This moment found me surrounded by partisans of the 7th brigade of the 14th international corps under the command of a Frenchman, whose name I forgot.

The troops and partisans who entered Berlin rejoiced, and we continued to work on demining.

Once again, I ended up in Germany at the beginning of 1946, when I worked as deputy head of the 20th Directorate of Restoration Works of the Ministry of Railways for the troops.

We had three railway brigades under our command, commanded by generals. My boss was Hero of Socialist Labor Nikolai Vladimirovich Borisov. Roads were restored in the western regions of Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, Germany and even in Yugoslavia.

In the middle of May I returned to Moscow and was admitted to the hospital with inflammation of the liver. I spent a little time in the hospital, two weeks. The liver calmed down, but during the examination of my hand they gave a certificate of complete unfitness for military service. I was unemployed again. I had a certificate of a disabled person of the second group, received back in the Finnish war, but I was not going to leave the military service. I did not show these certificates to anyone.

I did not have to return to partisan affairs: until the end of the war, I was engaged exclusively in demining.

Cleared out a lot. It helped that the Germans had worse mines, and there were no radio-controlled mines at all.

The deeds of those days are also memorable, but the story about them cannot add anything to how the Leninist idea of guerrilla warfare was carried out and how disastrous for the enemy the actions of partisans on enemy communications became since the summer of 1943. So I am interrupting my story. I can only add that the Soviet partisans and the partisans of the countries liberated by the Red Army, uniting their efforts, continued to fight the enemy until he completely surrendered, and that mines remained their main weapon in this struggle. I am proud that during the war, mainly mines invented by me were used. These were coal mines, and PMS, and many others. For the invention of mines, I was awarded the degree of candidate of technical sciences.

We were the first to create and use magnetic mines. However, they were not produced. They were made by the British and supplied to us. With the help of magnetic mines, the Gauleiter of Belarus was destroyed, a lot of equipment.

## Chapter 9

After the war, a sharp reduction in the army began. Went to see old friends. My old friend Pavel Alekseevich Kabanov is the Deputy Minister of Communications for the Railway Troops.

I was assigned to the reserve regiment. I was able to work in the archive. He received a salary and rations. It was possible to live. I was offered various positions: first, the head of the military department at the Novosibirsk Railway Institute, but my wife refused. They offered to become the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Moldova. The wife again refused.

Kabanov offered the post of deputy head of the 20th department of military restoration work for the troops. I held this position until the summer of 1946 and was in charge of the troops that carried out the restoration work. It was during this period that I was able to objectively assess the actions of the partisans and individual blunders in their work. However, this department was disbanded in the summer of 1946 and I again found myself without a job.

Finally, quite by chance, I met with the head of the personnel department of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement. He suggested that I go to a specially created institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs as acting head of the logistics department.

I dealt with logistics issues during the war and at the Military Transport Academy. I worked in this position for ten years - until 1956.

By the way, I'm back to work on my dissertation. I wrote it in 1952. It was called "Guerrilla Action". Stalin was still alive, and I could not reflect in it the activity as an organizer, and there was nothing good to say. The person to whom I gave my work to read advised me to hide it.

Only the first course was taken. I had two people on the pulpit - mine assistant and lecturer.

We have repeatedly turned to I.V. Stalin, to N.A. Bulganin[35] and other authorities, raising the question of the need to train troops in the ability to organize partisan actions in the event of encirclement. We argued that if the troops were prepared for partisan actions in the way that M.V. Frunze, then we would not have had such a catastrophe, when in the first months of the war, an incredible number of people were taken prisoner (and over 5 million during the entire war). If the troops, as in the period of the Civil War, being behind enemy lines, switched to partisan actions, this would largely change the course of the war. Specifically, I referred to the experience of V.K. Blucher [36], who, being behind enemy lines with 3 thousand people, carried out raids. Over time, his squad grew 3 times. We have argued that it is precisely the troops that should be able, in the event of an encirclement, to immediately and in an organized manner go over to military operations.

Finally, I met with a Central Committee worker who supervised the partisan war and was at one time in the Polish headquarters of the partisan movement, where we met him. I told him about our ideas. In my presence, he called Bulganin, the Minister of Defense, who received me, listened to me and contacted the head of our institute, Philip Yakovlevich Solovyov, and the latter agreed to organize training for students on issues of partisan struggle. At the military institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a group for the organization and tactics of guerrilla warfare was created at the department of logistics.

The Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, General of the Army Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov[37], who knew me from the Kalinin Front, greatly approved of our actions and contributed in every possible way to the work. At one time, it was the partisans who rescued Maslennikov from the encirclement. Therefore, he helped us a lot in the development of manuals.

I remember how in May 1952, talking with me on a new task for students of the military institute on the topic: "Transfer of troops who found themselves behind enemy lines due to the prevailing situation," he remarked:

- I fully agree that when the command staff knows the basics of the organization and tactics of guerrilla warfare, he is not afraid of the environment. After all, in most cases there is no encirclement as such, and troops that find themselves behind enemy lines due to the prevailing situation can independently conduct partisan operations, as was the case more than once during the years of the civil war.

Enthusiasts helped us. Evgeny Ivanovich Kosovsky joined this business - former head of communications UShPD.

We have our first listeners. We have developed a course of lectures. I published a closed book on partisan warfare on the topic: "The interaction of partisans with the troops of the army in the field."

I gave lectures at the Frunze Academy, where my notes were published as a separate book under the editorship of the head of the department of military history, General Vorobyov. There were such enthusiasts as Grigory Ivanovich Boyarinov, Boris Andreevich Pleshkunov, Boris Fedorovich Baranov, Leonid Efremovich Kolpakov, Dmitry Andreevich Shaposhnikov, Anatoly Isaevich Tsvetkov, Vladimir Nikolaevich Andreanov. These were graduates of the Military Institute, some of whom later formed the backbone of the Advanced Courses for Officers.

V.N. Andreanov, after graduating from the institute and going to work in the KGB, continued to develop our ideas.

After Stalin's death on March 5, 1953 and Beria's arrest, Maslennikov committed suicide. A new head of the institute appeared, who had nothing to do with the partisans, a certain Rokhalsky. Seeing no prospects for this case, he came to the conclusion that the course should be closed. The course was closed and I again found myself only the head of the logistics department. But I was already 55 years old, the pension was then very solid - 350 rubles. In addition, I also earned money by giving lectures through the "Knowledge" dissemination society. I had enough to support my wife and two children and I retired. They lived comfortably.

## **Chapter 10. At the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.**

In retirement, I took up writing memoirs, creating the story "Not a prisoner, but a partisan." After the 20th Congress, when the Department of the History of the Great Patriotic War was organized at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, I offered my services. I was accepted there as a senior research fellow.

It was very difficult to work: despite the exposure of the cult of personality, the institute tried in every possible way to whitewash Stalin. Here I had a chance to learn a lot about his affairs.

In fact, he supervised the work of our department P.N. Pospelov. At one of the meetings in 1962, I spoke and said that we should not just shout "Hurrah, hurrah," but say that the Soviet people won the war thanks to their courage and devotion to the Motherland, despite the mistakes of the leadership. After that, a month or two later, I was fired from the institute. However, they gave me a letter, supposedly for the work done, but as if there was no need to write more about the partisans. Ten years later, on some anniversary, I was awarded a second diploma in gratitude for my work at this institute.

While still working at the institute in August 1959, I was invited to Czechoslovakia. It was the 15th anniversary of the Czechoslovak uprising. I was awarded the Order of Czechoslovakia, the Order of Yegorov. This was the same Yegorov who had been the chief of finance at one time, and later, in Fedorov's detachment, deputy for sabotage. When he was thrown into Czechoslovakia with a group of only 22 people, in a month he already had 2,000. He was one of the "detonators" of the Slovak uprising. And so I was awarded the Order of Yegorov for the training of partisan personnel in Czechoslovakia. We met Yegorov himself earlier, when I was in Germany. Moreover, the Czech partisans then captured a lot of cars and I was awarded with an Opel. What else?

This trip made me return to memories. I wrote a lot, but nobody needed my notes.

"The Secret of Colonel Starinov".

This continued until, on September 6, 1963, Ovid Gorchakov's article "The Secret of Colonel Starinov" appeared. A.I. Adjubey, editor-in-chief of Izvestia, agreed with N.S. Khrushchev[38]. With the permission of Khrushchev, an essay on the explosion of the house where the first secretaries of Ukraine were once housed and where General von Braun, commander of the 68th German infantry division and head of the garrison of the city of Kharkov, was killed, was published. This was the first time it was written openly.

(The content of the article was decided to be presented here, since the newspaper with this test has long been a rarity)

The case with which Colonel Starinov arrived on October 1, 1941 in Kharkov was so secret that Lieutenant General Nevsky, head of the engineering troops of the Southwestern Front, not trusting the phone, reported it to a member of the Military Council of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of N.S. . Khrushchev:

- Colonel Starinov? - asked Nikita Sergeevich. - Well, I heard, I heard ... Hero of Spain. He blew up more than one echelon in the rear of Franco. Did you fly in from Moscow today?



"I came by car," the lieutenant general answered. - I barely made it through. The general walked over to a large map on the wall. - Right here between Kursk and Orel. An hour later, German tanks burst onto the highway.

For a minute the member of the Military Council and the chief of the engineering troops silently looked at the map. Until recently, it hung in Kyiv, until it was overwhelmed on September 19 by blue arrows, indicating the direction of the enemy's blows. Now these blue arrows are aimed at the circle with the word "Kharkiv" above it.

As early as July 28, Hitler announced that for Germany "the industrial area around Kharkov is more important than Moscow." The situation at the front remained threatening. Due to Stalin's unreasonable stubbornness, the Military Council of the South-Western Direction managed to avoid a catastrophe only with the greatest difficulty. Now Stalin ordered "to go over to a brutal defense." But it was already clear: Kharkov could not be held ...

When a short man of about forty entered the office, Nikita Sergeevich put aside the papers and stood up to meet him:

- So that's what you are, Colonel Starinov!

The tunic sat well on the broad-shouldered colonel. In the black buttonholes of the engineering troops - four sleepers, on the tunic the Order of Lenin (for Spain) and two Orders of the Red Banner.

- The task set before me by the chief of the general staff, reported Starinov, is this: to assist our troops with massive mine-explosive barriers. My operational-engineering group includes a unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Yakovlev - thirteen specialists. This is the command staff. The front headquarters placed five battalions at my disposal.

- Not enough, - said Nikita Sergeevich, - Well, what equipment do you have?

- The latest guided mines. Their designer is a talented young engineer Feinberg.

- What are your plans?

- Chief of the General Staff Marshal Shaposhnikov cited as an example the well-known operation "Alberich" carried out by the Germans in France during the First World War. Of course, our scale is different. We need to lay mines at depths of up to two meters. It is impossible to do this with a shovel, and we have no drills.

- I'll call Epishev in the regional committee. Kharkov workers will make drills for you. What are you going to mine?

- Airfields, the most important objects of the city, roads.

Colonel Starinov immediately set about drawing up a plan of barriers together with Lieutenant General Nevsky. In terms of the scope and volume of mine-blasting work, this plan was five times superior to Alberich, and the time for its implementation was half as much. On that sleepless night, Colonel Starinov developed the first complex mine-blocking operation in military history, combined with the actions of the partisan underground.

This plan seemed so extensive to the commander that he signed it, not without hesitation. Nikita Sergeevich, to whom Colonel Starinov came on the evening of October 3, further expanded the plan, making many additions and outlining a number of new objects for mining. And the first among them was a house on Dzerzhinsky Street, 17. A house known to all Kharkiv residents. The house where Nikita Sergeevich lived then.

The first feat in this battle was the feat of the Kharkov workers. Despite the pre-evacuation fever, air raids, thousands of complications and difficulties, the worker Kharkov fulfilled the task with honor: not only launched mass production of complex non-recoverable mines in an unthinkable short time, but also made a number of improvements to their design.

With the advent of the first drills and mines, tests of capricious equipment immediately began, the training of miners ... Hard work went on day and night, in the rain and under bombs. Mines were laid imperceptibly. From the side it seemed that the sappers were building bunkers.

The matter was complicated by enemy spies. The trained eye of Colonel Starinov saw either a new cobblestone, as if fallen from the sky near the mine that had been installed the day before, or a broken branch or a notch in a tree near the secret wells...

By order of Starinov, the miners made thousands of wells, but the mines were placed far not in each, charging the rest with blank mock-ups.

On October 12, the instruction was approved by a member of the Military Council. - Just keep in mind, colonel, for the safety of our troops and the population you answer.

He once again reminded of the need to mine house 17 on Dzerzhinsky Street. Only everything must be done in complete secrecy. If a fascist senses something is wrong, his feet will not be there!

Colonel Starinov examined the one-story house from top to bottom. It was solid, comfortable, simple style building. In the environment - nothing more.

If miners in uniform come here every day, Starinov told his deputy lieutenant colonel Yastrebov, this will arouse suspicion. The house is definitely being watched. You and I need to come here in civilian clothes with a group of miners. We will live here until the last day. Then no one will believe that we slept on mines. Of course, we will ask Nikita Sergeevich to move to another place.

Khrushchev, however, flatly refused to move. He told Starinov that his move was unlikely to go unnoticed, suspicions would arise, and the operation would fail.

On the same day, a group of miners drove into the courtyard of house N\_17 along Dzerzhinsky Street in a covered truck ...

I had to hurry. Kharkov held on to the last of its strength.

On the twenty-fourth of October, the Nazis broke into the city ....

Passing the retreating units of the Red Army, Starinov's battalions under the noses of the attacking Nazis blew up bridges, mined muddy autumn roads. Miners placed over 30,000 anti-tank mines in the enemy's path, set up about 1,000 surprise mines, and more than 2,000 emzedushki. "Emzedushki" miners called delayed action mines.

General Georg von Braun II, appointed head of the Kharkov garrison, did not rush to enter. First of all, he ordered an order to be posted on the walls of the city: "Every resident who knows the places where mines, time bombs, explosive charges are laid, or suspects that some objects have been mined, is obliged to immediately report this ... For the correct information on the other hand, anyone who hides the information he knows about the mined areas and does not report it to the commandant's office will be put to death ... "

Sappers, incurring rather heavy losses, cleared or detonated several thousand of the latest Soviet mines: at airfields, in the most vulnerable places of railway tracks, in buildings. The general settled in a small, uncomfortable house on the outskirts of Kharkov. But then Captain Karl Heiden, commander of the engineer battalion of the 68th division, pleased him: an excellent mansion was cleared - house 17 on the former Dzerzhinsky Street. Von Braun's staff officers had been eyeing this house for a long time.

First of all, the counterintelligence of the division collected detailed information about this house and reported: the house was occupied by "People's Commissar Khrushchev" himself, no mine-blasting work was noticed, and even if they had been carried out, Khrushchev would never have stayed in the house with his guards.

And yet the sappers found a mine ...

The captain and other miners retreated around the corner of a neighboring house. Time crept languorously, and the miner dismantled a bunch of coal after coal, acting with the precision of a surgeon operating on the heart, with the difference that the first mistake would have killed not

the patient, but himself. An hour later he came out to catch his breath. Cold sweat rolled down his face. No, he hasn't finished, there's still a lot of work ahead... The work went on until dark. The captain ordered to stop work until the morning.

In the morning the second round began. Three hours later, the daredevil reached the wooden box. By evening, the mine was removed. The miner neutralized her ingenious circuit breakers and fuses. The captain began to examine the mine. His eyes popped out of his head: a radio was built into the mine!

General von Braun immediately drove into Dzerzhinsky Street in his armored Jorge. Following rushed two armored cars and felgendarmes.

- Mister General! whispered Captain Heiden. - This is an unusual, fantastic mine! One of two things: either the Russians are fooling us, or these barbarians invented, overtaking the whole world, controlled at a distance by radio! But this cannot be!

The general settled in house 17. That evening he issued an order in which informed the population that his sappers had easily cleared most of the mines...

Clouds were gathering over Colonel Starinov's head. In Voronezh, where the headquarters of the front was located, a cipher arrived: Beria's proteges in military counterintelligence, referring to intelligence about the mass mine clearance carried out by the Nazis in Kharkov, on the order of General von Braun, started a case against Colonel Starinov, accused him almost of sabotage. Soon Colonel Starinov was summoned by a member of the Military Council.

Nikita Sergeevich was preoccupied, but looked friendly.

- Do you think they found your "smart" mine? - No, -  
the colonel did not want to believe it.

Nikita Sergeevich suddenly became stern.

- On the night of the fourteenth of November, the executioner must be executed!

In the dead of night, Lieutenant General Nevsky accompanied Colonel Starinov and Lieutenant Colonel Yastrebov on a mission. Their path lay not to Kharkov, not through the front line. All three drove up in the "emka" to the Voronezh broadcasting radio station.

The operation was carried out in the morning. At 4.10 Colonel Starinov ordered:

- Let's blow mine number one!

At 4:12 a.m., something clicked loudly in a wooden box that stood by Captain Karl Heiden's bunk. The captain jumped up as if stung and rushed to the box. The incredible happened! The lock has worked!

The captain's face broke out in a cold sweat. So it was a real mine  
a mine controlled from a distance by radio!

...Von Braun's wristwatch showed 4:15 when the field telephone rang. It was Captain Heiden. After listening to the excited report of the captain (the contactor in the extracted and defused mine worked!) the general sat down, his legs did not hold  
his...

The Kirov watch of Colonel Starinov showed 4.20, when in Voronezh, three hundred kilometers from Kharkov, he commanded:

- Let's blow mine number two!

At that moment, neither the general, nor his officers, nor house number 17 on Dzerzhinskaya was gone ...

Time passed. The battle on the Volga has died down. At the headquarters of the Southern Front, Colonel urgently called to the phone:

"Khrushchev is speaking," Starinov heard a familiar voice. - I congratulate you, Comrade Colonel, on completing your assignment in Kharkov! Clean work! Intelligence service

established the complete success of the operation! Be sure to see for yourself, I will send for you  
airplane.

On August 23, 1943, Kharkov was liberated. Starinov instructed to clear a number of buildings and the headquarters of the partisan movement.

Starinov drove up to house 17 on Dzerzhinskaya and entered the garden. The huge funnel  
the place where the house stood was overgrown with grass.

But why was it possible to use new weapons only in Kharkov, only against General von Braun? And Colonel Starinov thought bitterly about those Beria's henchmen who, because of Stalin's blind suspicion, destroyed Soviet military leaders, scientific specialists.

it was twenty years ago...[39] This

After the publication, repeated in the central press of several countries, I was offered to publish my memoirs. They appeared in 1964 under the name "Mines are waiting in the wings" in a sixty-five thousandth edition. The memoirs were reprinted twice in Czechoslovakia. In Yugoslavia, with a circulation of two hundred thousand copies, the book was published under the title "God of Diversions".

Another book was supposed to be published next year. I prepared the manuscript by order of "Voenizdat". I have already been paid part of the fee, but the manuscript received three negative reviews, and it was postponed, however, the fee was left. Then Khrushchev was removed, and she was completely forgotten. It lay in the editorial office for twenty years and was published in 1988 under the title "To pass unseen".

## Chapter 11

In early August 1967, I was urgently summoned to the editorial office of Pionerskaya Pravda, and there the editor-in-chief Nina Chernova showed me an invitation to go to Yugoslavia with a group of pioneers. Ivan Harish invited.

We met again after 30 years. He was known and respected by all the people of Yugoslavia.

For thirty years of separation, Ivan Harish has changed a lot. Then he began his combat path as a partisan-saboteur as my translator. As a woodworker and electrician, he quickly mastered the wisdom of sabotage techniques and tactics. Then he was less than 30 years old, but he managed to work in Canada, where he mastered English and French. He was also in the USA, but he was expelled from the country for participating in strikes. He went to Mexico, where he learned Spanish, then went to Ecuador. This was before the war in Spain.

In Yugoslavia, Harish only had a chance to study for four years, but he studied well, and then mastered woodworking and household electrical engineering. He could not find work in his own country, and therefore had to earn his daily bread abroad.

When the fascist rebellion began in Spain, Ivan Harish, overcoming all obstacles, reached Albacete and was waiting for an assignment to one of the international brigades. In January 1938, with the assistance of Andre Marty and the participation of Ya.N. Smushkevich began to collect detachments of partisan saboteurs; some of the first were the Yugoslavs, Czechs and Slovaks, Poles and Finns, and then the Germans and representatives of other nations.

Harish said that he derailed the first military train of the occupiers with a homemade mine. He carried out a number of major sabotage, became Tito's deputy for sabotage, a folk hero, a major general. His group grew into a brigade, derailed 163 trains, destroyed 72 bridges from 8 to 120 meters long, destroyed 870 wagons, including 32 armored and 23 tanks, killed many enemy soldiers and officers, including 1 general, colonel and lieutenant colonel. Deals a lot of damage to the enemy. At the same time, 78 people lost in 40 months of the struggle.

- My friend Ivan Karbovanets and I fled from the camp at the first opportunity in May 1939. We had no weapons, no necessary documents. We were dressed in solid Spanish republican military uniforms. The first day of the escape was especially hard. Hiding in the vineyard. It's good that no one looked at us. As soon as it got dark, we went to a small farm. The dogs barked disgustingly. We

decided to knock on the window of one, as it seemed to us, the poorest house. To the question of the owner - Who is here? - I answered in broken French, - "Lost! Please sell something edible. We have money, we will pay."

The owner opened the window and, looking at us, said: -

Have you fled from the camp again?

- Yes! we confessed.

- They will catch you in such a dress.

Indeed, our uniform was almost new and it betrayed us.

- I'll help, - said the owner, and he ventured to give us some kind of jackets, faded raincoats, even two hats.

We have become civilians with the Mexican documents that we have preserved. Moreover, the kind host gave us a loaf of bread and a piece of cheese. And yet, at first, we went only in the dark to the east, and hid for days. Meanwhile, the cleaning began. We took the risk of offering our services. The Second World War began, mobilization and workers were needed. There was also a job for us in the specialty. We contacted the underground. In April, the Germans occupied Yugoslavia and we decided to break through Germany there. This is where the Mexican documents came in handy. Again, the work of the Germans. And they were in dire need of workers.

The owner of the workshop was in great need of workers, and we worked 10-12 hours a day. I offered to bring good workers from Yugoslavia. The owner agreed and issued documents for me to Croatia, and my friend to Montenegro.

- Do not deceive, - the obese owner of the enterprise warned. - We won't let you down! You do pay well. And I safely got to

Croatia, quickly found friends. They got everything they needed and made 50 kilograms of homemade explosives that could explode without a primer. And on the night of September 9, Ivan Harish with his group derailed a military train on a crooked section of the embankment near the village where the traitors lived with the help of a makeshift mine. An entire battalion of German troops was destroyed. Then we visited the crash site, where there was already a memorial plaque and a photo. Thus began the fighting activity of Harish.

After some time, Ivan, after a series of successful sabotage on the lines of communication, decided to strike at the traitors and invaders. Dressed in the uniform of an Ustaša (Croatian nationalist) officer, he entered with a briefcase, and a bomb was planted in it, into the theater, where a gala concert was to be held for gentlemen of the officers. Harish handed over his coat in the locker room, wanted to hand over his briefcase, but "thought it up" and took it with him, showing the vigilant cloakroom attendant that there were only papers in the briefcase. In fact, it was a well-camouflaged time bomb. Entered the stalls well in advance. Neighbors, thank God, turned out to be officers of fascist Italy. When there were about 5 minutes left before the start, Harish asked the neighbors to look after the briefcase and said that he had to go to "that place to get rid of the accumulated liquid" and, covering the briefcase with a fascist newspaper, Harish left the stalls, and then out of the theater. Even before the beginning of the concert, the theater building shuddered, as it were, and there was a dull explosion. started

panic.

In Yugoslavia, Harish showed me the hideouts of the partisans. Here they hid during punitive operations. These were underground galleries with bedrooms, hospitals. They always covered the right entrance with booby traps. I regretted that in our conditions there were no such shelters.

In 1967 I met with Tito. We had a long conversation. Tito said that the Russians did not use all the advantages of guerrilla warfare. If there had been a unified leadership of the partisan movement, if cadres had been retained and unprepared people had not been transferred behind enemy lines, the German would never have approached Moscow. At the same time, he said that during the Second World War, Stalin made a number of major strategic mistakes:

First, despite all the evidence of the likelihood of an attack, Germany did not take timely measures to repel the attack. Secondly, he did not take measures to ensure that the Soviet troops, once behind enemy lines, would go over to partisan actions.

We said goodbye to Broz Tito for a short time, counting on a new meeting, but she did not  
took place.

xxx

In the 1980s, I again began teaching at the Department of the Military Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs USSR and taught until 1984, when I was finally awarded the title of professor.

Even today I cannot write about where I worked after. Let me tell you one thing: I taught Chinese, Cubans and many others.

I can proudly say that my students were successful in Italy (they hanged Mussolini[40]). According to the Japanese, the resistance of the Chinese partisans to a large extent prevented them from actively waging war against the Soviet Union. Therefore, when the war against Japan began in 1945, we quickly got through it thanks to the help of the Chinese partisans.

One of the most famous Chinese partisans was brought up by V.K. Blucher. They used mines very skillfully. After the Chinese, the Vietnamese used mines most productively. The American army, without losing a single battle in Vietnam, lost 70% of its equipment in skirmishes with partisans. They were forced to leave in disgrace.

I am proud of my students.

## **PART II. LOST OPPORTUNITIES.**

The command of the enemy troops had to \_\_\_\_\_ in the rear, it was practically possible  
second front to fight \_\_\_\_\_ This is with the \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ to create that large forces of troops were diverted.  
seriously affected the outcome of \_\_\_\_\_ partisans, the general state of the German front \_\_\_\_\_ and ultimately to  
the war.

Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections.

### **Chapter 1. Definition of concepts, the role and significance of guerrilla warfare.**

The classical definition of the concept of "partisan war" was given at the beginning of the 19th century by the famous Russian partisan and poet Denis Davydov[41]. He wrote: "Guerrilla warfare consists of neither very fractional nor paramount enterprises, for it is not about burning one or two barns, not disrupting pickets and not delivering direct blows to the main forces of the enemy. It encompasses and crosses the entire length of the paths, from the rear of the opposing army of that space of the earth, which is determined to supply it with troops, food and charges, through this, blocking the flow of the source of its strength and existence, it exposes it to the blows of its army, exhausted, hungry, disarmed and deprived of the saving bonds of subordination. "[42].

This definition remains true against the aggressor in modern wars without  
use of weapons of mass destruction.

The possibilities and success of guerrilla warfare are associated with a number of socio-political, economic, military, technical and natural-geographical factors. These factors, according to their causal essence, can be divided into objective ones, which do not depend on the partisans, and subjective ones, depending on the composition of the partisan unit, the degree of its preparedness and security, and the quality of the leadership of the partisan forces.

The political situation is a decisive factor for the emergence and development of guerrilla warfare. The essence of the political situation lies in the attitude of the population towards the partisans and their opponent, in the ability of the people to accept

participation in the fight against the enemy and rendering assistance to the partisans. The origins of the partisan movement, its scope and strength are predetermined by spiritual power, patriotism, the ardent desire of the masses of the people to see their homeland happy, free from internal enslavers and foreign invaders. The ranks of the partisans are replenished voluntarily only by their own, that is, loyal people. Without it, there will not be enough bases; without it, the partisans cannot escape in any fortress. For the fortress of the partisans is also its own people, who will prompt, and indicate, and help, and help out, and strengthen the partisan detachment with new forces.

As was often the case at the front, if only one soldier remained from a company, it was believed that the company was dead. And when there was one partisan from the detachment, a new partisan detachment almost always grew up and even turned into a partisan unit. This is especially clearly seen from the actions of our partisan paratroopers in Czechoslovakia. What bases did Kvitinsky's detachment, Shukaev's formation, landing groups have there: Velichko, Volyansky, Yegorov, Popov, Khimich, Astakhov. What bases did all these and many more of our Ukrainian partisans have there, in Czechoslovakia, in Poland, besides the people's base, although they all turned from groups and detachments into formations of many thousands?

And what bases did the raid partisan formations in Ukraine have, operating every day in a new area?

Misunderstanding that the base of the partisans is the people, attachment to the front, inability to break away from it for their wide, unrestricted maneuvers in the operational and strategic depth of the enemy rear - this was the reason for the failures of the first partisan detachments.

The guerrilla movement arises in the course of the war. In the armed struggle against neo-colonialist, racist and other reactionary regimes, the guerrilla movement, as a rule, arises long before the start of the armed struggle, before the start of the uprising, and takes a long time to prepare. Historical experience teaches that the success of the liberation (partisan) struggle depends to a decisive extent on how carefully it is prepared, how much it stems from a nationwide political crisis and how much it relies on the revolutionary and patriotic upsurge of the people, and sometimes on the political situation in other countries. which can in one way or another affect the course and final outcome of the struggle.

The nature of guerrilla warfare, its direction, scope and effectiveness as a whole depend on the specific historical tasks facing the participants in a given liberation movement and the ways to solve them. Together, these conditions give rise to the most effective guerrilla struggle.

The scope, depth and effectiveness of guerrilla warfare are also significantly affected by heroic-patriotic traditions and the freedom-loving peoples.

A decisive role in the outcome of a guerrilla war is often played by the presence of an organization capable of leading the people's liberation struggle. Historical experience convincingly shows that popular uprisings and guerrilla wars fail even under all other favorable conditions in the absence of a single organization capable of leading the popular masses and successfully leading their struggle. In modern conditions such organizations can be religious, national or social parties.

However, not only the presence of a special body of military leadership of partisan forces plays a role, but also its quality. The experience of partisan struggle in the Second World War and subsequent national liberation wars convincingly showed that the command of the actions of partisan forces must be created in advance and staffed with personnel with the necessary training. Mistakes in guerrilla leadership were often costly and reduced the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare. Therefore, those leaders of the national liberation movements acted correctly, who in advance created a competent military leadership of the partisan forces, as was the case, for example, in China, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Cyprus and a number of other countries. This fully justified itself.

However, just as the most competent headquarters is useless in the absence of ordinary soldiers, so the military leadership of the guerrilla forces certainly cannot be considered a guarantee of success. Who are these people who operate in partisan detachments?

Partisans are direct participants in actions that cause damage to the enemy in manpower, military equipment, disrupt the management of the population and troops, reduce the combat capability of enemy troops in other ways, conduct reconnaissance, etc.

Participants in the guerrilla movement and guerrilla warfare are also all those who, without directly participating in the actions of the guerrillas, provide the guerrilla forces with everything necessary for struggle and life. Note that such participation in guerrilla warfare is usually more dangerous than participation in combat operations of detachments, which, having inflicted damage on the enemy, can get out from under his blow, while their assistants remain in place and often suffer heavy losses. Therefore, it is clear how unfair it is that many worthy local residents who ensured the actions of Soviet partisans in the Great Patriotic War were not awarded.

The readiness of the broad masses of the people for guerrilla warfare against foreign and domestic enslavers can only be realized most effectively with proper advance preparation.

Preparation for a guerrilla war against reactionary and colonial governments, as well as preparation for it in the event of an enemy invasion, includes the spiritual and political preparation of the population, the creation of special leadership bodies, the organization of guerrilla forces, their preparation, action planning and comprehensive support.

The preparation of partisan forces for warfare includes: the creation of leadership bodies, training of personnel, the formation and arming of groups and detachments both on enemy-controlled territory and outside the country, up to the organization of the production of explosives, mines and grenades and simple means, the organization of covert control .

The most important element of this preparation is the development of options for a plan of action, depending on the likely situation, in the conditions in which they can start.

Consequently, the preparation of the partisan forces for the fight can be considered complete when materially secure controlled partisan formations are created, as well as variants of plans for their actions, depending on the possible conditions for the deployment of the war.

Such training under ordinary peaceful conditions requires a considerable amount of time (sometimes from 2 to 5 years). It must be comprehensive and cover as many regions of the country as possible, so that then, by sudden simultaneous actions, cause confusion in the enemy and prevent him from suppressing the partisan forces at the very beginning of their activity.

As an example of wise advance comprehensive preparation for guerrilla warfare in the event of enemy aggression, one can cite the preparation for it in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and early 1930s. So, only in the Byelorussian SSR in the first half of the 30s there were six partisan detachments of 300-500 people each, sabotage groups were created and trained at large railway junctions and in cities. All of them were provided with weapons, ammunition and mines, given their rapid growth[43]. Unfortunately, all this was liquidated in 1937-1939. A similar picture was in Ukraine and the Leningrad military district.

What are the characteristics of guerrilla warfare? This:

- a peculiar concept of the enemy, which includes both his troops and institutions, authorities at various levels, the dominant political organizations of the enemy, various organizations of accomplices and their military and paramilitary formations, etc.;



- achievement of tactical, operational and strategic goals, throughout the entire war or most of it, with small, limited forces and means against enemy forces that are superior to partisan forces in numerical and military technical terms;

- the diversity of the nature of the objects (military, transport, industrial, warehouse, etc.) on which partisan forces strike;

- the absence of a front line and actions in the territory controlled by the enemy, the absence of a certain form of clothing among partisans (and only if necessary, the use of signs and stripes showing belonging to partisan formations);

- predominant strikes on selective objects, disconnected territorially, but united by their significance;

- the irregularity of combat nutrition (weapons and ammunition) of the partisan forces;

- extensive use of local resources of various kinds for partisan forces;

- great difficulties with the transportation and treatment of the wounded and sick;

- the objective need, along with military action against the enemy, to constantly improve contacts with the population, carry out accessible social events, protect the population and establish people's power, starting from grassroots bodies with varying degrees of democracy, and thus involve the people in the war of liberation.

Guerrilla warfare can hardly be successful without knowledge and application of the theory of guerrilla warfare. The impetus for the development of the theory of the art of guerrilla warfare at the beginning of the 19th century was the effective actions of the Guerrillas against the Napoleonic troops in Spain, as well as the actions of Russian partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812.

In 1821 in Russia, for the first time in history, the profound work of the partisan war hero D. Davydov was published: "An Experience in the Theory of Partisan Actions"[44]. In it, with skill, all questions of the organization of guerrilla forces, the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare were outlined. Many provisions of this work by D. Davydov have not lost their significance in our time.

In 1858, the work of Major General N.S. Golitsyn "On partisan actions on a large scale, brought into the correct system and applied to the actions of armies in general and our Russians in particular"[45], which outlined the issues of the strategy of guerrilla warfare and protecting the rear from enemy partisan actions.

Issues of guerrilla warfare are reflected in the writings of the military researchers of the West, including K. Clausewitz[46] and G. Jomini[47].

In 1884, the work of V.N. Klembovsky "Partisan actions", which was then reprinted three times during the years of the civil war.

In Soviet times, a number of very interesting works were also published, such as the book by M.A. Drobov "Small war: partisanship and sabotage"[48] or P. Karatygin's work "Partisanship".

The success of their actions largely depended on how correctly the theory of organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare was developed, to what extent it corresponded to practice, how well the leaders and commanders of guerrilla forces mastered it. The backwardness of theory, its inability to timely reveal new phenomena that affect the possibilities and effectiveness of guerrilla warfare, cost great sacrifices and sharply reduced the effectiveness of guerrilla operations in past wars.

However, it is not enough to have and systematically improve the theory of the art of guerrilla warfare; it must become the property of those who conduct or will conduct guerrilla operations.

## **Chapter 2. The role and significance of the partisan struggle in the XIX - early XX century.**

The great Russian commander Generalissimo A.V. Suvorov [49] wrote: "Without a lamp of history and the tactics of darkness," implying that without knowledge of the past, numerous mistakes can hardly be avoided, especially in the art of war. Guerrilla warfare is as much a branch of military science as any other and, as such, needs to be studied and has a long and glorious theory.

If we analyze all the liberation wars waged by the peoples, it becomes obvious that partisan movements, as an active form of armed resistance to foreign invaders, occupied a very prominent place in this patriotic struggle.

History knows such wars of liberation, when partisan formations were the only force that opposed the regular army of the conqueror, many times superior to the partisans.

Such an example is the struggle of the Spanish people at the beginning of the 19th century against the army of Napoleon. The regular Spanish army, almost without loss, in six days, was defeated by Marshal Murat, who was at the head of an 80,000-strong army. And the Spanish royal family - the Bourbons in full force voluntarily arrived as a prisoner to the winner. And suddenly, quite unexpectedly for all of Europe, Spain flared up with a fierce, uncompromising partisan struggle against the French conquerors.

The winner of Europe did not manage to cope with the Spanish Guerillas. To reach Madrid, capture it and capture the ruling dynasty, he needed 80,000 troops, and for the six-year occupation of Spain, he needed more than 200,000 troops[50].

The emperor encountered an even greater scale of partisan struggle in Russia. It is known that of the 600,000 troops that went on a campaign against Russia, Napoleon [51] brought only 130-140 thousand to Borodino. And Napoleon attributed these losses to a large extent due to guerrilla warfare. In a letter to Marshal Berthier, he wrote: "Note to the Duke of Elchingem (Ney) that he loses more people every day in foraging than in battles" [52].

When the Russian troops left Moscow, M.I. Kutuzov [53] strengthened the spontaneous popular partisan movement with military partisan detachments, sending to the rear on Napoleon's communications up to 20 military partisan detachments numbering from 200 to 2500 each, thereby including the forces of the army and the people in a single plan to achieve victory over the enemy. It was a brilliant experience of joint operations of mobile military and local peasant partisan formations behind enemy lines. The successful actions of the army partisan detachments contributed to the rise of the people's forces and the development of the partisan movement.

After the transition of the Russian army to the counteroffensive and the flight of the French from Moscow, the guerrilla war along the communications lines of Napoleon's retreating troops became nationwide. If the role of partisan struggle in the Patriotic War of 1812 during the period of the enemy's offensive from the border to Moscow was expressed in

that Napoleon was forced to leave large garrisons on his communications, expend his forces on guarding carts and couriers, then during the retreat of Napoleon and his pursuit, the role of guerrilla warfare was to disrupt the planned withdrawal of enemy troops, to deprive them of food and "rescue bonds of subordination"[54] .

All this was of great strategic importance. Despite the careful organization of the rear and the allocation of significant troops to protect it, Napoleon was unable to protect his communications from partisan actions.

In the second half of the 19th century, with the advent of railways, the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare increased even more. In the North American Civil War (1860-65), it was the railroads that served as the main object of partisan actions. The destruction of railway tracks, bridges and other structures proved to be the most sensitive for the enemy.

The growth in the size of armies, their increasing dependence on supplies from the deep rear, the development of railway transport increased the role and importance of partisan operations, and the appearance of crushing explosives and the improvement of methods for their detonation significantly increased the combat capabilities of even small detachments. The guerrillas began to inflict damage on the enemy without entering into a combat clash with him. This was achieved by the destruction of unguarded sections of railways and small artificial structures.

New potential opportunities for partisanship emerged during the Franco-German war of 1870-1871. In January 1871, French partisans (france tireres) by blowing up bridges in the rear of the German army besieging Paris, sought to interrupt the railway connection for 15 days. According to N. Petrovich, the actions of such partisan detachments forced the Germans to allocate a quarter of the active army, that is, about 100 thousand people, to protect their rear [55].

Due to the specific features of the First World War, during it, partisan operations were carried out on an extremely small scale, mainly in non-European theaters of military operations. In Europe, the actions of the Serbian partisans (komitajs) can be noted as the most objective. With a total number of no more than six to seven thousand people, they forced the Austrian command to keep an army of 70 thousand people in the occupied country, sometimes even removing additional troops from active fronts[56].

Partisan actions acquired a huge scope in the Civil War. According to the German press, in the summer of 1918, up to 200,000 partisan rebels operated in Ukraine. And by the time the Austro-Hungarian occupiers were expelled from Ukraine, 300,000 were already fighting with weapons in their hands[57].

In Siberia, whole partisan fronts operated against the Czechoslovak rebels and Kolchak[58]: the North-Kansky, the Stepno-Badzhaysky, and the Shchitkinsky. There were vast partisan regions: Altai, Angarsk, Transbaikalia, Ussuri, which were sometimes even called partisan republics.

By the autumn of 1919, more than 200,000 fighters, who were assisted by the majority of the working population of Siberia and the Far East, acted against the American-Japanese interventionists and the white troops of Kolchak alone in the ranks of the partisans[59]. In the Far East, the partisan movement contributed to the final expulsion of the Japanese-American interventionists.

In the rear of Denikin[60] in Ukraine in the autumn of 1919, more than 100,000 rebels operated. By November, the activity of the partisans, led by the Bureau behind the front, had increased so much that the enemy was forced to withdraw from the front and throw in the Donbass, Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson selected parts of Shkuro[61] and Slashchev[62].

Numerous partisan detachments operated against the interventionists (Americans, British, French) on the outskirts of the young Soviet Republic, numbering over 50 thousand people in their ranks in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. In the Arkhangelsk province - up to 20 thousand, in the Urals - up to 30 thousand and in the Far East - up to 50 thousand people[63].

Most of the partisan detachments, as these areas were liberated by the Red Army, were merged into regular units. There were also reverse cases, when, due to necessity, military units switched to partisan methods of struggle, finding themselves behind enemy lines.

It is impossible not to note the effectiveness of Makhno's actions[64], who, during the November 1919 counter-offensive of the Red Army, literally paralyzed Denikin's rear and captured the main supply base of the Volunteer Army, cutting off all the railways in its rear. (By the way, I met Makhno. He was an excellent organizer).

To suppress the Tambov uprising, the participants of which actively used the methods of partisan struggle, it was necessary to use troops with a total number of more than 120 thousand, which with their firepower supported 9 artillery brigades, 4 armored trains, 6 armored aircraft, 5 armored detachments and 2

squadron. Only with the use of elite units of the Red Army was it possible to suppress the partisan movement. Tukhachevsky himself[65], who commanded these troops, wrote that he had to fight "with the entire local population", and these were "not battles and operations, but, perhaps, a whole war"[66].

Thus, the guerrilla struggle during the Civil War undoubtedly had a huge impact on its final outcome. It should be noted that the specificity of partisanship at that time was determined by two points: the high speed of movement of the partisans (they could, using horses, change them at the crossings) and the ability to attack the enemy at a time when he was isolated from his main forces and, therefore, could not count on their help. Under these conditions, the most effective were small detached detachments, whose advantage was elusiveness. In the future, this experience of the Civil War had both a positive and a negative impact on the process of organizing partisan struggle during the Great Patriotic War and on its effectiveness.

### **Chapter 3. The role and significance of the partisan struggle on the eve of the Second World War.**

In 1935, fascist Italy attacked Abyssinia. The plan of the Italian command was to defeat the small Abyssinian army (10 thousand people) and, having captured the capital before the rainy season, end the war in one and a half to two months. In fierce battles from October 3, 1935 to May 5, 1936, the Italian fascists managed to break the resistance of the Abyssinian troops[67]. But the Abyssinian people, who had risen to the liberation war, thwarted this plan. The outbreak of partisan struggle continued even after the official end of the war. Mussolini was forced to keep up to 200 thousand troops and more than 300 combat aircraft in Abyssinia to conduct punitive expeditions against the Abyssinian patriots. During the Second World War, the guerrilla struggle in Abyssinia flared up with renewed vigor. It ended with an armed uprising of the people and the restoration of the national independence of the Abyssinian state in 1941.

But without a doubt, the most brilliant page in the history of guerrilla warfare in the pre-war period is the guerrilla war in Spain. More than anything, she influenced the development of partisan and sabotage art. On July 18, 1936, the famous phrase "A cloudless sky over all of Spain" heralded the beginning of the rebellion of the "right" Falangist generals against the legitimate government of the Spanish Republic. The rebels were supported by fascist Germany and Italy, in a short time they supplied them with about two thousand combat aircraft, 1200 tanks, two thousand guns, rifles, machine guns, shells and cartridges. Well-trained pilots, tankers, artillerymen and other military specialists went to Spain from these countries.

The number of the Italian expeditionary army reached 200 thousand people, the German legion "Condor" - 50 thousand. This intervention largely changed the course of the war. As the regular republican army retreated under the onslaught of the phalangists and interventionists, partisan detachments and groups began to operate in the territory occupied by the rebels. Volunteers from 56 countries came to the aid of the Spanish people, primarily from the Soviet Union.

The numerical and qualitative growth of the armies involved in the conflict on the side of Franco, combined with the actions of counterintelligence, significantly narrowed the ability of the partisans to fight the enemy in open battle. On the other hand, these armies have become much more dependent on various supplies - from fuel and lubricants to ammunition. For the first time in the 20th century, this opened up completely new opportunities for conducting a sabotage war, and many of the sabotage techniques worked out during the Spanish Civil War were then replicated and used in various countries at different times.

The Spaniards, who last guerrillaized during the Napoleonic Wars, more than 120 years ago, had neither the skills nor the specialist saboteurs capable of solving the specific tasks of guerrilla warfare in the rear of the modern regular army. Seeing this, senior adviser Yan Karlovich Berzin [68] achieved a direction to

Spain of well-trained, experienced commanders and specialist graduates of special schools from the USSR[69]. They began their activities as advisers and instructors of small reconnaissance groups, then turned into sabotage groups.

The actions of the partisans, who used improvised sabotage weapons, were so successful that when our unit, commanded by Domingo Ungria and (where I happened to be an adviser) derailed a train with the headquarters of the Italian aviation division, the General Staff of the Republican Army created a special battalion for sabotage operations in behind enemy lines[70].

Then, in July 1937, after street sabotage that disrupted the communication of the Madrid rebel front with the South for 6 days during the Brunet operation, the General Staff of the Republican Army turned the battalion of Domingo Ungria into a special brigade for partisan operations behind enemy lines. At the same time, the personnel of special battalions operating behind enemy lines were given one and a half salaries, summer rations and uniforms as they wore out.

And in October 1937, in connection with the successful actions of the partisans, the 14th partisan corps was created as part of the Spanish Republican Army, which, disrupting the rear of the enemy, assisted the troops in their operations at the front and contributed to the strengthening of the partisan movement in the territory occupied by the enemy.

Despite the fact that the fascists knew about the existence of special units in the Spanish Republican army designed to disrupt the work of their rear, they knew all their main means and methods, the command of the fascist army could not organize reliable protection of the most important communications. The Nazis spent so much effort protecting their rear that their numbers exceeded the number of republican special units and local partisans by 20-30 times. At the same time, the losses of the Spanish special units were 150-200 times less than the losses of the enemy.

The guerrilla forces in actions to disrupt the work of the rear of the rebels essentially replaced aviation and already in the autumn of 1937 diverted more than 110 thousand enemy soldiers and officers to guard communications and other important facilities. By sabotage on communications and other objects, the partisans inflicted significant damage on the enemy in equipment, other materiel, and even manpower[71].

The fall of the Spanish Republic in the spring of 1939, as a result of the betrayal of the defeatists and anarchists, led to enormous sacrifices for the Spanish people and their armed forces. At the same time, thanks to their maneuvering tactics, units of the 14th partisan corps almost did not suffer, which then left in two directions - to Algeria and France.

After the occupation of France by the Nazis, this corps, under the command of deputy commander Antonio Buitrago, escaped from the camps and began fighting along with the French partisans[72]. Corps commander Domingo Ungria found shelter in the USSR and actively participated with me in the partisan struggle in the temporarily occupied territory of the Soviet Union.

The significance of guerrilla warfare in the rear of foreign interventionists and rebels in Spain in 1936-39 is determined by the creation of new forms, methods and technical means of guerrilla warfare. All this helped to paralyze the rear of the fascists and forced them to stop sabotage, since all the forces intended by the enemy to operate in the rear of the republican troops were used to protect their own rear.

The guerrilla war in Spain was also of great importance in the training of personnel of the International Brigades. Approximately 400 foreigners fought in the partisan formations of Spain. After the defeat of the Republicans, they returned to their countries - Italy, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, having gained experience and skills of a new guerrilla war, which was a great contribution to the deployment of the partisan movement during World War II. So, the chief of staff of the 14th partisan corps L. Ilich worked as the head of the operational department of the main headquarters

French partisans and franchisors. Many members of the International Brigade participated in the partisan struggle in the USSR, Poland, Albania, Belgium, and France. Even after the Second World War, many veterans of the guerrilla war in Spain participated in the guerrilla struggle against the imperialists and colonialists in Algeria, the Portuguese colonies, in Latin America.

The Spanish partisans who emigrated from the country turned out to be truly necessary when it was nevertheless necessary to organize a partisan movement in the territories of the Soviet Union occupied by the Wehrmacht. In the partisan formations that I happened to command, there were 356 Spaniards - experienced, skilled fighters. The Spaniards operated in the German rear as part of the guards miners and the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes (OMSBON). They became instructors in special partisan schools. Former unit commander Juan Menendez, with a group of other Spanish specialists, taught the paratroopers the tactics of guerrilla operations. Juan Antonio Ramirez was the deputy commander for sabotage of a large partisan formation in Ukraine.

The significance of the guerrilla war in the rear of foreign invaders and falangist rebels in Spain in 1936-1939 is determined, firstly, by testing new forms, methods and technical means of guerrilla warfare and, secondly, by training cadres of international brigades partisans, who, as we see, During the Second World War, they made a great contribution to the deployment of guerrilla warfare. If not for Spain, the scope of the partisan movement in Europe would never have reached such strength. It is safe to say that the modern guerrilla sabotage war was born in Spain and from there spread to other countries.

It is impossible not to mention another war that greatly influenced the development of modern guerrilla-sabotage warfare. I'm talking about more than twenty years of national liberation war of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders (1937-1945) and the army of the Kuomintang (1928-1949), in which the guerrilla struggle was of exceptionally important - strategic importance. It ensured the widespread deployment of a mass movement aimed at fighting the invaders, which had a positive effect on the course of World War II, created the conditions for the expansion of enemy troops and raising the spirit of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), contributing to its numerical growth and military success.

#### **Chapter 4. Doctrine of M.V. Frunze[73] and preparation for guerrilla warfare. The**

experience of guerrilla warfare, accumulated in the 1910-20s by the Russian army, was developed by Soviet military theorists and laid the foundation for the military doctrine of the young state. In conditions when Russia was surrounded by enemies, with a constant threat of attack, it was partisan formations that could play a big role in ensuring security.

Until 1933, the Army was told that in a future war with its maneuver operations "a major role will belong to ... partisan actions, for which it is necessary to organize and prepare for their implementation on the widest scale."

A huge merit in organizing the preparation of the country's armed forces for the conduct of the guerrilla war, which widely unfolded in the USSR in 1922-1932, rightfully belongs to M.V. Frunze. Back in July 1921, an article by M.V. Frunze "Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army". In it, Frunze emphasized the importance that preparations for conducting a guerrilla war could acquire for the organization of the country's defense. "If the state pays enough serious attention to this, if the preparation of this "small war" is carried out systematically and systematically, then in this way, - the author noted, - it is possible to create such a situation for the enemy army in which, with all their technical advantages, they will be powerless in front of a comparatively poorly armed, but full of initiative, bold and determined adversary"[74].

A prerequisite for the success of a "small war", according to M.V. Frunze was to develop its plan in advance and create the prerequisites for ensuring the success of its broad development.

It was based on the Leninist idea that "partisan actions are not revenge, but military actions"[75] and the doctrine of M.V. Frunze. He formulated the norms and conditions for guerrilla warfare:

"The methods and forms of waging war are not always the same. They change depending on the conditions of development and, above all, on the development of production. Military tactics primarily depend on the level of military equipment.

We see the second means of combating the technical superiority of the enemy army in the preparation of a guerrilla war in the territories of possible theaters of military operations.

But an indispensable condition for the fruitfulness of the idea of a small war is, I repeat, the advance development of its plan and the creation of all the data that ensure its broad development. Hence, the task of our General Staff should be to develop the idea of a small war"[76].

Preparation      To guerrilla war.

In January 1930, I was sent to work in the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Ukrainian military district, located in Kyiv, in the department that was preparing for the partisan war. By that time, I had experience in mine-blasting operations of the civil war, experience in training demolition miners of the railway troops, participating in the preparation of railway sections in the border strip for the rapid construction of barriers in case of an enemy invasion. I made a number of proposals for mine-blasting and developed several models of mines. They were highly appreciated by I.E. Yakir[77], who paid great attention to preparing for a guerrilla war in case of enemy aggression.

I.E. Yakir spoke in special partisan schools where personnel were trained, attended exercises where partisan detachments and sabotage groups "operated". He determined the location of hidden, prepared in advance partisan bases, and even once he himself was present when laying in the caches the means of struggle needed by the partisans on one hidden base prepared in advance. Much attention was paid to preparations for a guerrilla war by K.E. Voroshilov, A.I. Egorov, Ya.K. Berzin, V.K. Blucher, I.P. Uborevich, V.M. Primakov[78] and other military leaders.

In 1929-33, as a specialist, I had the opportunity to participate in the training of partisan personnel in five special schools, including the central school, where K. Sverchevsky was the head and where foreign personnel were trained. Some of them then organized guerrilla warfare in the countries occupied by the Nazis, including Poland, Italy, France and, above all, Yugoslavia.

Along with these schools, there were schools in Kyiv, one in Kharkov, one in Kupyansk. In the latter, personnel were trained for operations abroad. I trained two Chinese groups there: I trained two Chinese groups in the technique and tactics of sabotage.

The training of specialists was carried out with the expectation of turning them into commanders during the war. At the same time, partisan detachments, organizational and sabotage groups were being prepared, capable of operating in unfamiliar terrain, including outside the Soviet Union. These partisan cadres were trained in raiding and parachuting.

In the cities and on the railway sections to the east of the fortified areas, well-trained underground saboteurs equipped with special means were planted. They were carefully hidden. Being infinitely devoted to the Soviet power, they not only did not show this loyalty in any way, but, moreover, for outsiders they even appeared to be offended by the Soviet power. These saboteurs disguised training in special schools either by business trips to build roads, or by improving

specialties, when assistant drivers received the right to drive a steam locomotive and so on.

The commanders of subdivisions and units of the Red Army, who had undergone special training and retraining, if necessary, could proceed in an organized manner to partisan operations, covertly base and move in the territory occupied by the enemy, leave the enemy blockade, use improvised means to inflict damage on the enemy.

The training of partisan personnel was combined with the improvement of methods and means of fighting behind enemy lines.

Taking into account the difficulties in supplying the partisan forces, especially at the beginning of the war (and we knew this from the history of our struggle against the interventionists and the White Guards and from the experience of our foreign comrades, for example, in China), significant stocks of the means of struggle needed by the partisans were created at hidden bases west of the line fortified areas. It was a far-sighted move. If the enemy troops reached the fortified areas, partisan bases with a large supply of means of struggle would be in their rear.

Partisan formations were involved in combined arms exercises. There were also special gatherings. So, in 1932, secret exercises took place near Moscow - the Bronnitsky maneuvers. The scope of the case can be judged from the following data. In Belarus, six partisan detachments were trained, each consisting of 300 to 500 people. In addition, underground sabotage groups were created and trained in border towns and railway junctions. 50,000 rifles, 150 machine guns, a lot of ammunition and mine-explosives[79] were laid in underground secret warehouses. In Ukraine, at least 3,000 partisan commanders and specialists were trained, and a lot of weapons, ammunition and mine explosives were laid. Similar work was carried out in the Leningrad Military District.

In preparation for a guerrilla war in the event of enemy aggression, I also had the opportunity to participate in clarifying mobilization plans for deploying a war behind enemy lines. These plans were developed at the headquarters of the Ukrainian military district and at the IV Directorate of the General Staff. Great preparations for guerrilla warfare were also carried out along the lines of the OGPU, and especially along the lines of the road transport departments of the OGPU on the border railways. The organs of the OGPU were mainly preparing for the subversive actions of the underground partisans, and along the line of the NPO, the troops were trained for partisan actions and the preparation of partisan formations that could operate on unfamiliar territory. I know that the local Party organizations of the border regions and republics also provided assistance to the OGPU bodies in the selection of subversive personnel.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks did not give guidance in preparations for partisan operations behind the lines of a potential aggressor. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus and the Leningrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took part, which was expressed in helping the intelligence agencies and the OGPU in the selection of personnel, their employment in the desired area, as well as in the provision of premises. There was no participation of local party organs in the training and mission of the partisan formations. Inside the partisan formations, as in all the Armed Forces of the USSR, there were political workers who did not replace commanders.

As far as I know, until 1933 the leadership of the partisan forces operating behind enemy lines was planned by the command of the military districts by radio from the rear of our troops. It was assumed that the partisan formations would create and lead the underground, which would carry out their tasks.

As a result, the command of our units and formations in the early 30s was not afraid to be behind enemy lines. If it was impossible to break through to their main forces, they could proceed in an organized manner to partisan operations, striking at the rear of the enemy. And, of course, they were sure that next to and with them in the enemy rear there would always be patriots ready to provide any help.

Preparations for guerrilla warfare in the event of enemy aggression in the early 1930s were carried out under very difficult conditions:



forced collectivization, dispossession of the middle peasants and famine. Measures were taken to save trained personnel from starvation: they were given jobs at sugar factories, timber industry enterprises and construction sites, but still the losses were great. Nevertheless, by 1933, everything was prepared so that in the event of enemy aggression, suddenly and simultaneously, such a large-scale controlled partisan operation would be paralyzed, as a result of which all communications of the western regions of Belarus, Ukraine and Bessarabia, occupied by the enemy, would be paralyzed, as a result of which the troops at the front would be left without replenishment, ammunition and fuel.

#### Repression.

In 1933, supporters of the theory of war on foreign territory won. (During the repressions against the military in 1937-38, the warehouses were liquidated, and many foreign-made barrels were thrown away like scrap. Everyone who was involved in the preparation of a small war was repressed in 1937).

In May 1935 I graduated from the railway department of the Military Transport Academy of the Red Army and was appointed deputy military commandant of the Leningrad-Moskovsky station. I would certainly have died, since I worked under the direction of I.E. Yakira, Ya.K. Berzin, accompanied by M.N. Tukhachevsky and V.M. Primakov, who were declared enemies of the people and shot. I'm lucky. In November 1936, I managed to get to Spain, where I became an adviser and instructor to the partisan formation under the command of D. Ungrii, who, in 10 months of our joint work, turned from the commander of a sabotage group into the commander of the 14th sabotage corps of the Spanish Republican Army.

At the beginning of November 1937, I returned to my homeland and was stunned when I learned that all my bosses in all the lines where I served and studied were subjected to repression.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army S.G. Gendin introduced me to the Commissar of Defense. K.E. Voroshilov approved my activities and promised new awards. Two weeks later, Gendin was arrested as an enemy of the people, and I stayed at the Baltschug Hotel, awaiting appointment.

After a long wait, I was invited to the NKVD.

There was, as they say, a conversation with predilection. I was told that advance preparation for a guerrilla war in the event of enemy aggression was not a good deed, but the idea of enemies of the people, such as Yakir, Uborevich, and others. I tried to prove the need for this preparation, referring to the fact that it was carried out on the basis of the provisions of B .AND. Lenin, proposals by M.V. Frunze. He said that the participants in the civil war, party members and Komsomol members were mainly involved in this case. The interlocutor smiled slyly. The conversation was long, and I was given the opportunity to "think". I went outside[80].

Everything was like a nightmare. It became clear to me that the partisan cadres we had prepared in advance, with rare exceptions, had already been repressed. I was seized by such fear as I had never experienced - neither at the front, nor behind enemy lines. In the war, I risked only myself, and here people close to me were put under attack.

As it became known later, dozens of times more well-trained partisan commanders and specialists died from repressions in the 1930s than during the entire Great Patriotic War. Only those who fell out of sight of Yezhov's apparatus survived. Basically, these were participants in the national revolutionary war in Spain (A.K. Sprogis[81], Troyan, N.A. Prokopyuk, and others) and those who changed their place of residence unnoticed by Yezhov's henchmen. It was they who became the heads of those schools that formed the partisan cadres of the Great Patriotic War.

The repressions of 1937-38 dealt a crushing blow to the country, which affected the course of the war; they disabled about or even more than 40 thousand officers. This is three times more than what the Wehrmacht lost on the eastern front during the entire first year of the war. The repressions led to the fact that in the Red Army many divisions, units, and even more formations and associations were commanded, to put it mildly, by unprepared people.

Particularly great damage was inflicted by these repressions on our preparations for guerrilla warfare in the event of enemy aggression. All partisans-underground saboteurs were completely repressed. I do not know any of the underground saboteurs trained by us who would not be repressed. Of the two dozen surviving officers who were trained by us from the commanders and political workers of the Armed Forces and partisans of the civil war, two died during the Great Patriotic War, and more than one thousand were repressed.

It was these repressions and the incompetence of the leadership of the partisan movement during the war that led to the fact that the partisans did not solve their main task - to cut off the enemy troops at the front from their sources of supply.

However, don't be organized by M.V. Frunze training, we would not have reached the scale of partisan operations that were carried out in the last years of the war. And if the personnel had been saved, then it would have been possible to deploy mass controlled actions immediately, and not two years after the start of the war!

Frunze in his doctrine remained faithful to the Leninist principle that: 1) guerrilla warfare is not revenge, but military action. Consequently: 2) it must be planned by the General Staff, and not by party institutions. The third most important provision of the Frunze doctrine consisted in the advance preparation of a guerrilla war.

## Chapter 5

The Great Patriotic War, as already mentioned in the first book, found me in the position of head of the department of mining and barriers of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army. Returning from a business trip at the end of June 1941, I headed the operational-engineering group on the Western Front, whose task was to set up barriers. Soon I learned that the party organs of the republics and regions, on the territories that the enemy had invaded, began to create partisan detachments and, almost without any preparation, throw them behind enemy lines.

Partisan actions began from the first days of the Great Patriotic War, contrary to historical experience and mob installations in preparation for guerrilla warfare in case of enemy aggression.

In his address to the Soviet people on July 3, 1941, Stalin also called for guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. He said: "In areas occupied by the enemy, it is necessary to create partisan detachments, mounted and on foot, to create sabotage groups to fight against parts of the enemy army, to kindle guerrilla warfare everywhere and everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telegraph and telephone communications, set fire to forests, warehouses and convoys. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupt all their activities "[82].

The posing of the question of the methods of guerrilla warfare in Stalin's speech surprised me. Firstly, there is no one to create partisan detachments in the areas occupied by the enemy, not to mention all the difficulties of this matter. This should have been done even before the occupation of the territory. Secondly, partisans cannot set fire to wagon trains and engage in battles with parts of the enemy army. After all, in combat contact, the enemy has the opportunity to build up his forces, receive reinforcements during the battle, while the partisans, having very limited resources, cannot do this. In addition, after all, enemy troops are equipped, as a rule, much better than partisans! How can untrained, poorly armed people (after all, these partisan detachments would be created on enemy territory) fight with units of a regular enemy army? This appeal by Stalin aimed the partisans at fruitless partisanism, and not at partisan warfare in order to cut off enemy troops from their sources of supply. Thirdly, the call to set fire to forests behind enemy lines was harmful to the partisans and useful to the Nazis. If anyone else had said that the partisans should set fire to the forests, he would no doubt be considered a provocateur or a fool.

It was in the first quarter of the 20th century that partisans had equal, and sometimes even greater, maneuverability than the most mobile units of the enemy, for example, cavalry, and therefore could be based and raid on any terrain and at any time of the year. The motorization of troops, their saturation with a large number of rapid-fire weapons, the increase and improvement of aviation, created a sharp superiority of regular troops over partisans in speed of movement and weapons. Now the most favorable for the partisans was the area that would be inaccessible to motorized troops and had extensive shelters from enemy aircraft.

In domestic conditions, such a locality, without a doubt, was forests, which were the main base of the partisans. And these own bases should be burned?

Stalin clearly did not take into account the counter-guerrilla measures of the enemy. Meanwhile, taking into account the experience of past wars, especially the experience of fighting partisans in Spain in 1936-1939, the German General Staff, even before the attack on Poland, provided for a whole system of such measures. Special troops and bodies were created for the counter-partisan struggle, which acted according to a predetermined plan. In the course of past campaigns, the Nazi punishers gained a lot of experience, which they later used in the occupied territories of our country.

Partisan operations in the rear of a strong enemy specially prepared for counter-partisan struggle required comprehensive preparation of partisan forces and optimal planning of their actions. Nothing like Stalin was envisaged in his speech. Moreover, in the same speech, he demanded "during the forced withdrawal of Red Army units ... not to leave the enemy a single kilogram of bread ... Collective farmers must steal all cattle, hand over the grain for safekeeping to state bodies for export to the rear areas, bread and the fuel which cannot be taken out must certainly be destroyed." [83]

The situation was quite different in the territories left by our troops in 1941. A significant part of the Soviet land was occupied by the fascist invaders before any evacuation of even the most important defense enterprises began. Soon after the enemy invasion, the evacuation of industrial equipment, agricultural machinery and collective farm livestock and food from those areas threatened by the occupation began. At the same time, almost only workers and engineering and technical personnel were evacuated from local residents. Very few railway workers were evacuated and all the collective farmers remained in place. Thus, the bulk of the population did not evacuate.

In such conditions, the export and destruction, instead of distribution, of food, and, above all, grain, doomed the population of the territories temporarily occupied by the enemy to starvation. The literal implementation of these orders would only lead to a sharp increase in the number of collaborators, would cause hatred among the local residents for the Soviet government and the army, and would push many into the service of the enemy. After Stalin's speech, the hasty formation and transfer to the rear of the enemy intensified without proper preparation of partisans, detachments and sabotage groups. Meanwhile, their main task was not even formulated: to cut off enemy troops from their sources of supply.

What was the real guerrilla tactics? Undoubtedly, the means of armed struggle influence both the possibilities and the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare; M.V. also wrote about this. Frunze. On the eve of World War II, the appearance of numerous military equipment (tanks, motorized infantry, aviation, radio communications) had a decisive influence on partisan operations.

On the one hand, as a result of this, the partisans, as already mentioned, lost a very significant advantage over regular troops in maneuverability on the ground, accessible to armored units; aviation could not only help the enemy troops in detecting large detachments of partisans, but also directly influence the partisans; radio communication made it often useless to cut telephone wires before partisan attacks on

headquarters, warehouses and other objects of the enemy, reduced to a minimum the isolation of individual enemy units from his main forces.

Troops and cargo transported by road and trains were completely unable to prevent the explosions of mines planted on the roads. Only very strong guards using technical means of protection can prevent the mining of communication routes, however, such guards, as a rule, are created after the start of mass sabotage. Therefore, it is very important to mine these objects with mines of various types before creating such a strong defense.

As far as motor transport is concerned, even in Spain it was confirmed that not only railways, but also automobile columns, even accompanied by tanks, are very vulnerable to partisans. The convoys could not send military guards, and the Francoists did not have enough strength to purposefully guard the roads.

Having inflicted a fire strike on the column, the partisans "finished off" it, if it was within their power, or left for the area where pursuit was excluded. By using guided mines to hit car columns, the partisans could generally remain invisible and therefore invulnerable.

Even the appearance of aviation in many countries benefited the partisans. If enemy aviation hindered the actions of partisans, then for the first time in history our own made it possible to supply partisan formations with everything necessary over the head of the enemy, deliver various means of combat, instructors, specialists and leaders to the enemy rear, and evacuate the wounded.

The advent of radio helped the partisans even more, since it made it possible to maintain reliable communication with their leadership bodies and immediately transmit intelligence about the enemy.

Technological progress has given the partisans the opportunity to disable road and especially rail transport, influence the enemy's lines of communication, and destroy his troops during transportation without coming into combat contact. But for this it was necessary to ensure the supply of partisans with special mines and explosives (explosives). The partisans could not solve the problem of closing the night and day traffic on railway lines and highways, as Stalin demanded, at the expense of trophies and ammunition and weapons picked up on the battlefields. Special mines usually do not lie on the ground, and as for trophies, it should be noted that partisans have much less opportunities to take trophies than regular troops. Stalin clearly did not understand this. Such a setting was not a forced measure. Let's run ahead. When the possibilities for supplying the partisans increased, on August 18, 1942, the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement (TSSHPD) P.K. Ponomarenko[84], after another conversation with Stalin, gave a radiogram to a number of commanders of partisan formations. In this telegram, they were oriented towards supply through trophies, pointing out that "supplying the partisans from the center", allegedly, "is not only difficult, but can also lead to incarceration."

All the technical means and capabilities described above, all the experience accumulated in Spain, could and should have been used to protect their country, and not be guided by the views of partisan activity frozen at the level of the Civil War and Stalin's calls like "burning forests."

On July 13, 1941, by order of the people's commissar of defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko[85], I was concurrently appointed head of the Operational Training Center (OTC) of the Western Front, whose task included the most minimal training of partisan detachments and sabotage groups, their material support and transfer to the rear of the enemy. All this took no more than seven days. I note that in the 30s, future partisans who had at least a year of combined arms training were trained for as much as three to six

months.

The partisan formations we were preparing were in dire need of radio communications, special mines, weapons and ammunition. something we are with

they were mined with labor, hoping that the command of the partisan forces would soon be created, which would be engaged in planning and ensuring partisan actions.

Only a month after the start of the war, on July 18, 1941, a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On organizing the struggle in the rear of the German troops" appeared. However, it did not bring clarity. It did not say a word about the preparation of partisan formations, the organization of communications and supplies, the involvement in the partisan struggle of military personnel who, due to the prevailing situation, ended up behind enemy lines and could not break through to the main forces of the Red Army. And this decree did not set the task of cutting off enemy troops from their sources of supply.

And most importantly, instead of the system of command and control of partisan forces, which was well developed in the early 30s and tested in Spain, it was proposed to "deploy a network of our Bolshevik underground organizations in the occupied territory to direct all actions against the fascist invaders." It was a clearly unfeasible plan, which led to the death of many courageous communists. It contradicted the experience of guerrilla warfare in China and Spain, and was soon refuted by domestic practice. In addition, such a network of Bolshevik underground organizations to lead the struggle behind enemy lines simply did not exist, and it could not be created even in a year. The fact is that the Nazis provided for measures to combat the party and combat partisan underground. All citizens of the USSR who changed their place of residence after June 22, 1941 were registered with them or even immediately subjected to repression.

The hastily organized underground made up of people who were known as communists, and even more so the leaders of party organizations, turned out to be very vulnerable and the underground workers in most cases died if they did not go to the partisan formations (secretaries of the underground regional committees and district committees of the CPSU (b) turned, as a rule, to the commanders and commissars of these combat units).

Even the experience of exercises in the early 1930s convincingly showed that when conducting a full-scale guerrilla war, it is impossible to do without operational-military bodies for directing partisan forces with powerful radio centers.

The July resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks also did not stop the hasty formation and mass transfer to the enemy rear of poorly trained, poorly armed and almost not equipped with reliable means of radio communication partisan detachments. The guerrilla war of Soviet patriots, as Hero of the Soviet Union M.I. Naumov, "was conducted not only ineptly, but also mismanaged, one might say, neglected" [86]. In addition, the misfortune of the first partisan detachments and formations was also rooted in the fact that they were used in the front line of the enemy. "... Untrained, not equipped in a front-line manner, not at all adapted in any respect to a positional mode of action, the partisans often died without causing significant harm to the enemy, without destroying his communications. And there only strengthened, taking advantage of the silence, the administrative bodies of the occupiers" [87].

And yet, even under such, the worst of all possible circumstances, with huge losses and low efficiency, the actions of the partisans were very sensitive to the Wehrmacht and visible to distant allies. "Behind the lines of the German fronts," W. Churchill wrote, "partisans appeared who waged a brutal war against the Germans, disrupting their communications. The Russian railway network captured by the enemy turned out to be unusable." [88] potential opportunities that lurk even in poorly prepared and ineptly conducted guerrilla warfare.

#### Losses.

By the autumn of 1941, 18 thousand partisans were transferred to the occupied part of the Leningrad region, including 6 partisan regiments with a total number of up to 8 thousand people. By winter, no more than 4 thousand of them remained.

In Ukraine, by the fall, 2 partisan regiments, 883 partisan detachments and 1,700 reconnaissance and sabotage groups with a total strength of 35,000 people were preserved. By June 1942, only 30 partisan detachments numbering 4043 people remained, and only in April 1943 the number of Ukrainian partisans reached 15 thousand, and in January, when the number of NOAU reached 400 thousand, the number of Ukrainian partisans did not exceed 48 thousand people.

The situation was no better in Belarus, where there were exceptionally favorable conditions for waging a guerrilla war: vast forests and swamps, people devoted to their homeland.

On August 1, 1941, there were 231 active partisan detachments on the territory of Belarus, with a total number of over 12 thousand people. At the end of summer and autumn, the sending of partisan detachments behind enemy lines continued, and by the end of the year 437 partisan detachments and groups, numbering 7254 people, were created and sent to Belarus. On January 1, 1942, 61 detachments remained. Thus, by January 1, 1942, less than 4% of partisan detachments had survived in Ukraine, less than 10% of detachments and groups in Belarus, and about 25% in the occupied Leningrad region.

The situation was much better in the Smolensk, Kalinin, Orel and Moscow regions, where there was more time for the preparation of partisan formations (although also no more than 2-3 months) ...

The partisan forces were our "second front" and their number without rear support reached 150-240 thousand. This front was at one time commanded by Marshal K.E. Voroshilov. Then the front was left without a commander and the chief of staff of this front was a career political worker P.K. Ponomarenko, who did not command a company and did not graduate from the military academy. The Belarusian partisans were "commanded" by the head of the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement P.Z. Kalinin, who in the Red Army would not have been trusted with a platoon, but he was instructed to command an army, the number of which in 1943 exceeded 100 thousand armed partisans. And the war behind enemy lines is very difficult. At the front, the enemy in front of you is usually only in front, and behind enemy lines, he is dangerous from all sides. The fronts were commanded by such marshals as K. Rokossovsky[89], I. Konev, R. Malinovsky, G. Zhukov, I. Bagramyan[90] and others. It is impossible to win without mastering the art of war, and in guerrilla warfare, it is precisely the art of war combined with political support that is also needed. Therefore, it was advisable to entrust the command of partisan forces to people with special training, and party workers to deal with political support.

As early as July 1941, participants in the guerrilla war in the rear of the fascist interventionists and rebels in Spain made a proposal to stop the transfer of partisan formations that did not have proper training to the rear of the enemy, to shift the emphasis on the formation of special units from carefully trained people to send them to the rear of the fascist invaders in order to cut off enemy troops at the front from their sources of supply.

Given Stalin such an indication, it would be possible in a short time to put out of action the enemy's extended communications passing through areas very favorable for partisan operations. However, despite numerous proposals, he did not.

Nevertheless, the ideas of a more effective organization of guerrilla warfare, for example, never left my mind. Once I shared my thoughts with the secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U N.S. Khrushchev, who in the fall of 1941 was also a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front. As it turned out, Khrushchev was ready for such a conversation: at one time, something similar was offered to him by M.K. Kochegarov is a former head of one of the partisan schools in Kyiv and a participant in the war in Spain. Khrushchev informed the Military Council of the Front about my considerations and, on his recommendation, sent them to Stalin in the form of a document signed by me and General Nevsky. For his part, Khrushchev wrote a personal letter to Stalin, in which he asked him to receive me for a talk on this issue.

In December 1941, I was already sitting in Stalin's waiting room, but he did not receive me and sent me to L. Mekhlis[91]. As soon as I began to state the main provisions, Mekhlis abruptly interrupted me:

- Don't talk about that! This is not what is needed now. He paused and ironically exclaimed:

- Deep enemy rear, communications! Have you fallen from the sky? Don't you know that the enemy stands near Moscow itself?! It must be taken into account that winter has come, and it is necessary to fully use the advantages that it gives! We need to freeze the Nazis! All forests, all houses, all buildings where the enemy can hide from the cold must be burned! Do you understand?

I cautiously noticed that the forests do not burn in winter and that they are a base for partisans. And if you burn villages, our people will lose their homes.

The objection only added fuel to the fire. Mekhlis called me and Nevsky[92] unfortunate theoreticians and blind men. He demanded that the Moscow region be turned into a snowy desert: wherever the enemy poked his head, he should only stumble upon cold and ashes.

Upon returning to the second home of the NCO, where I was staying, I again remembered the words of Mekhlis I had just heard and was horrified. Sweat even broke out on my forehead ... After all, in a speech on July 3, 1941, Stalin called for setting fire to forests behind enemy lines ...

The next day, I reported to Khrushchev via HF that instead of Stalin, I accepted Mekhlis, and how he reacted to our proposal with Nevsky.

- Comrade Stalin is very busy, - Nikita Sergeevich said diplomatically, - but I will call Comrade Voznesensky.

And indeed, a few days later, the head of the engineering troops of the Red Army, Major General L.Z. Kotlyar[93] and I were invited to the chairman of the State Planning Commission N.A. Voznesensky[94]. It was proposed to take with them samples of circuit breakers and fuses, which were discussed in the report addressed to Stalin. Voznesensky was smiling and looked very

young. He offered to sit down, he himself sank into a chair last. After a detailed discussion, the needs for special non-retrievable slow-moving anti-train mines were identified. Already in the spring of 1942, they began to enter the troops in significant numbers.

## Chapter 6

The reason for the huge losses suffered by the partisans, as well as a small I see the effectiveness of the guerrilla war in 1941-42 in the following mistakes:

1. Strategic mistakes of the military leadership, as a result of which The Patriotic War was stretched out for almost five years.

2. Repressions that destroyed experienced, well-trained personnel and the elimination of the necessary measures in the event of enemy aggression 3-4 years before the war.

3. The leadership of the military operations of the partisans was entrusted to a person who had neither military nor special training.

4. Unprepared formations were thrown behind enemy lines.

5. The partisans were given overwhelming tasks that could be solved only by combat clashes, which is basically wrong.

6. There was no planning for the actions of the partisan forces, which is associated with the incompetence of the leaders of the headquarters of the partisan movement.

Let's take a closer look at these errors. Mistakes of

the military leadership in determining the tasks of guerrilla warfare. All the strategic mistakes

made were the result of forgetting the provisions formulated by M.V. Frunze.

The first mistake was the substitution of the military organization for party bodies.

On July 18, 1941, the leadership of the partisan struggle was entrusted to the party organs, and behind enemy lines to the underground party organs. This great strategic mistake led to the removal of the General Staff from the leadership of the guerrilla war behind enemy lines, to heavy losses in the first year of the war.

Stalin did not distinguish between the concept of the activities of the CPSU in leading the partisan movement and the leadership of the war in the rear of the Wehrmacht. Hence the lack of a unified purposeful leadership of the war in the rear of the Nazis. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, contrary to all guidelines during pre-war preparations for a guerrilla war in the event of enemy aggression, took upon itself and entrusted to local party organs the functions of military leadership of the war behind enemy lines that were unusual for them.

During the years of the civil war, V.I. Lenin, the Central Committee of the party took measures to establish a centralized military-operational leadership of the partisan struggle. For this purpose, the Central Headquarters of Partisan Detachments (TsShPO) was formed, created at the direction of Lenin at the operational department (Operod) of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. After the signing of the Brest Treaty, for conspiratorial reasons, the headquarters was renamed the Special Intelligence Directorate of Operod. His former boss S.I. Aralov[95] noted in his memoirs that Lenin attached great importance to the work of the partisan headquarters and the special intelligence department[96], whose activities were controlled and directed by the Central Committee of the RCP(b).

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the military councils of the fronts, the Central Committee of the CP(b)U and the Central Committee of the CP(b)B, the regional committees of a number of occupied regions turned to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and personally to Stalin with proposals to create a military-operational body to lead the struggle in rear of the enemy. But Stalin did not show decisiveness in this matter.

For some time, the Directorate for the formation of partisan units, detachments and groups as part of the People's Commissariat of Defense was created, but it did not show itself in anything special and was abolished in December 1941.

The second mistake is the lack of advance preparation of troops for war. To partisan

Forgetting the provisions of M.V. Frunze about the preparation of troops for partisan operations and the elimination of measures for advance preparation for a partisan war, led to the fact that, it would seem, under favorable conditions for conducting a partisan struggle, about four million Soviet soldiers, finding themselves behind enemy lines due to the prevailing situation, fell into captivity.

The third mistake is the policy "Drive the German on freezing".

"Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Soldiers of our army and navy! I appeal to you, my friends!" - so began on July 3, 1941 on the eleventh day of the war, Stalin, who came to his senses, began his speech. And then he demanded from his "friends" who were subjected to Nazi aggression, "during the forced withdrawal of the Red Army ... not to leave the enemy a single kilogram of bread ... The collective farmers must steal all the cattle, hand over the grain for safekeeping to state bodies for its export to the rear areas, bread and fuel, which cannot be taken out, must be unconditionally destroyed."

By this Stalin thought to make it difficult for the Nazi troops to advance inland. But in reality, this requirement of the leader helped the occupiers a lot, even considering that it was not fully implemented. Stalin knew that the Finns did this when their troops retreated during the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939-40, but Stalin did not take into account that the pace of the offensive of the Red Army troops was small and the enemy managed not only to steal cattle, but also to evacuate the population from territory under threat of occupation. Moreover, during the retreat, the Finns burned everything they could in the settlements they left and mined some of the surviving buildings with slow-motion mines. The winter was cold, and after a series of mine explosions in the surviving buildings, our troops were already afraid to occupy them.

Devastating the abandoned territory during the withdrawal, the Finns could not hope for the return of the abandoned lands. The devastation of the territory during the withdrawal of the command of the Finnish army was supplemented by the actions of their partisan snipers



and various kinds of mines. All this constituted significant difficulties for the Red Army.

Another thing is the situation on the territory left by the Red Army. A significant part of the Soviet land was occupied by fascist invaders without any evacuation of even very important enterprises. Soon after the enemy invasion, the evacuation of equipment from industrial enterprises, agricultural machinery, and collective farm livestock began. Workers and engineering staff were evacuated along with the equipment to the East. Very few railway workers were evacuated and collective farmers remained in place.

Instead of distributing foodstuffs, and above all grain, to the population, Stalin demanded that everything that could not be taken out during the withdrawal of troops be destroyed. Thus, the "beloved leader of the people" doomed the population in the abandoned territory to starvation.

If Stalin's demand had been fulfilled, then almost the entire population of the left-bank regions of Ukraine and the occupied territories of Russia would have died out during the occupation.

The fourth mistake is the task of cutting off the enemy set. source of supply from was not

During the Great Patriotic War, the dependence of troops at the front on the sources of its support increased sharply. The saturation of the armies with a large number of artillery, armored vehicles and rapid-fire weapons made the troops dependent on their uninterrupted supply of a large amount of ammunition - fuels and lubricants (fuels and lubricants). The army of a million people also needed a large amount of food.

Consequently, in the Great Patriotic War, the role of transport increased, which was supposed to deliver to the troops at the front everything necessary for combat and life. The main types of transport in the last war were railway, which provided the supply of everything the troops needed from supply sources to military bases, and automobile, which delivered everything the troops needed from supply stations. In an emergency, when ground transport could not deliver goods to the troops, for example, surrounded, the troops were supplied by air. But air supply during the Great Patriotic War was relatively small and could only be carried out with air supremacy. As a rule, the supply of encircled troops by air was accompanied by large losses of aviation, and was short-lived.

In the Great Patriotic War, when the Nazi troops invaded deep into the territory of the country, their situation could be worse than the troops of Napoleon, who occupied Moscow. Why? Yes, because rail transport was more vulnerable than horse-drawn times of Napoleon. The partisans could have an impact on horse-drawn transport only by ambushes, the destruction of bridges, and the roads themselves were not vulnerable. Heavily guarded carts could only be destroyed or even captured as a result of a military clash.

During the last war, there were already means that made it possible to disable road and especially rail transport without engaging in combat with the troops being transported. But, unfortunately, despite the courage and bravery of the Soviet partisans, despite their nationwide support by the population, during the Great Patriotic War it was not possible to cut off the enemy troops from their sources of supply, although the partisans were also tasked with plans to stop traffic on the railways and night traffic. vehicles were compiled and approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The partisans, sparing no effort, showing courage and courage, initiative and endurance, could not completely close the Wehrmacht's supply routes on the Soviet territory it occupied and thus put its troops at the front in front of a catastrophe.

Partly as a result of the wrong strategy, the Patriotic War was stretched out for five years.

Elimination of measures taken earlier in case of enemy aggression, repressions that destroyed experienced, well-trained personnel and elimination of measures taken earlier in case of enemy aggression 3-4 years before

wars were the main catastrophic mistake made in the course of preparations for war.

According to Lieutenant General A.I. Todorsky[97] were repressed: Of the 5

marshals of the Soviet Union - 3 Of the 2  
army commissars of the first rank - 2 Of the 4 army  
commanders of the first rank - 2 Of the 12  
commanders of the second rank - 12 Of the  
2 fleet flagships of the second rank - 2 Of the  
6 flagships of the first rank - 6 Out of  
15 army commissars of the second rank - 15 Out of 67  
commanders - 60 Out  
of 28 corps commanders - 25 Out of  
199 division commanders  
- 136 Out of 397 brigade  
commanders - 221 Out of 36 brigade commissars - 34

If we count only the highest staff, from marshals to army commissars of the second rank, inclusive, it turns out that out of 46 people, 42 were put out of action.

No defeat ever leads to such a monstrous loss of command personnel. Only the complete surrender of the country after a lost war can have such consequences. Just on the eve of the decisive battle with the Wehrmacht, on the eve of the greatest of wars, the Red Army was beheaded. Stalin's repressions of Soviet officers before the war so greatly weakened the armed forces of the Soviet Union that they, with superiority in the number of tanks, aircraft and guns, were defeated. In the first months, the Nazis managed to approach Leningrad and Moscow, occupy the Baltic states, Belarus, almost all of Ukraine.

If thousands of experienced, well-trained specialists had not been repressed in our country, from the first days of the war, hundreds of detachments similar to those of S.A. would have begun to operate behind enemy lines. Kovpak, G.M. Linkova, F.D. Gnezdilov and others, and by November 1941, the Wehrmacht troops at the front would have been reliably cut off from their sources of supply. It is no secret that in the first year of the war not a single partisan detachment under the command of experienced or well-trained commanders died behind enemy lines. Moreover, these detachments grew significantly in the first year and inflicted significant damage on the enemy. Most of the experienced and well-trained commanders fought the entire war behind enemy lines, inflicted great damage on him, from the commanders of groups and small detachments they turned into commanders of partisan brigades, divisions and so-called partisan formations. Among them are such as twice Hero of the Soviet Union S.A. Kovpak, A.F. Fedorov, Heroes of the Soviet Union G.M. Linkov, V.M. Yaremchuk, D.K. Karitsky, A.M. Grabchak, S.A. Vaupshasov[98], V.Z. Korzh[99], K.P. Orlovsky[100] and many others. For example, military engineer G.M. Linkov with minimal losses on his part.

The incompetence of the leadership of the partisans.

The leadership of the military operations of the partisans was entrusted to a person, not having neither military nor special training.

Stalin did not fully understand the meaning and possibilities of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. The Supreme, as well as the head of the main Directorate of formations E.A. Shchadenko[101] and ex-People's Commissar of Defense K. Voroshilov did not take into account the changes and capabilities of the partisans in a timely manner compared to their capabilities in the civil war. During the years of the civil war, the partisans solved their tasks of fighting the enemy with surprise raids

and ambushes, possessing greater maneuverability than their opponent. Before the raid on the enemy garrisons, the partisans, cutting off the wire connection, as if isolated them from the outside world, and those who were attacked could not receive support.

A two-hour conversation between Stalin and Ponomarenko in December 1941 ended with the Supreme Commander instructing him to immediately begin

organization of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TsShPD) at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and lead this headquarters.

As a career political worker P.K. Ponomarenko began to select cadres of senior staff of the headquarters "from among the workers of party bodies, political workers of the Red Army and border troops, who had already proven themselves in the organization of partisan detachments, as well as the necessary specialists in radio communications, mine-blasting, intelligence, etc. This important task was solved with the help of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and party organs of the republics and regions"[102]. So it was in fact. Such a selection of personnel of the TsShPD led to the fact that he could not provide optimal planning for the operations of the partisan forces. The plans of operations developed by the TsShPD and the headquarters of the partisan movement subordinate to it were not plans for organized military operations, but rather resembled the resolutions of party organs on sowing and harvesting. Political workers who did not undergo special partisan training (there were no more political workers who had such training - they were repressed long ago) had neither experience nor knowledge to guide the actions of partisan forces.

Sad but true - P.K. Ponomarenko was such a Stalinist hardening partocrat who believed that he knew everything and could do everything. What had a particularly negative impact on the effectiveness of the guerrilla war in the rear of the Wehrmacht was his steady implementation of the clearly erroneous instructions of the "great leader", his lack of knowledge of military art, and hence the underestimation of the need for solid special partisan training of commanders and leaders for war behind enemy lines.

Moreover, several years after the Great Victory, Ponomarenko argued that rigid centralized planning of partisan actions was harmful. While the plan will be brought to the executor, the enemy may already disappear. But the main objects of partisan action are railways and roads, communication lines are the most difficult for the enemy to defend, and partisans with minimal losses or even no losses will be able to disable them precisely with optimal planning. Only when planning the actions of partisan forces can the enemy be forced to go on the defensive.

In a conversation with Stalin, P.K. Ponomarenko suggested moving from long-term training of singles or groups of classic saboteurs to a widely organized, systematic mass sabotage work, decisively eradicating handicrafts and disunity[103].

Experience convincingly proved that it was well-trained saboteurs who inflicted more damage on the enemy and, as a rule, without losses on their part. The former head of the TsShPD did not understand the significance of the mass training of classic saboteurs. Moreover, he did not understand that the most excellent specialists in mine-blasting business can be very mediocre saboteurs if they do not understand that sabotage behind enemy lines in their implementation is very different from mine-blasting work carried out when their troops withdraw.

I know dozens of classic saboteurs from the demolition troops of the engineering troops, who only after special training became excellent saboteurs. Something else is also known. A demolition worker with extensive experience in the headquarters of the engineering troops of the Red Army, who did not have special partisan training and had not been behind enemy lines, made a proposal to undermine the rails with 100-gram thick pieces. The head of the TsShPD, after checking at the training ground near Moscow, signed the instruction and ordered a huge number of these checkers, but it turned out that behind enemy lines, where conditions were completely different, the partisans could not always ensure that the checker fit tightly to the rail head and the necessary powder, as a result, often after the explosion of a 100-gram checker, the rail head remained intact and, moreover, sometimes there were only cracks or even spots on the rail. And "silently" instructions were given to undermine the rails with 200-gram checkers.

In the letters, including the author of these lines, there was a proposal to create special sabotage brigades to strike at enemy communications. Stalin did not respond to these proposals in 1941. By that time, experience had shown that

the fight against parts of the enemy army was reduced mainly to the derailment of trains, undermining cars and armored vehicles with mines, and only under favorable conditions - inflicting damage on the enemy by actions from ambushes. Fights between partisans and units of the Wehrmacht in its rear for partisans are associated with greater losses than battles with at the front. In its rear, the enemy can increase its efforts during the battle, uninterruptedly providing ammunition. The partisan regiments, which were created to fight enemy units in his rear, did not have these conditions. Therefore, 2 Ukrainian and 6 Leningrad partisan regiments, having entered into a military clash with the invaders, despite the heroism of the personnel, were defeated.

Fulfilling the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the head of the TsSHPD launched a stormy activity, primarily in organizing communications with partisan formations operating behind enemy lines. A powerful central receiving and transmitting radio center was quickly created, and a radio school was deployed.

When the work on the creation of the headquarters of the partisan movement was carried out and all the planned activities were proceeding at an increasing pace, unexpectedly at the end of January 1942, the Supreme Commander ordered the liquidation of the created TsSHPD. The question arose of what to do with the already created bodies, schools, including the radio school. PC. Ponomarenko found a way out - the central radio school was transferred to the budget of the Council of People's Commissars of Belarus.

Covert actions are the basis of guerrilla tactics.

The partisans were faced with overwhelming tasks that could only be solved by military clashes, which, in principle, is wrong. If all the losses of the partisans are taken as 100%, then it turns out that they suffered more than 90% of the losses in open battles.

Covert actions and skillful conspiracy were successfully used by partisan forces in the temporarily occupied territory. And it was precisely the hidden actions of the partisans, as even our opponents admit, that did not allow the enemy to feel safe in the occupied territory.

If all the damage inflicted by partisans on the enemy is taken as 100%, then it turns out that even according to the materials of the headquarters of the partisan movement, more than 85% in manpower and more than 95% in materiel was caused by covert actions of partisans. With the use of mines, without engaging in battle with the enemy and rational planning of operations, the ratio of losses was up to 1 to 250 in favor of the partisans, in open (especially protracted battles) the losses of the partisans were greater than the losses of the enemy. For partisans, open combat is the most disadvantageous activity.

Partisan formations were often based precisely near enemy garrisons and the largest cities. For example, partisans in Spain were based for a long time only 2 km from a strong garrison guarding a large hydroelectric station, located near Cordoba, Grenada, where there were large garrisons. Soviet partisans were based near large garrisons near Bryansk, Minsk, Vitebsk, Pinsk, Orsha, Gomel, Kiev, Rovno, Nezhin, Chernigov, in the cities of Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Minsk. In Paris there were large forces of partisans who liberated the city from the invaders before the Allied troops arrived there.

If, in the initial period of the war, Soviet partisans conducted only open hostilities and relied on the force of arms, and did not know how to conspire and conduct covert actions, then hundreds of sabotage, organizational, and other small groups would die without causing significant damage to the enemy. So, if K.S. Zaslonov with his small group would have started with open hostilities, then he would not have inflicted huge damage on the enemy with the help of "coal mines" (and without losses on his part). So it was with other Heroes of the Soviet Union G.M. Linkov, V.M. Yaremchuk, A.M. Grabchak, A.I. Izhukin and many others. So it was with twice Heroes of the Soviet Union S.A. Kovpak and A.F. Fedorov.

It should be noted that already in July 1942, Soviet partisans occupied entire areas and "territories" behind enemy lines, the total perimeter of which was 2-2.5 times the length of the Soviet-German front, the number of armed partisans

was 50 times smaller than the size of the Red Army, and in terms of armament, the partisans could not be compared with the regular troops of the Red Army. In the summer, the enemy had the strength to launch an offensive in the south and reach the Volga and the North Caucasus. At this time, the partisans expanded their territory, since the main enemy forces were engaged in battles with the Red Army. At the same time, by covert actions, the partisans forced the enemy to throw almost all the forces allocated for the counter-partisan struggle to the defense of communications and to the fight against the underground partisans in cities and other settlements held by the occupiers. Significant forces diverted the raiding detachments and formations.

Partisan detachments were based on terrain inaccessible to heavy equipment or secretly; did not succumb to the provocations of the enemy, and where possible, avoided open hostilities, tried to act covertly, used conspiracy and a variety of weapons. The partisans inflicted especially great damage to the enemy with special sabotage means on the lines of communication, during transportation.

without Front Commander.

The actions of the partisan forces were not optimally planned, which is due to the incompetence of the leaders of the headquarters of the partisan movement.

Seven months have passed since the war began. The enemy occupied a huge territory, and the partisan struggle behind enemy lines developed very slowly, despite the patriotism of the people, and the presence of a large number of people who wanted to beat the enemy in his rear. Thousands of poorly or completely unprepared volunteers were transferred, and they, having no connection, seemed to disappear in the occupied territory.

In January 1942, in Belarus, where there were exceptionally favorable conditions for a partisan war, only 59 partisan detachments were operating, while in five western regions, there were actually no partisans until the spring of 1942[104].

It was believed that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was in charge of the partisan struggle as a whole, but in fact, the intelligence agencies of the Red Army, the NKVD, political agencies, and in some places showed initiative and engineering troops. It also happened like this: some planted agents behind enemy lines, others, unknowingly, destroyed it.

## **Chapter 7. Overcoming the crisis.**

In the spring of 1942, the Germans went on the offensive on the Southern Front and the Red Army suffered heavy losses. The partisan forces, having no radio communications and sabotage means, nevertheless reduced the capacity of the railways, inflicted damage on the enemy, creating unbearable conditions for him, which affected the combat capability of the enemy troops.

And so, on May 30, 1942, a decision was made by the State Defense Committee to create the TsShPD and the headquarters of the partisan movement subordinate to it in some occupied republics and regions. All of them were located in the rear of the Soviet Army. It was perfectly rational. And now partisan formations, individual detachments and groups were directly led by the corresponding headquarters. The erroneous attitude towards the leadership of partisan forces through underground organizations was dispelled. True, "underground" regional committees were operating behind enemy lines, headed by party secretaries, who openly wore military uniforms, up to the general's, red flags flew over many "underground" regional committees, and Soviet newspapers hung nearby on stands. Moreover, in Moscow and near Moscow there were "illegal" Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Ukraine and Belarus. They were guarded by NKVD officers in military uniform.

Until the fall of 1942, the TsShPD was a collegium consisting of the chief and representatives from the NKVD and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army. Then P.K. Ponomarenko became the sole head of the TsShPD.

Being the commander of the 5th Separate Engineering Brigade (OIB) for special purposes, on June 10, 1942, I, together with its commissar A.I. Bolotin reported to the commander of the Kalinin Front, General I.S. Konev a proposal to create special brigades for operations on enemy communications. The front commander, having approved the proposal, sent it to Stalin. Upon learning that this letter had reached the member of the State Defense Committee K.E. Voroshilov, Konev sent me and Bolotin to Moscow. Voroshilov received us in the presence of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.I. Kalinin[105]. He also approved our proposal, the essence of which boiled down to the following: from the volunteers of the airborne, engineer and railway troops, create a brigade on each front, which, with the assistance of local partisans, should disable enemy communications. For the first month, the formation, preparation and planning of the operation was planned, for the second - the transfer of units behind enemy lines and the installation of non-retrievable anti-train mines with long deceleration periods, for the following months - the optimal mining of new areas with delayed-action anti-train mines, covering them where necessary, the destruction of small bridges and the undermining of rails, and in the case of insurmountable protection of the path in favorable terrain - the shelling of locomotives from anti-tank rifles, strikes on road transport from ambushes and mining. Some units were planned to be transferred across the front line on foot, primarily where there were corridors in the front line; the rest - by air. For the first month of the operation, about 1,000 sorties would be required, and subsequently 400-500 sorties per month. Two months after the creation of the brigades, it was planned to paralyze the railways and greatly disrupt the operation of the enemy's road transport.

On the advice of Kalinin, Voroshilov called GKO member G.M. Malenkov and, having outlined to him the essence of our proposal, asked him to accept us. Malenkov, having received us, carefully read the note, agreed with it and offered us, together with the head of the engineering troops of the Red Army, General M.P. Vorobyov[106] to prepare a draft order of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR on the creation of special brigades for operations on enemy communications. The next day, the documents were presented to Malenkov, he approved them and sent us with them to the Chief of the General Staff, General A.M. Vasilevsky[107] to issue an order. But no such order was issued. On August 17, 1942, another NPO order was signed - on the creation of separate guards battalions of miners for operations on enemy communications. However, these battalions, together with the partisans, still could not block the occupiers from supplying ammunition, fuel and lubricants, and replenishment.

The guards miners showed courage, courage and ingenuity, interacted with the partisans on the ground and made a worthy contribution to disrupting the work of enemy transport. However, their capabilities were not fully utilized due to their lack of radio communications and centralized management of their actions. Separate guards battalions of miners are essentially military partisans, but they were not subordinate to the TsShPD.

At the end of July 1942, I was recalled to the disposal of the head of the TsShPD, not even giving me the opportunity to hand over the brigade, and on August 1 I was appointed head of the Higher Operational School for Special Purposes being created at the TsShPD, and in early September, concurrently, I was appointed assistant to the head of the TsShPD for sabotage.

On September 5, 1942, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin "On the tasks of the partisan movement". It finally formulated that: "The Red Army heroically repels the onslaught of the enemy and inflicts crushing blows on him. continuous strikes by partisan detachments against the enemy from the rear. The popular partisan movement on our territory, temporarily captured by the German invaders, becomes one of the decisive conditions for victory over the enemy." And the partisans were given the following tasks: "arrange railway disasters, undermine railway bridges, destroy enemy garrisons, headquarters and other military institutions, guard transports and warehouses, destroy bases and warehouses of weapons, ammunition, food, destroy communication lines, attack enemy airfields,

capture or exterminate representatives of the fascist occupation authorities. Tasks were set for conducting reconnaissance". There were many tasks, but the main task of "closing the supply routes" seemed to be dissolved in many other tasks that were set for the partisans.

More K.E. Voroshilov [108] - the commander-in-chief of the partisan movement. O

The next day, September 6, 1942, the post was established - Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, to which was appointed a member of the Politburo of the CPSU (b) Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov. For a long time he was closely engaged in preparing for a guerrilla war in case of enemy aggression. However, in 1937-38, with his active participation, almost all well-trained partisan cadres were repressed, hidden partisan bases were liquidated, and no one dealt with the issues of alleged partisan actions behind enemy lines. Now he reaped what he had done.

However, Voroshilov nevertheless tried, as was envisaged in the early 1930s, to militarize the partisan forces and start carrying out sudden large-scale operations of the partisan forces in order to close the paths for the supply of enemy troops and cut them off at the front from sources of supply. The Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement took measures to equip the TsShPD with experienced military personnel.

TsShPD and subordinate republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement carried out a lot of work on the training of partisan personnel: radio operators, saboteurs, intelligence officers. Radio communication with partisan formations was established. Measures were taken to supply the partisans with the means of combat and communications they needed. But due to the non-allocation of aircraft for the delivery of goods to the partisans, they were in dire need of mine-disruptive means, anti-tank missiles and other types of weapons. To improve the management and provision of partisan forces, General A.K. Sivkov, H.D. Mamsurov and the author of these lines made a proposal to militarize the partisan formations and introduce support for their actions on a par with the Red Army units to fully supply the planned operations of the partisan forces. The commander-in-chief signed a memorandum on this issue, but the head of the TsShPD - P.K. Ponomarenko refused to sign it. This proposal was not supported by Malenkov and the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky. However, preparations for a crushing blow to the enemy's communications continued intensively.

As P.K. Ponomarenko, speaking about the activities of the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, Marshal K.E. Voroshilov, "thanks to his authority, energy and perseverance, many important issues of the partisan movement were resolved, especially in terms of combat and logistics and air transportation for the partisans." It was as a result of the measures taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement that already in the 4th quarter of 1942, the Main Military

Engineering Directorate of the Red Army (GVIU) delivered 40,000 slow-acting mines, 30,000 anti-train, 12,000 motor vehicles, 40,000 ampoule, 15,000 lever, 15,000 small magnetic min, 45,000 anti-personnel, 25,000 wheel locks "[109].

Under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief, the partisan movement took concrete measures in order to still militarize the partisan formations, and in the spring, when the black path was established, sudden operations of large partisan forces, which were already planned to include individual guard battalions, completely paralyzed the movement on iron and night movement on highways in order to prevent the enemy from supplying and replenishing his troops at the front, and thereby make it easier for the Red Army troops to defeat the Wehrmacht troops, which will be left without ammunition, without fuel and lubricants, despite all attempts to save the roads from partisan action.

And suddenly, on November 19, 1942, the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement was abolished allegedly "in order to make the leadership of the partisan movement more flexible, in order to avoid excessive centralization"[110]. In reality, the centralization of the leadership of the actions of the partisans was clearly not enough. Separate guards battalions of miners, for example, remained in

at the disposal of the chiefs of the engineering troops of the fronts and acted independently and independently of the TsShPD.

Zigzags: headquarters and partisan leader.

In fact, the abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief by the partisan movement was due to the fact that K.E. Voroshilov nominated not partocrats to all key positions in the TsSHPD, but experienced military leaders who had experience in commanding troops, knew how to plan the actions of troops, quickly realized the great possibilities for optimal planning of partisan forces, since the main objects of their influence - communications - do not maneuver like troops on front, and sudden operations with the massive use of non-retrievable anti-train and transport mines of instant and delayed action will be insurmountable for the enemy.

PC. Ponomarenko felt hurt. His proposal to grant partisan commanders maximum independence, objections to the militarization of partisan formations, the creation of partisan divisions and corps, which would consist mainly of sabotage groups reduced to companies, detachments, brigades and even corps, did not hold water. Moreover, the head of the TsShPD more than once expressed the idea in a narrow circle that the partisan movement should not be commanded, but led. And it is led by the Central Committee of the Party. That's right - the communist party led the partisan movement, but the partisan forces that arose as a result of the partisan movement must be commanded. This also proceeded from Lenin's teaching that "partisan actions are not revenge, but military actions."

By the way, Stalin and Ponomarenko called the partisans people's avengers and often called them to revenge, which made it difficult to achieve the main goal of the partisan war - to close the deliveries of the invaders and thereby leave their troops at the front without ammunition and fuel. This Ponomarenko either did not understand or did not want to understand, and once he expressed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief the idea of guiding the partisan movement by the party and greater freedom of action for the partisan leadership, which knows better behind enemy lines where, when and how to carry out assigned tasks. The action plans of the partisan forces must not tie their hands with the plans drawn up at the headquarters.

In essence, the head of the TsSHPD advocated such partisan actions that turned to partisanship.

What grounds did Stalin have for such a decision? The success of the guerrilla war could once again raise the authority of the disgraced marshal. Eliminating the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, Stalin essentially took over the leadership of the partisan movement as the head of the Communist Party and as the Supreme Commander of all the Armed Forces, and the partisan forces were our second front. Stalin certainly knew that the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko had neither a military education nor special partisan training, but the Supreme Commander himself had no idea what kind of training the commanders and specialists of partisan formations needed.

Unfortunately, Panteleymon Kondratievich himself, as a true party crat, considered himself the leader of the partisan struggle, who understood the importance of communications and the meaning of organizing their destruction by partisans. However, judging by his behavior and the content of his post-war publications, the head of the TsSHPD did not study the works of world-renowned practitioners and theorists of guerrilla warfare D. Davydov, General Golitsyn, Klembovsky[111], Gerschelman, and others. He obviously did not read the closed works of Karatygin and others, according to which partisan personnel were trained until 1935. Guerrilla warfare guidelines during pre-war preparations justified themselves in Spain, Yugoslavia and other countries. Briefly, these settings were as follows:

1. For a guerrilla war in case of enemy aggression, it is necessary to prepare in advance and comprehensively. At the same time, all troops must be prepared if the need arises to go over to guerrilla operations.

2. Guerrilla actions should be sudden operations, and not scattered actions of individual groups and detachments.



3. Since partisan actions are a special type of military action, they must be carried out on the basis of military art by people who have special military training.

An example of such actions was the partisan war in Yugoslavia, which began after the organization of the headquarters of partisan detachments. And when everything was ready for a sudden major operation, the partisans attacked the fascist invaders.

The liquidation of the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement led to a sharp decrease in the possibilities of carrying out sudden crushing blows on enemy communications. Being the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, Marshal K.E. Voroshilov essentially turned into the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan forces, since, being a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he could quickly coordinate the actions of partisan formations not only led by the headquarters of the partisan movement, but by detachments and groups led by the NKVD, GRU and chiefs of engineering troops. After the liquidation of the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, the head of the TsSHPD, in fact, remained only with the partisan formations led by the headquarters of the partisan movement. And this led to the fact that sometimes up to a dozen diversions were carried out in one direction in one night, but only one diversion caused a break in traffic in the sector, the elimination of the consequences of which was the longest. The rest of the sabotage had little or even no effect on the throughput of the sections and only led to the expenditure of forces and means to eliminate the consequences of the sabotage.

After the abolition of the post of the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, the activities of the TsSHPD began to fade as it was. Only painstaking and very useful work continued to establish radio communications with partisan formations. Planned, but poorly provided autumn-winter operations. The directorates of the TsSHPD were transformed into departments and very experienced and energetic workers left the headquarters: generals Sivkov and Khmel'nitsky.

Meanwhile, near Stalingrad, the German army suffered a crushing defeat and successfully developed the winter offensive of the Soviet troops.

In February 1943, the offensive operation of the troops of the Bryansk Front began. It seemed that the liberation of Belarus would soon begin, and liquidationist sentiments appeared in the TsSHPD, and not without reason. After all, many of his employees, like the head of the TsSHPD himself, were connected with Belarus in their pre-war work. March 7, 1943 TsSHPD was abolished. However, the expected result of the winter offensive in the central direction did not work out.

The Germans even managed to keep Smolensk and Orel.

On April 17, 1943, the TsShPD was restored, but the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, which led the partisan actions in Moldova, was no longer subordinate to the TsShPD.

On November 26, 1943, the regional center of Belarus, Gomel, was liberated, and on January 13, 1944, the TsSHPD was finally abolished, and that was the end of the remnants of the centralization of partisan forces on the territory of the USSR still occupied by Nazi Germany.

Note that the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander, contrary to the statements of Marshal G.K. Zhukova, only received reconnaissance and operational reports from the headquarters of the partisan movement, but did not actually respond to them.

All these perturbations, underestimations and zigzags in the leadership of the war in the rear of the Wehrmacht, complemented by the disruption of the timely provision of planned operations, made it possible for the invaders to provide for their troops at the front, despite the heroism of the partisans.

## **Chapter 8. The Wehrmacht could have been defeated in 1943.**

As already mentioned above, in an order dated September 5, 1943, People's Commissar of Defense Stalin set the partisans the task of "closing the enemy's supply routes." The fulfillment of this task would lead to the catastrophe of the enemy troops. They would be left without ammunition, fuel, without replacements and could not maneuver.

In an order dated February 23, 1943, Stalin, already as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, ordered "to fan the flame of partisan struggle behind enemy lines more widely, destroy enemy communications, blow up railway bridges, disrupt the transfer of enemy troops, the supply of weapons and ammunition, blow up and set fire to military depots, attack enemy garrisons, to prevent the retreating enemy from burning our villages and towns, to help the advancing Red Army by all means, by all means.

There was no longer a strict requirement to "close the supply routes" in this order. In the order of May 1, 1943, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union I.V. Stalin ordered the partisans to "deliver powerful blows to the enemy's rear, communication routes, military depots, headquarters and enterprises, destroy the enemy's lines of communication... mercilessly take revenge on the German invaders... Help the Red Army with all your might."

The fulfillment of these tasks required, first of all, the centralization of the leadership of the partisan forces and the optimal planning of their operations with comprehensive support.

However, the Headquarters actually removed itself from the leadership of the war in the rear of the Wehrmacht.

And meanwhile, as we have already said, the measures taken by Stalin did not contribute to the fulfillment of the main task set by him "to close the supply routes." As a result, by the spring of 1943, the partisan forces did not have a unified military leadership.

So the operational plan of combat operations of Ukrainian partisans for the spring-summer period of 1943 was approved by the "illegal" Central Committee of the CP(b)U only on April 7 and sent ... to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which approved this plan only on April 26. At the same time, the State Defense Committee of the USSR adopted a resolution on the delivery of 260 tons of ammunition, weapons, and mines to Ukrainian partisans. The delivery of goods to ensure the combat plan of the Ukrainian partisans dragged on until July 1, which led to a forced downtime of 15,000 partisans.

Despite all the zigzags and turmoil, the partisans led by the TsSHPD, which had a stable connection with partisan formations with a total number of over 100 thousand people, had exceptionally great opportunities to close traffic on the railways in the rear of the enemy group "Center". These partisan forces could be greatly assisted by guards miners, formations led by the NKVD and the GRU.

The ability of the partisan forces to complete the task - to close the enemy's supply routes - although they were greatly reduced by the elimination of centralized control and the reassessment of the possibility of supply through trophies, were still  
are great.

The head of the transport service of the Wehrmacht G. Potgisser writes that the partisans determined the fate of the railway transport in the occupied territory. The experience of partisan operations on the railroads of the occupiers convincingly showed that the invaders did not have the strength to secure the railroads against the partisans. As of January 1, 1943, the enemy's railway network in operation was over 22,000 km. The partisans carried out sabotage almost without loss in areas where there were less than 2,000 enemy soldiers per 100 kilometers. Only the most important sections of the roads, where partisans were active, were protected in this way. If the partisans committed sabotage in all areas, and the enemy would bring the density of guards up to a regiment per 100 km, then the total number of guards of the railways in the occupied territory would exceed 400 thousand people, but such guards, as experience has shown, still would not save the railway the road from partisan saboteurs.

As was known from the intelligence and testimonies of captured Germans, the most critical position of the enemy was with locomotives. When the Red Army troops withdrew, the locomotives were evacuated or put out of action. The Nazi command was forced to collect locomotives on the roads of the occupied countries of Europe, not shunning even the most outdated ones, and drive them to the east. The so-called ersatz steam locomotive "M-50" appeared, which began to be produced by German steam locomotive plants for the "Eastern" railways, unsuccessfully trying to replenish the locomotive fleet, which was catastrophically reduced from the blows of Soviet partisans, aviation, resistance forces in the West, as well as from wear and tear in difficult conditions. The Germans also had the opportunity to involve Soviet railway workers in the repair of locomotives, 510,556 of whom worked in the occupied territory in January 1943.

The commander-in-chief of the partisan movement and the leadership of the TsSHPD understood what an Achilles heel the railways represented for the Wehrmacht: they were the only mode of transport that could deliver from Germany and Western Europe everything necessary for the Nazi troops operating on the Soviet German front. Locomotives and trains in motion were the main targets, strikes against which the partisans could solve the problem with the least expenditure of forces and means - to stop the movement on the railways and inflict huge damage on the enemy in the transported goods and manpower.

The greatest break in the movement could be achieved by destroying large and medium bridges at the same time, but this was sometimes associated with heavy losses, since significant bridges were heavily guarded. It was possible to completely paralyze the movement in winter by disabling the water supply in a certain area. The failure of communication lines made it difficult for transport to work, but did not stop it for long periods. Very tempting, simple and often quite affordable was the undermining of the rails. But the enemy had them in excess and, as a rule, the enemy welded and replaced the rails blown up at night and replaced them during the day, and then invented an 80 cm removable bridge and began to let trains pass through it.

German railway workers took measures to protect the locomotives from the explosion of anti-train mines. To do this, empty platforms were hitched in front of the locomotives, the speed of trains was reduced during the day to 40 (forty) km per hour, at night to 25 km per hour. This, in turn, caused an increase in the number of locomotives and the time spent by trains on the way, but did not exclude damage to locomotives on curved sections when partisans planted mines that explode only under locomotives or under loaded wagons.

Train crashes, as well as raids on them by our aircraft, morally affected the transported troops and thereby reduced their combat capability.

Let us dwell on the question of the disintegration of enemy troops.

The fascist army remained combat-ready until the last days of the war. And the German army in 1917 decomposed during the year of its stay in the occupied Soviet territory. Soviet power was even established in Bavaria, and the troops of the interventionists in the civil war were rapidly losing their combat effectiveness. Why? Largely due to skillful policy towards prisoners and clever propaganda. There was nothing like it in the Great Patriotic War. In a report on November 6, 1941, Stalin declared "it is necessary to exterminate all German

occupiers to a single one, who made their way to our homeland to enslave it."

On November 7, 1942, the order "To exterminate fascist scoundrels" was issued, then on May 1, 1943 - "to mercilessly take revenge on the German invaders", on November 7, 1943 - "to ruthlessly destroy the Nazi invaders." There were no such appeals during the years of the civil war, and the occupying troops

decomposed.

The head of the TsSHPD understood the significance of "attacks on trains", but could not organize massive planned sabotage on the railways behind enemy lines due to his lack of proper training, and his excessive ambition. Partisan attacks on enemy communications, and indeed all the combat activities of partisan

TsSHPD planned formations not as military operations, but as sowing work. The inability of the TsSHPD to give them the required amount of mine-explosive weapons, anti-tank missiles further reduced the effectiveness of the partisans' actions. This is not so much the responsibility of the TsShPD as the General Staff and Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which, while approving the plan of the TsShPD and the USHPD, did not timely submit aircraft to deliver goods to the partisans. All of them clearly underestimated the capabilities of the partisans in the very effective use of mine explosives and ammunition. So, at the front, an enemy tank was blown up by only one anti-tank mine out of four thousand installed by sappers. Behind enemy lines, partisans spent an average of 4-5 minutes to destroy one train, and when using high-speed instant mines, partisans spent only one mine in weakly guarded areas to destroy a train. Meanwhile, attacks on railway transport required a large expenditure of air bombs and were ineffective in destroying bridges, and during raids on railway junctions they were often accompanied by significant losses, which sometimes exceeded the losses of railway workers and air defense systems of railway junctions. This was during German air raids on the Kursk railway junction in the summer of 1943.

By the summer of 1943, Soviet partisan formations with a total strength of over 120,000 people, having stable radio communications with the authorities, with optimal planning of their actions and the delivery of only 2,000 tons of mine-explosive means to them, could, within three months, produce at least 12,000 train wrecks, withdraw from building a significant part of the water towers on the railway, undermine several significant bridges and up to 50 thousand rails. But, having lost confidence in the possibility of closing traffic on the railways with train wrecks, the head of the TsSHPD proposed the so-called rail war.

The operations of the rail war did not reach the goal and, moreover, the number of trains delivered to the Wehrmacht not only did not decrease with the increase in the number of undermined rails, but, on the contrary, even increased. So, the more the partisans tore the rails, the less they caused train wrecks. This dependence was understood by the partisan commanders, including those of the Belarusian partisan formations, and, starting from September 1943, sharply reducing the number of undermined rails, at the same time increased the number of crashes and the enemy began to let trains go to the front less and less.

What is the reason for the failure of the goal of the rail war - "to close the traffic on the railways for a long time and thereby put the enemy troops at the front in front of a catastrophe."

The first and main reason is the incompetence of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Head of the TsShPD.

They misjudged the enemy. The Germans took out the rails from the occupied territory of the USSR from the roads they did not need. This clearly contradicts the statement of the head of the TsShPD about the shortage of rails among the Germans. Hence, the order of the head of the TsShPD to undermine the rails "on spare, access, auxiliary and depot tracks" was erroneous. This led to the fact that only the undermining of rails on highways had an impact on the capacity of the roads. And, most importantly, the blowing up of rails by partisans "everywhere" on all other tracks caused great harm to the advancing troops of the Soviet Army. The rail war began and was mainly carried out during the offensive operations of the Red Army, when "the Soviet command took the necessary measures to disrupt the destruction of the transport economy by the retreating Nazis. However, despite the measures taken by the Headquarters of the All-Russian Supreme Command and the command of the fronts, everywhere to save the railways from destruction the retreating enemy failed"[112]. And it turned out that during the retreat the enemy undermined the rails on the highways, and the partisans undermined them everywhere in areas unnecessary to the enemy, such as the Orsha-Lepel section, and thus made it difficult for the Soviet railway workers to restore the highways.

Yes, and on highways explosives were spent very irrationally. So, in one direction Smolensk-Orsha-Minsk-Brest on the night of August 3, 1943, a significant number of rails were blown up on almost all stages. To restore the track, 34 recovery trains were simultaneously involved in the Minsk Directorate of Eastern Roads. In one direction at the same time

worked up to 4-6 recovery trains. The traffic capacity was affected only by the restoration of the track on one of the most severely damaged sections. For the rest, the damage inflicted on the enemy by undermining the rails in no way affected the throughput and the damage caused to the invaders was many times less than what the partisans spent on undermining the rails.

This is not the fault of the partisans. They followed orders exactly, showing heroism, and often undermined the rails, destroying the guards, while incurring losses. In August and the first half of September, the partisans spent 50 tons of explosives to blow up the rails. This was enough to cause at least 1,500 train wrecks, which would have resulted in a significant reduction in capacity on the roads behind the lines of the enemy group of forces "Center".

In August 1943, the partisans lost 724 people killed and wounded[113], mainly during the rail war.

During the rail war, partisans destroyed bridges, water pumps and committed sabotage at stations.

One of the acts of sabotage at the station between Minsk and Gomel, a tank car was blown up by a magnetic mine and 1 train with building materials, 2 with ammunition and 1 with Tiger tanks were destroyed by fire. The losses of the Wehrmacht from one magnetic mine turned out to be much greater than from the entire rail war.

The second important reason for the failure of the rail war is the distrust of the General Staff and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the reports of the partisans about the losses and damage of the invaders. Indeed, sometimes the partisans passed off the desired losses as real ones, but the data on the interruptions in the movement of trains from the action on communications were often even underestimated by them. The total data of the partisans on interruptions in movement from all types of sabotage in railway transport created the impression that, if they corresponded to reality, not a single train could arrive at the front of the Army Group Center from June 1943, and the troops of this group received daily up to 50-70 trains. And the whole point was that the partisans gave data on breaks in the hauls between two intermediate stations. In one direction, sometimes there were even more than 10 traffic violations in one day, but only one, which was the longest, affected the throughput. The rest had no effect on the throughput, but caused damage to the enemy in the rolling stock, transported people and cargo.

A thorough study after the war showed that the sum of the break in the movement of trains from the actions of partisans on the hauls was 18,750 days, on sections it reached only 11,120 days.

The harmfulness of the installation of the head of the TsShPD on the widespread undermining of rails was that there were 11 million rails in the occupied territory on January 1, 1943, and the undermining of 200 thousand rails per month is only less than 2%, which was quite tolerable for the occupiers, especially if they were undermined to a large extent where the Germans themselves could not destroy during the withdrawal.

The Supreme Commander, having approved the rail war plan, did not order the adoption of measures for its material support. The requested number of aircraft was not allocated in time. At the same time, in May alone, 500 sorties were made to the Orel-Glazunovka sector.

However, the experience of partisan operations in the summer of 1943 once again convincingly confirmed that there were every opportunity to fulfill the tasks that Stalin approved back in December 1941.

So, the connection under the command of A.F. Fedorov from July 7 to August 10 completely paralyzed the Kovel junction by crashing 123 trains[114].

Indicative is the decommissioning of the railway section Shepetovka Ternopil. In September 1943, a large partisan detachment with a total strength of up to 450 people under the command of K.S. Bozhensky, with sudden raids, blew up several bridges, destroyed and mined the path in several places. As a result of systematic sabotage by the partisan Hero of the Soviet Union A.Z. Oduhi, the enemy failed to restore the site. For six months, the Germans did not manage to miss a single

one train. During the retreat, the Germans could not destroy the tracks in this section and take out the food they had prepared from the warehouses at the stations. Soviet troops captured a lot of food in this area, the railway workers quickly restored this area, and the partisans cleared it of the delayed-action mines they had set[115].

In 1943, Ukrainian partisans, starting in April, could produce up to 2,000 train wrecks a month if they had received enough mines and explosives in a timely manner. Unfortunately, in three years (1942-44) Ukrainian partisans received by air only 34,562 various mines and 142,595 kg of tol. Only in December 1943, when the troops of the Red Army in the Ovruch region approached the vast partisan region, did mines and explosives begin to be delivered to the partisans by land through the wide Ovruch corridor.

The partisans made up for the lack of explosives by smelting tol from bombs, but this did not save the situation.

It should be noted that during the Great Patriotic War, 24,837,500 anti-tank, over forty million anti-personnel, 1,437,200 special mines and 34 thousand tons of explosives were produced and delivered to the troops.

The situation could have been completely different in the summer of 1943 if the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement K.E. Voroshilov would have remained at his post in November.

TsSHPD would be reorganized into the headquarters of the partisan forces with a political department that was engaged in the political support of the partisan forces, as was the case in other branches of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In this case, as was the case, for example, in Yugoslavia, hundreds of thousands of Soviet people would join the ranks of the partisan forces, who ended up behind enemy lines without being drafted into the Red Army or who fled from captivity. Separate guards battalions of miners would only act on enemy communications as classic saboteurs who were able to crash trains on heavily guarded bridges with the help of mines seized by a locomotive, as well as mines installed on trains.

The main task of the partisan forces remained trains and vehicles, the main goal was to cut off enemy troops from their sources of supply. To do this, already having the necessary funds in abundance, it was only necessary to ensure their delivery by air to the partisans, for which it was necessary to rationally reduce the number of air bombs dropped for attacks on enemy transport, and at this expense to ensure the delivery of an additional 50 thousand tons of cargo and 2 thousands of high-class saboteurs-instructors. All operations should be carried out suddenly according to optimal plans in order to force the occupiers to spend as much manpower and resources as possible where delayed-action mines explode, and the partisans are already working in other areas where mines are just being laid.

In the Great Patriotic War, Soviet railroad workers who worked on the railways of our territory were very little involved in sabotage activities. And there were more than half a million of them, there were wonderful small magnetic and other mines, which made it possible to disable steam locomotives for a long time, undermine tanks, and burn rolling stock. Partisans can successfully carry out missions to be solved by combat only when there is confidence that the enemy will not put up serious resistance.

In the last war there were several attacks on headquarters and garrisons, when the partisans suffered heavy losses, but in the reports the losses of the Germans were exaggerated hundreds of times or more, and the losses of the partisans were hidden.

Attacks on garrisons, headquarters, the creation of unbearable conditions, individual terrorist acts, such as the murder of the Gauleiter of Belarus, cost the population very dearly, often led to the defeat of the underground and only increased the vigilance of the invaders, without affecting the combat capability of the troops at the front.

Throughout the war, Soviet partisans destroyed or captured 52,958 trucks, cars, and special vehicles, burned or blew up 9,514 road bridges.

If the partisans had more explosives, they could inflict much more damage on the occupiers by hitting vehicles. It should be noted that bridges were burned and blown up mainly on dirt roads, mainly in order to prevent the penetration of convoys into the territory controlled by the partisans.

The partisans committed sabotage behind enemy lines and on river transport, and even disabled the Dneprobug Canal. By the way, the invaders tried to use the river transport for the export of timber and almost never used it for military transport.

By January 1, 1943, the fascist aggressors occupied about 1 million square kilometers of Soviet land, on which there were at least 50 million Soviet people, including at least two million people of military age. At that time, there were less than 150 thousand people in the partisan formations and more than 500 thousand worked on the railways operated by the occupiers. Over 300 thousand people could have become partisans, but there were no weapons. Everything on the battlefield has already been cleared away. It cost the partisans, as they say, "more expensive to get weapons and ammunition." Attacks on headquarters and garrisons, as a rule, quickly depleted ammunition supplies, and there were not always trophies.

It took only 2.5 thousand tons of weapons and ammunition to arm 200 thousand from the partisan reserve. For a long-term closure of traffic on railways and at night on automobile roads, it was necessary to deliver to the partisans a total of about two thousand mine-explosive and incendiary means every month. This is only for the first 3-4 months of the operation, code-named "Kaput to the occupiers." Then the enemy will be demoralized and the expenditure of funds for cutting off enemy troops at the front from their sources of supply will decrease. When carrying out an operation to put the roads out of action, it is necessary to take into account their restoration by our advancing troops. Therefore, even the rescue of objects that are difficult to restore from their destruction by the retreating enemy troops should be envisaged and the locations for the installation of delayed-action mines, which may not work until the enemy withdraws, should be fixed.

In Yugoslavia, in more difficult conditions than in our occupied territory, thanks to the centralized competent leadership, the heroic partisan detachments during the war turned into the legendary People's Liberation Army, which, even before the approach of the Soviet Army, liberated more than half of the country and distracted all the time of the Great Patriotic War large forces of the Wehrmacht, paralyzed rail and road traffic in the occupied territory and thereby saved the people from extermination by the fascist barbarians. Soviet partisans can also be proud of their exploits, but they could have done much more for the Red Army if they had a centralized competent leadership, headed by the General Staff and properly trained military leaders.

If...

In the winter of 1941-42, Kazankin's airborne units and Belov's Cavalry Corps partisans, operating in small groups, tried to cut off the enemy's troops from the enemy's central group from their supply sources and thereby leave them without fuel and ammunition, which would have led to the catastrophe of Nazi Germany back in 1942; but parts of Kazankin and Belov, not prepared for partisan

Actions, they themselves turned out to be "encircled" behind enemy lines.

If it weren't for the tragedy of 1937, thousands of commanders well prepared for partisan warfare remained in the troops, and the troops that found themselves behind enemy lines at the beginning of the war would not have been captured, but would have moved in an organized way to partisan operations and the Germans themselves would have been trapped, cut off from their sources of supply.

Headquarters                      And guerrilla strategy.

Former member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal G.K. Zhukov[116] in his book "Memoirs and Reflections" writes that "The Headquarters directed all military operations of the armed forces on land, at sea and in the air, built up strategic efforts in the course of the struggle at the expense of reserves and the use of the forces of the partisan movement. The working body ... was the General Staff". And further he claims that "If in the first year of the war there was still no proper organization and centralization in the leadership of the partisan movement, then subsequently the Stavka managed military operations behind enemy lines confidently and firmly. This was done through the Central Headquarters created under it on May 30, 1942 partisan movement... There was a real opportunity to direct the actions of all the forces of the partisan movement in the interests of the army, to coordinate the interaction of partisan detachments with the operations of the fronts.

The general tasks of the partisan forces were set by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. In accordance with the situation, they were specified on the ground by party organizations and bodies of the partisan movement.

Meanwhile, as I know from my work as an assistant to the chief of the Central and deputy chief of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, in reality, throughout the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command did not actually control military operations behind enemy lines. The General Staff, as a working body of the Headquarters, did not have the proper influence on the use of partisan forces in the interests of the fronts. In the presence of the Central, Republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement, the general tasks for the partisans were set by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin as the People's Commissar of Defense and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, central and regional committees of the Communist Party, whose territory was invaded by the enemy.

However, in the presence of the Central and subordinate partisan headquarters, military operations behind enemy lines were conducted by special partisan formations led by the intelligence agencies of the Red Army, as well as the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the miners of the engineering troops.

Combat operations behind enemy lines were carried out by Soviet partisans in the Great Patriotic War for 46 months. The central headquarters existed for only 18 months, while for the last 7 months the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement was not subordinate to it. The headquarters was indifferent to the zigzags in the leadership of the partisan forces.

In the presence of the headquarters of the partisan movement, they developed operational plans for military operations for certain periods of time, as well as individual operations only for the partisan forces subordinate to them. These plans were approved by the leading party bodies of the republics and regions, and then submitted to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and to the Headquarters. There, as a rule, they were approved without any changes, but, with rare exceptions, the plans were not financially supported and in most cases were not carried out, but no one was ever responsible for this. So, on April 7, 1943, the "illegal" Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, which met in Moscow and was actually completely legal, approved the operational plan of combat operations presented by the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement in the spring and summer of 1943, which was then sent to The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and not to the Headquarters, and only on April 26 the plan was approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. At the same time, the State Defense Committee (GKO) adopted a resolution on the material support of the partisans of Ukraine. While they planned, approved the plan and financially ensured its implementation, large partisan formations were inactive. Spring passed, and in the summer this plan was carried out in an insignificant part.

The situation was even worse with the operations of massive undermining of the rails, which were planned by the TsSHPD.

Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin in July 1943 approved the operations of the "rail war" for the simultaneous massive undermining of the rails, but did not provide it financially, and as a result, instead of "disrupting the operations of the enemy on the fronts", as it was supposed by the plan, during the operation "rail war" in August 1943 year, the enemy managed to deliver more trains to the front than in June, while



the efforts of the guerrillas were directed to the derailment of trains. The operation "Rail War", approved by the Stavka, turned out to be harmful not for the enemy, but for our railway troops, who, on the territory liberated by the Soviet Army, restored sections of railways that were unnecessary to the Germans and destroyed by partisans. But more on that ahead.

The central headquarters of the partisan movement from the very beginning of its existence, and the Ukrainian one from March 1943 until the last days, sent intelligence and plans of operations to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, which were approved by Stalin either as Supreme, or General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, or chairman of the GKO. Plans for the material support of the partisans, with rare exceptions, were not carried out. The Supreme Commander did not define the strategic goal of guerrilla warfare - to cut off enemy troops at the front from their sources of support. This had a negative effect on the results of the actions of the partisan forces.

According to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, "the tasks of the partisan movement were to create an unbearable situation for the Nazis, to destroy the enemy's manpower, military equipment and materiel, to disorganize the work of his rear, to disrupt the activities of the military authorities and administrative bodies of the fascist occupiers."

About the main goal of the guerrilla war - not a word. The creation of an unbearable situation for the occupiers often resulted in severe disasters for the population. Often, terrorist acts carried out by partisans to "create an unbearable situation" led to the death of a large number of patriots and often made it difficult to accomplish the main task - disruption of military transportation.

Marshal G.K. Zhukov argued that the range of the listed tasks of the partisans, their importance suggests that the partisans could only act in an organized manner, with entire formations and detachments[117]. In reality, actions by entire formations and detachments took place during raids or during sudden raids on enemy weak garrisons and warehouses, but the partisans inflicted the greatest damage to the enemy with small losses and, as a rule, without any losses at all, by sabotage using mines and explosives, especially non-recoverable anti-train mines. The use of automatic anti-train and anti-vehicle mines gave the partisans the opportunity to inflict great damage on the enemy without engaging him in battle. On the contrary, acting in entire formations and detachments, they often suffered heavy losses. At the same time, the partisans could not conduct long-term battles with the enemy, outside their region or region, since during the battle they did not have the opportunity that the enemy had to build up efforts and organize replenishment of ammunition. On the other hand, the partisans had a very large opportunity to destroy troops and military equipment and other means during transportation in trains. And experienced partisans skillfully used these opportunities. Zhukov's assertion that the daily leadership of the partisan forces in the localities was carried out by the underground organizations of our party is not true either. In fact, the partisan forces in the field were led not by underground party organizations, but by the command of partisan formations, detachments that led at the beginning of the war the party bodies that led the partisan formations, and were not underground, as many erroneously interpret, but after the creation of the headquarters of the partisan movement they began to lead the partisan forces.

The commanders of especially powerful formations G.K. Zhukov calls P.M. Masherova[118], Z.A. Bogatyr, I.E. Anisimenko, D.T. Burchenko, who were commissars of brigades and formations. At the same time, such commanders who had extensive experience, like G.M. Linkov, A.E. Andreev, V.A. Kvitinsky and many others, G.K. Zhukov does not mention. Someone entered G.K. Zhukov, the commander of the sabotage group M. Hussein Zade [119], among the outstanding leaders of underground party organizations and commanders of partisan detachments and formations, who did everything possible to fight enemy forces, skillfully interacted with our regular troops. M. Huseynzade's group in Yugoslavia did not interact with our troops.

How little attention the Headquarters paid to partisan forces is evident from the fact that the 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and a member of the Headquarters throughout the war, Marshal G.K. Zhukov had no idea about the size of the partisan forces. In his memoirs, he writes that "in the occupied regions of the RSFSR, according to far from complete data, there were 260 thousand people's avengers in organized detachments of partisans (in Ukraine - 220 thousand, in Belarus - 372 thousand)"[120]. In fact, the total number of partisans throughout the occupied territory of the Soviet Union did not exceed 250 thousand, and in Ukraine only 47,789 people at a time.

The General Staff was the main working body of the Headquarters for the leadership of the armed struggle, but its former chief, in his memoirs, speaking about the work of the General Staff, says nothing about the leadership of Stalin and the General Staff in the partisan war in the rear of the Wehrmacht. And this is no coincidence. The Chief of the General Staff or, in his absence, performing these duties, receiving reports and other materials from the Central and Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, did not actually react to them. Yes, as can be seen from the memoirs of Army General S.M. Shtemenko[121], who began serving in the General Staff in 1940 and from 1943 until the end of the war served as chief of the Operational Directorate, there was not a single officer in the General Staff who would deal with issues of guerrilla warfare[122].

During the Great Patriotic War, I had a chance to talk a lot with K.E. Voroshilov on these issues. He is the only member of the Headquarters who, in the pre-war years, was preparing for a guerrilla war in case of enemy aggression. Before being appointed Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, as I know for sure, I was afraid to turn to Stalin on issues of the movement without the support of other members of the Headquarters or the Politburo. Yes, and being the Commander-in-Chief, Stalin was very afraid.

The then attitude of the leadership to the guerrilla war was reflected in the Field Manual of 1943. In it, for the first time, in paragraph 17, those erroneous concepts were formulated that laid the foundation for the attitude towards the partisans.

Supply.

In the Draft Field Manual of 1943, it is written that trophies are the basis for providing partisans. Crimean partisans in the autumn and winter of 1942/43 were dying of hunger at the moment when aircraft dropped bombs on enemy communications. The effectiveness of these bombings was minimal. The guerrillas could have derailed enemy trains with great success, but they were starving to death. It was easier for them to undermine the train than to get a loaf of bread. In fact, captured ammunition and weapons in partisan formations constituted an insignificant part of their needs. Weapons and ammunition, completed in the Soviet rear, the detachments received at the points of formation. In the early years of the war, partisans procured weapons and ammunition in the fields after the battles. The local population helped them a lot. But in the reports, the commanders of the partisan formations, weapons and ammunition picked up on the former battlefields, were passed off as trophy ones.

The main supply of the partisans since the summer of 1942 was the delivery of means of struggle to the partisans through the front line by air or through the corridors in the front line. So, during the war, Ukrainian partisans received 12,622 machine guns, 3,507 rifles, 1,255 machine guns, 272 mortars, 492 anti-tank rifles and 20 cannons, over 13 million rounds of various cartridges and many other means of combat, in addition to December 1943 - March 1944 they received 776 tons of means of struggle through the Ovruch corridor. For Belarusian partisans, captured ammunition accounted for no more than 5% of all the ammunition they used up.

The attitude towards insufficient provision of partisans with weapons, ammunition and other means of struggle, which was actually carried out by the Headquarters, sharply reduced the capabilities of partisan forces in the fight against the enemy. And with centralized competent planning of the operations of the partisan forces and their proper support, in the summer of 1943 they could completely paralyze the enemy's railway communications and stop night traffic on roads,

as the former head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, P.K. Ponomarenko, wrote[123].

G.K. Zhukov and war rear of the Wehrmacht.

Member of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander Marshal G.K. Zhukov spoke about the results of the actions of the Soviet partisans: "In 1943, the partisans blew up 11 thousand trains, damaged and disabled 6 thousand steam locomotives, about 40 thousand wagons and platforms, destroyed over 22 thousand cars and more than 900 railway bridges. The organizers of these actions were local underground party organizations"[124].

Unfortunately, due to the lack of explosives, the partisans could not destroy the railway bridges, but only damaged them, and often very weakly. In 1943, the actions of the partisans were not led by local underground party organizations, but mainly by the headquarters of the partisan movement. In addition, separate partisan formations led by the Main Intelligence Directorate and the NKVD, as well as guards miners, operated behind enemy lines.

Underground party organizations did not have any means for mass sabotage in the rear of the Wehrmacht. In 1943, the means of struggle were delivered to partisan formations, including underground ones, from the rear of the Soviet Army, mainly by air and in some cases by land.

From the work of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, it can be seen that the Stavka essentially did not pay due attention to the partisan struggle in the rear of the Wehrmacht, having in 1943 great opportunities to fully provide the partisans with mine-explosive means by reducing the dropping of bombs on enemy railways. This could lead to the cessation of railway traffic in the rear of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR and the cessation of night traffic of enemy vehicles and create for the Germans in the summer of 1943 a situation close to disaster.

Bridge over the river Pavia was bombed by dozens of planes - he survived. They gave explosives to the partisans - they destroyed it. In May 1943, 500 sorties were made to the Orel-Bryansk sector, and the Bryansk railway junction was also bombed. The traffic was slightly disturbed - less than the blowing up of one bridge by partisans.

In December 1941, Stalin agreed with P.K. Ponomarenko that "Systematic sabotage can close traffic on railways, night traffic on highways and make daytime traffic inadequate. This will force the enemy to withdraw dozens of divisions from the front to guard communications, which ultimately will hinder sabotage, but will not eliminate them "[125 ].

Stalin did not object, but offered to solve this problem at the expense of the trophies obtained by the partisans, which was clearly impossible. Experience convincingly showed that the effectiveness of the use of mine-explosive means by partisans to undermine bridges, cars, train wrecks is hundreds of times higher, and it is associated with fewer losses on our part than bombing attacks on enemy rail and road communications. But throughout the war, air strikes against railway communications increased, and the partisans could not close traffic on the railway lines from the spring of 1943 only because of the lack of mine explosives and the lack of optimal planning of operations.

Underground or partisan?

Partisan actions in the conditions of the Second World War were complex military actions using special means, giving the partisans the opportunity to inflict damage on the enemy without entering into battle with him. The management of partisan actions already required the availability of radio communications.

The underground party organizations did not have the necessary personnel, commanders, or radio communications. And in general, underground party organs were created at partisan bases and during the withdrawal of our troops, and could only lead those formations that they or with their participation had created.

Underground party organizations had nothing to do with more than 90% of what the partisans did. Rather, they themselves were led from partisan zones, districts and territories, where there were no governing underground bodies.

During this period, the partisans were in dire need of mine-disruptive means and, with sufficient provision of them, they could already in 1943 cut off enemy troops on the Eastern Front from supply sources.

Stalin of the Great Patriotic War. V

On June 20, 1941, I was at the headquarters of the Belarusian Military District and saw depressed officers there, who were worried about the concentration of Wehrmacht troops ready to attack.

The head of artillery of the military district, General A.N. The cry with which we became friends in Spain told me bitterly: "The Germans are clearly preparing for an attack, and we were ordered to send a number of guns concentrated at the training ground for construction. They reported to Moscow. They answer:" Comrade Stalin knows and says - no give in to panic."

In the border military districts near the border, a huge amount of ammunition was concentrated, even weapons and fuel and lubricants, which were not essentially covered by the troops. I met a car column that was going to Bialystok after it was occupied by the enemy. During the withdrawal of our troops, I destroyed the fuel reserves, which we could no longer use, and even more so there was no way to take them out.

The destruction of food during the withdrawal, the requirement to "drive the Germans into the cold" by setting fire to the settlements in which they were located, helped the occupiers a lot. They carried on propaganda that all this was being done by the Soviet government because it no longer thought of returning, otherwise why destroy what could be preserved for use upon return.

Moreover, the demand for the destruction of unexported grain and the theft of collective farm cattle helped to attract to the side of the enemy people who had lost faith in the victory of the Red Army, especially relatives of those who suffered during the repressions during collectivization.

History does not know such a massive use of the population and prisoners of war in the fight against their troops, as it was during the Great Patriotic War. Over one million two hundred thousand Soviet people of almost all nationalities participated in the war against their homeland in the police, as well as in military formations. Many prisoners of war went to these military formations, created by the occupiers, with the aim of escaping from starvation captivity and at the first opportunity to go over to the side of the partisans, as did the brigade under the command of Gil-Radionov, which, having destroyed the occupiers and hardened traitors who were in it, completely switched to side of the partisans, turning into the 1st anti-fascist brigade. Many police officers, risking the lives of their families, also went over to the side of the partisans. So in Belarus, over 26 thousand policemen went over to the partisans.

Left without food and other means of subsistence, the Soviet railway workers, in order not to die of hunger, were forced to work for the enemy. In total, over 500 thousand Soviet railway workers worked in the temporarily occupied territory already in the winter of 1941-42, who restored and ensured the movement of trains. And only individual saboteurs who underwent special training inflicted significant damage on the invaders. The group on the railway headed by K.S. was especially successful. Zaslonov, A.E. Andreev. But there were only a few such groups, and communication with them was practically not maintained. And if, during the withdrawal of our troops, food that could not be evacuated would be distributed to those who, due to the prevailing situation, remained in the occupied territory, there would be fewer of those who worked for the enemy.

Destruction of grain and other foodstuffs during the withdrawal of the Red Army troops greatly hampered the deployment of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.

The picture could have been much worse if all Stalin's demands were met in full. Then a sea of population would begin behind enemy lines, which was necessary

invaders, and there would be no one to disrupt the work of enemy communications of the enemy. So basically the partisans could only eat at the expense of the local population.

Factors of guerrilla warfare.

Experience has shown that there are certain factors that determine the management of guerrilla warfare against the aggressor.

1. Its advance preparation, as pointed out by M.V. Frunze. From the warehouses mentioned above, the Ukrainian partisans were able to get much less than was laid down when they were created. For two years, the partisans were able to get only 120 tons of tol. The rest was confiscated in 1937. The same thing happened in Belarus, where before the war 50,000 rifles were laid in caches.

2. Frames!

3. Attitude of the population. Initially, we could not count on significant assistance from the population, as we retreated and the population was suppressed. The beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops inspired the population to replenish the partisan detachments and to help the partisans.

The Second World War convincingly showed that guerrilla warfare - war behind enemy lines - is also a military art, although it has its own specifics. Since guerrilla actions are military actions, they are subject to many laws of military art.

### **Part III. THE THEORY OF GUERRILLA WAR.**

"Woe to the one who multiplies someone else's power, both by force, for it is obtained by skill, or by one to whom power it." A gets these virtues Not inspire confidence at

Niccolo Machiavelli.

#### **Chapter 1. Second front.**

By training partisan cadres during the war, by checking partisan actions, by removing minefields after the war, I was able to evaluate the effectiveness of many partisan operations that I organized or knew about.

I was convinced that, starting from 1943, the second front - these were partisans.

Traditionally, they mistakenly evaluate the significance of Stalin's order N\_227 on the creation of detachments. They didn't save the day. No! They only increased the number of surrendered prisoners. Not barrage detachments, but the courage and courage of the Soviet soldiers ensured victory despite the mistakes and crimes of Stalin. In the course of the war, without heavy losses, commanders and commanders gained the necessary experience.

Note that during the years of the war with the USSR, the Wehrmacht lost fewer officers, and mostly junior and middle ones, than our Army in 1937-38 as a result of Stalinist repressions.

Two forms of guerrilla warfare.

The guerrilla war was waged in two forms: from the underground and from the areas of deployment of partisan forces.

As for the first form, the actions of Konstantin Zaslonov[126] are indicative here.

He was trained at the A.K. Sprogis as part of a small group. After training, he was sent to Orsha. Before the arrival of the Nazis, headed in this city depot.

After analyzing the situation, Zaslunov realized that by fighting he would cause little damage and decided to wage an underground struggle. To this end, he came to the Germans and offered his services. There was a desperate shortage of personnel and he was asked to remain in the same position, that is, the head of the depot.

The results of his activities are as follows: from December 1941 to February 1942, he launched derailed 6 trains and damaged 170 locomotives. I later checked it myself.

The Germans began to guess, but did not understand who was behind it. They got to the point that they began to crush coal so that "coal" mines would not fall into the furnace with it. They could not repress anyone, since the main workers were Russians. Thus, one trained person with a small group of assistants managed to do much more than a whole unit.

And it was all he had - tol and fuses. That's what a professional does.

Another example of an underground organization is the actions of Colonel Vasily Ivanovich Nechipurovich. Almost all of his 208th division was captured. He went underground, organized a detachment, left the city with him and switched to partisan operations. Very soon, his detachment controlled a large territory.

Unfortunately, the lack of proper organization led to confusion among the partisan commanders and inconsistency in actions. Nechipurovich reported this to the center and ... was recalled. A case was brought against him.

The third example is the underground of A.F. Fedorov. Organized by a person who was a party worker, it could not be created in the city. They were known by sight. So they immediately went to the forests. They fought in uniform, did not hide and carried weapons. In fact, it was not an underground, but partisanship. In Odessa, the partisans were no longer underground.

## **Chapter 2. International partisan movement.** When planning an

attack on the USSR, the German General Staff knew about the preparations for a guerrilla war in the USSR in the second half of the 20s and early 30s. He knew that Soviet military specialists participated in the organization of partisan struggle in the rear of the Nazis and rebels in Spain in 1936-39. The enemy was preparing for a quick and brutal suppression of the beginnings of the partisan movement. However, in determining the probable actions of the partisans, the Nazi general staff clearly underestimated them, and overestimated the capabilities of their troops in the fight against the partisans.

The General Staff of the German Ground Forces believed that the motorization, mechanization of the army and the presence of radio communications in the troops would drastically reduce the capabilities of the partisans.

The partisans retained their superiority in maneuverability on terrain inaccessible to motorized mechtroops. And the presence in the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union of powerful aviation and radio communications made it possible to provide the partisan forces with the means of struggle they needed, quickly receive valuable intelligence from the partisans and evacuate the wounded and sick partisans from the rear of the enemy to the rear of the Soviet Army.

The Nazis also knew about the presence of special sabotage means, but underestimated the possibility of their effective use by partisans.

The Hitlerite leadership also knew about the Stalinist repressions, which eliminated all measures to prepare for the partisan war, which helped the Nazis a lot, but, fortunately, several dozen experienced and well-trained partisans survived, who managed, overcoming the consequences of Stalinist repressions, to launch a partisan war with difficulty .

As a result of all this, the Nazi high command was unable to suppress the partisan movement, although it used much more forces and means than expected before the war to fight against the partisans, as well as to protect important communications and other objects in its rear.

The partisan movement began to develop especially widely after the defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow. In the occupied territories of France, Greece, Yugoslavia and other countries, hundreds of detachments and groups began to operate, waging a guerrilla war.

An important role in the development of the French partisan movement, as in many other countries, was played by the wars of the 14th Spanish partisan corps, part of which, after the fall of the republic, was interned in France. After the occupation of France, the corps fighters broke out of the camps and went about their usual business under the command of Antonio Buitrago, formerly the deputy commander of the corps. By 1943, the corps already had 27 sabotage brigades, consolidated into nine divisions. Their actions spread to 2/3 of the territory of France, they participated in the liberation of a number of cities, including Marseille and Paris.

In France, as, for example, in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and other countries, approximately 80% of the commanders of partisan formations and saboteur specialists were trained either by direct participants in the guerrilla war in Spain, or by instructors who passed through their hands. The former chief of staff of the 14th partisan corps, L. Ilich, was the head of the operational department of the main headquarters of the French partisans.

In Yugoslavia, the fascist aggressors faced, probably, the most organized guerrilla war in all European countries. In April 1941, German and Italian troops occupied Yugoslav land. Already in May, military committees were created under all national and regional committees of the CPY and the Supreme Headquarters of Partisan Detachments. Weapons and medicines were collected; young cadres were trained; measures were taken to return to the country the participants in the war in Spain, who were in French camps.[127] Josip Broz Tito radioed to Moscow:

"May 13, 1941

Tov. Dimitrov.

We organize combat detachments, educate our military cadres, train armed uprising in the event of an attack on the USSR.[128]

In Yugoslavia, the partisan war began suddenly for the occupiers, partisan actions immediately covered large areas. At that moment, the Yugoslav partisans still made little use of special equipment, the forms of their struggle somewhat contradicted the main tasks of the partisan war. However, this did not lead, as in the Soviet Union, to catastrophic losses: the fact is that the partisans managed to achieve strategic surprise. The enemy did not have the strength to support their garrisons - all armed units in the rebel territory were too weak and were defeated. The results of this uprising were magnificent.

"September 28, 1941

27.09 held a meeting at the Supreme Headquarters of the partisan detachments of Yugoslavia. There were 20 representatives of headquarters and commanders of partisan detachments from all regions of the country. A plan was drawn up for further military operations and sabotage. Half of the territories of Serbia and Bosnia, as well as most of Montenegro, have already been cleared of the invaders. In the rest of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, there are large partisan units that hold individual cities and attack various strategic targets ...

Walter (J. Broz Tito)"[129]

The structure of centralized control of partisan units in Yugoslavia was effective and, in comparison with the Soviet one, more solid:

"The organizer and leader of all the partisan detachments of Yugoslavia is the Communist Party. The military leader is the Supreme Headquarters, to which the main headquarters of the provinces are subordinated. The commander-in-chief of the partisans Tito ..." [130]

Such a fact is interesting. In April 1942, Moscow requested "brief biographical data on the most important partisan leaders unknown to us.

armies", to popularize the Yugoslav partisan movement. The list provided included eighteen names. Of these, nine were regular officers of the former Yugoslav army, five were officers of the international brigades in Spain, and only four were civilians before the war (and even then one was a reserve officer) [131] In Yugoslavia, it was clearly understood that the guerrilla war should be led by the military.

At the very beginning of the guerrilla war, its main goal was determined, which was then strictly observed: "Not a single gun, not a single rifle, not a single cartridge, not a single grain of wheat, etc., should fall into the hands of fascist criminals. Mobilize all your forces against the transformation of our country into a supply base for the fascist mob..."[132]

"The example of the Yugoslav people shows ... that the partisan struggle, even in the present conditions, is the decisive and most effective form of resistance to the invaders.

The facts speak of this with complete conviction. The Yugoslav partisans, for example, disabled the country's lead and copper industries, on which the German occupiers had high hopes. The machinery at the enterprises was rendered unusable, the mines were blown up, the workers went into partisan detachments. This is not sabotage, which reduces output to a certain extent, but the complete elimination of one of the most important sources capable of feeding the fascist military machine.

... The destruction of railways is of particular importance. In this matter, the Yugoslav partisans achieved outstanding success. Not only are the German and Italian occupiers no longer masters of the railways of Yugoslavia, but in general they can hardly use them. The partisans blew up dozens and hundreds of bridges, destroyed the most important highways, and blew up a number of junction stations. [133] With great difficulty, the German troops and the gendarmes of the traitor Nedić manage to keep the traffic on only one Belgrade-Nis railway line."[134]

Winston Churchill told the British Parliament in February 1944 on the situation in Yugoslavia:

"The partisans, led by a skilful leadership, organized into detachments, were both an elusive and deadly force. Not only Croats and Slovenes, but also a large number of Serbs joined Marshal Tito, and now he has more than a quarter of a million people and a large amount of weapons taken from the enemy or the Italians, and these people are organized into a significant number of divisions and corps.

The whole movement took on a certain form, without losing its partisan qualities, without which, perhaps, it could not have succeeded. Around and within these heroic forces a national unifying movement is developing. The Communist elements have the honor of being the initiators, but as the movement grew in number and strength, a process of change and consolidation took place and national concepts prevailed. In the person of Marshal Tito, the partisans found an outstanding leader who covered himself with glory in the struggle for freedom.

In the middle of 1943, the Axis were forced to keep about 33 full divisions and a large number of police formations in the Yugoslav region. The partisan forces and the NOAU cleared all of Albania and most of Yugoslavia from the enemy, including, together with the troops of the Red Army, they also liberated its capital, Belgrade. A number of formations of the NOAU penetrated into Hungary and Bulgaria and helped local partisans. And after the capitulation of fascist Italy, with the help of the same NOAU, several Italian partisan divisions and brigades were formed.

The partisan movement was characteristic of many occupied European countries. Even such a small country as Belgium had its partisans, who bravely acted on enemy communications.

The victories of the Soviet Army near Stalingrad and on the Kursk Bulge contributed to the further growth of the national liberation movement in the countries of Europe and Asia. By 1944, members of the Resistance, making extensive use of the experience of Soviet partisans, deployed large-scale military operations behind enemy lines and organized popular uprisings.



According to the most modest data, partisan forces in World War II managed to:

- to divert over 54 divisions and more than 1 million 200 thousand policemen and other traitors in Europe by the end of 1941, and by the beginning of 1944 more than 113 divisions and over 1 million 700 thousand police formations[136], which in the absence of partisans, they could turn into 150 infantry divisions. Consequently, the partisans diverted more forces to themselves than the second front in Europe;

- significantly disrupt the operation of the enemy's road and especially railway transport (partisan strikes on the enemy's railway transport are almost ten times more effective than the results of enemy air raids on the railways of the USSR and allies);

- seriously hinder the use of human and material resources in the occupied territory;

- save millions of civilians from hard labor and extermination in camps of death;

- save huge material assets from being taken away and destroyed by the enemy at his departure;

- to help their troops in overcoming water barriers and mountain passes, in the liberation of cities;

- free from the invaders a significant part of the territory occupied by them in USSR and other occupied countries.

The Slovak national uprising that broke out on August 29, 1944, raised by local patriots with the help of Soviet partisans, turned Slovakia into the arena of a national liberation war. Thus, the 60,000-strong army of Slovakia was withdrawn from the armed forces of the fascist bloc, which went over to the side of the partisan forces and participated in the battles already against the fascist German troops.

The revolutionary uprising in Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, ended with dignity fighting Bulgarian partisans.

In the course of the war against the Japanese invaders in Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, national liberation armies grew up and strengthened on the basis of partisan detachments, which turned into powerful forces that liberated these countries from colonial oppression. Moreover, it was the flames of the guerrilla war that thwarted many of the plans of the Japanese militarists.

The fear of the armed people on the part of the Allied governments led to the fact that in October 1944 the Anglo-American troops landed on the already liberated territory of Greece and began a war against the Greek national liberation troops, who had previously fought against the Nazi invaders. And this struggle between the Anglo-American troops and the reactionary forces of Greece continued until 1948. The Americans did the same treacherously with partisan forces in Italy, in the Japanese-occupied countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.

ocean.

To judge the scope and effectiveness of the partisan struggle during the Second World War, we present the following data.

By the spring of 1944, the number of partisan forces and the national liberation armies created on their basis in the rear of the fascist invaders exceeded one million three hundred thousand people[137]. And these were for the most part well-organized groups, detachments, formations, and even entire armies, which had a clear moral advantage over the enemy. And the partisans largely compensated for the lack of aviation, tanks, lack of artillery and automatic weapons with their special tactics and sabotage equipment.

Partisans inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in other countries as well. French partisans only during the landing of the allies in northern France in the summer of 1944, according to the American command, by their actions on communications in two weeks caused the Germans more damage than the Allied aviation in two months[138].

Issues of guerrilla warfare in the rear of the fascist and Japanese aggressors in World War II is devoted to many works of researchers.

What is the secret of the success of guerrilla warfare?

First of all, it is explained by the heroism of the partisans and the people, the effective tactics of the struggle and the skillful use of technical means. And all this allows the partisans to conduct combat operations with minimal human and material costs. In order not to be unfounded, let's confirm this with some comparative figures.

So, in World War II, the armed forces of the anti-Hitler coalition at the front spent more than one ton of ammunition per disabled enemy soldier and officer, and the partisans only used about 20 kg - that is, 50 times less[139]. The partisans used automatic mines, especially anti-vehicle mines, even more effectively. According to the reports of the headquarters of the partisan movement and the materials of the check, as well as according to the documents of the enemy, it turns out that every fourth mine worked effectively. At the front, on average, about 4,000 anti-tank mines were spent on one blown up tank (when the partisans have only 4 mines!). And even more anti-personnel mines were spent on one enemy soldier and officer killed[140].

Note that after the Second World War, the armed forces of many countries created anew special units for partisan and, above all, sabotage operations behind enemy lines; there is an extensive literature on the basics of organization, guerrilla tactics, and guerrilla warfare strategy. Much of it is open. Knowledge of the fundamentals of the organization and tactics of guerrilla warfare is necessary for troops that can find themselves behind enemy lines and there, if necessary, go over to guerrilla operations.

### **Chapter 3. The art of guerrilla warfare is a serious science.**

The art of guerrilla warfare includes the organization and training of guerrilla forces, planning, comprehensive support and conduct of guerrilla operations. Gone are the days when partisans successfully fought against foreign invaders without any preparation. Military-technical progress - the development of transport, the emergence of armored forces, aviation, radio communications and, finally, weapons of mass destruction, the improvement of counterintelligence services make it difficult, but, as experience convincingly shows, does not exclude the successful conduct of a guerrilla war with proper preparation for it and the skillful use of available to the partisans of the means of struggle, and above all, the means that enable the partisans to carry out their tasks without engaging in combat with the enemy.

Moreover, the present state of industry, transport and means struggle sharply increased the importance and possibilities of guerrilla warfare.

The experience of the Second World War and subsequent national liberation wars convincingly showed that with modern means of struggle and communication, in order to achieve the goals of a guerrilla war, its leaders must master all the components of military art - tactics, operational art and strategy.

Guerrilla tactics constitute the theory and practice of preparing and carrying out actions by individuals, groups, detachments and formations in conspiracy, movement, overcoming enemy counter-guerrilla measures and carrying out assigned tasks (ambushes, raids and inflicting damage on the enemy without engaging in battle), as well as forced defensive actions.

The operational art or small strategy of partisan forces covers the theory and practice of preparing and carrying out operations that, in a war against an aggressor, are capable of cutting off enemy troops from their sources of supply using ground and underground transport, seizing bridgeheads when forcing rivers, water barriers, as well as other operations that contribute to the success of their regular troops.

In national liberation wars, sudden operations by partisan forces can stun the enemy and create conditions for the victory of the insurgents. The operational art of guerrilla warfare - the theory and practice of sudden, comprehensively secured operations of guerrilla forces capable of overcoming the enemy's counter-guerrilla measures and inflicting damage on him, are of great importance. The state of modern technology makes it possible to do this with relatively small forces using discreetly installed means capable of acting at a given time.

Guerrilla strategy - the theory and practice of preparing and conducting a guerrilla war. It is engaged in determining the strategic tasks of the partisan forces and the conditions and means necessary to fulfill them. The guerrilla strategy and practical activities of the leadership of the guerrilla forces should not allow actions that would alert the enemy in the course of carrying out operations, so as not to cause him difficult to overcome or even completely insurmountable counter-guerrilla measures before the operations that achieve the set goal are completed.

Post-war progress and its impact on the possibilities of guerrilla warfare. Almost half a century has passed since the end of World War II. During this time local wars in the world did not stop and guerrilla wars broke out more than once.

But the most instructive are the actions of partisans in South Vietnam, where the troops of a very powerful country, the United States, were defeated, and the actions of partisans in Afghanistan, where the troops of another superpower could not save the regime of Karmal and Najibullah imposed from outside. At the same time, the Soviet troops suffered particularly heavy losses of seriously wounded soldiers who were blown up by mines.

The defeat of American troops in Vietnam and the failure of Soviet operations in Afghanistan were the result of the fact that the military and political leadership of these countries underestimated the new opportunities for guerrilla warfare that appeared as a result of military technological progress that occurred after World War II. Such opportunities are especially great for partisan forces organized and supplied by states possessing modern military equipment adapted for use behind enemy lines.

Historical experience convincingly shows that guerrilla warfare is very effective only in just wars of liberation. The same experience shows that individual and even massive terrorist acts do more harm to those by whom they are directed than to those against whom they are directed.

#### **Chapter 4. Partisan struggle is the most important factor in achieving victory over fascism.**

Questions of guerrilla warfare in the rear of the fascist and Japanese aggressors in the Second World War are devoted to many works of researchers. Here are some of their assessments.

"The history of wars does not know a single example when the partisan movement would play such a role as it played in the last world war," the former Colonel General of the Nazi army, Lothar Rendulich, is forced to admit. "In terms of its size, it represents something completely new in military art. In view of the colossal impact that it had on the front-line troops and on the problems of supply, logistics and administration in the occupied areas, it became part of the concept of total war." [141]

Heinz Guderian [142], who served as commander of the 2nd Panzer Group and then Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, says that "as the war became protracted and the fighting at the front became more and more stubborn, guerrilla warfare became real a scourge, greatly influencing the morale of front-line soldiers." [143]

This is also confirmed by the English researchers C. Dixon and O. Heilbrunn: "The damage caused to the German army by the guerrilla war cannot be determined only by the number of dead and wounded and the number of destroyed guns and warehouses.

one should add the loss of combat capability and striking power by the German army, the significance of which is difficult to assess in numbers. "[144]

J. Fuller[145] writes even more vividly in his "Second World War of 1939-1945": through which communications passed, the partisan units played the same role as the flocks of submarines in the Atlantic Ocean. [146]

Only Soviet partisans (according to the "History of the Great Patriotic War"):

- destroyed, wounded, decomposed or captured about one and a half million enemy soldiers, officers, officials of the occupation administration, etc.;
- made more than 18.000 train wrecks;
- 9400 locomotives were destroyed and much more of them were put out of action for a considerable time, about 42,000 cars and motorcycles, about 4000 tanks, armored vehicles, self-propelled guns and artillery tractors, about 800 aircraft;
- destroyed and damaged about 2,000 bridges on railways and about 8,000 on roads, and inflicted much other damage on the enemy, which is difficult to express in exact numbers.

It should be noted that in terms of its effectiveness, guerrilla warfare, as it undeniably follows from the above figures, is comparable, at least, with a major military strategic operation that affects the outcome of the war.

It is hard to imagine how the absence of partisan struggle in the rear of the fascist invaders would have affected the course of the war. The enemy would have the opportunity to additionally use on the external fronts from 50 to 100 divisions of field troops and at least 100 to 150 divisions, additionally formed at the expense of police units, which were distracted by partisans in the last world war. The absence of partisans would enable the aggressor to make fuller use of the human and material resources of the territories he occupied. The enemy would not have felt interruptions in the operation of transport.

In fact, the guerrilla war was one of the most important factors in achieving the Victory, but at the same time, it alone would not have been able to achieve it in domestic conditions, just like the Red Army alone, without partisans.

The partisan movement began from the first days of the war, unorganized, with an erroneous directive about the formation of partisan detachments in the territories occupied by the enemy. It is also negative that the Field Manual of 1943 stated that the main unit of a partisan war is a separate, independently operating partisan detachment. Strategic mistake! An independent detachment chose its own target, went, completed its task, but attracted the attention of the enemy and prevented other partisans from completing a much more important task. Separate, independent actions of partisan detachments alerted the enemy and prevented them from carrying out operations that could be of operational and even strategic importance.

The commanders of the guerrilla formations understood the perniciousness of such an approach to guerrilla warfare. If, according to the data for June 1942, 241 separate detachments, 12 brigades and 58 brigade detachments operated on the territory of Belarus (the percentage is 77.5% of individual detachments for 22.5% of large formations), then in June 1943 - 129 separate detachments, 91 brigades and 456 brigade detachments (that is, 19% to 81%, respectively), and in June 1944 - 53 separate detachments, 102 brigades and 490 brigade detachments (8% to 92%) [147].

In 1942, a partisan corps was even formed on the Kalinin Front, but was disbanded by the Center as a "bureaucratic superstructure" that interfered with the effective actions of the partisans.

As a result, in 1944, when almost the entire territory of our country was liberated, only good things continued to operate behind enemy lines.

trained sabotage groups, whose training was so high that even operating abroad, they could organize large partisan formations there. They could organize uprisings there (as, for example, the Slovak National Uprising), they were the detonators of the struggle in foreign countries. The most understanding of the possibilities of inflicting damage on the enemy, the commanders acted until the very end of the war and, in fact, met with the allies on the Elbe.

It is impossible not to admire the high professionalism of the actions of these partisan saboteurs. But alas, there were few of them. The bulk of the partisans, after the expulsion of the invaders, remained in our rear, turned into infantry, some of them went to Soviet work, some to fight against the OUN-UPA gangs.

The second direction of development of the guerrilla movement and guerrilla warfare can be conditionally called "Western". What was it? Let's start with Yugoslavia. There, the main unit of the partisan struggle was not considered a separate detachment. During the war, partisan detachments and groups turned into formations, then into divisions and corps, and finally became the NOAU, which, by simultaneous partisan actions on enemy territory and army actions on the front line, pushed the enemy back and almost completely liberated their country and even part of Italy.

In Italy, there were also large partisan formations, which turned into a powerful army that swept away the fascist regime in the north of the country and even captured Mussolini. Even if there were no allies, the Italian partisans would have liberated their homeland.

What happened in France? In France, too, small formations of the Resistance Movement, led by de Gaulle and the anti-fascist military movement of the CPF, turned into larger ones by merging. These partisan formations literally fettered the enemy, making it difficult even to supply internally with massive sabotage. As a result, France not only did nothing to help Germany, but, in essence, could not satisfy its own needs. Only losses for the occupiers!

Thus, two paths have emerged: the first is the transformation of partisan formations into an army capable of conducting full-scale military operations, and the second is the separation of highly professional subversive groups from the bulk of detachments and groups operating behind enemy lines, capable of operating in almost any conditions and on any territory. The first is typical for countries that, for one reason or another, did not have a national army capable of resisting the aggressor, the second - for the state, whose armed forces, along with the partisans, fought against the invaders.

Which of these ways is the most promising - the future has shown, but here it is only worth noting that the answer to any question depends on the specific circumstances and the absolutization of the value of accumulated experience has, as a rule, not led to anything good.

Recognizing this, in September 1942, Stalin wrote in his order "On the Tasks of the Partisan Movement": "The defeat of the German armies can be carried out only by simultaneous military operations at the front and powerful continuous strikes of partisan detachments against the enemy from the rear ... The popular partisan movement on our territory, temporarily captured by the German invaders, becomes one of the decisive conditions for victory over the enemy."

Hear: only!

Hear: one of the decisive conditions for victory over the enemy! In

November 1944, the Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin delivered a report: "The 27th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution." Then, on November 7, 1944, order N\_220 was issued.

The report and the order noted the great victories of the Red Army and the merits of the allies in achieving huge victories over the fascist Wehrmacht. About help

partisans to the troops of the Red Army and allies in achieving these victories, Stalin did not said not a word.

In conclusion, the order said: "The Red Army and the armies of our allies have taken up starting positions for decisive attacks on the vital centers of Germany. The task now is to crush Nazi Germany in the shortest possible time with the swift onslaught of the armies of the United Nations.

Comrade Red Army and Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals!  
Working people of the Soviet Union!

In the Great Patriotic War, we defended our Motherland from the invaders, finally eliminated the threat of enslavement of the peoples of the USSR by fascist monsters, and now we are on the eve of complete victory.

The fact that the Supreme in his report and order did not note the merits of the Soviet partisans in victories over the Nazis, the partisans were very hurt. I remember the sad and bewildered expression on the faces of seasoned partisan saboteurs who were struck by the fact that the Supreme Commander forgot about their enormous contribution and about what he himself wrote less than two years ago.

Even more bewildering was the fact that no tasks were assigned to the partisans. But at that time, Soviet partisans were fighting independently behind enemy lines outside the Soviet Union, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and a number of other countries. This could not but lead to the fact that the partisan forces could be beyond worries about their supply and fate.

And then came the long-awaited day, the Day of the Great Victory. Great holiday, great joy - finally ended the war, which at times seemed endless. And the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself congratulates the people on the Victory. He speaks of those who forged this Victory, died at the fronts and worked for the front.

But not a word about partisans.

And so it has gone on since then, according to tradition: on May 9, the head of state speaks, speaks of the Victory and those who wrested it from the enemy - and is silent about partisans and saboteurs. It was as if they didn't exist. The country began to be called differently, the ideology, it seems, changed, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the Victory. President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin. He speaks well, for a long time. Not a single mention of partisans.

Both in scientific works and in school textbooks about guerrilla warfare - it is somewhat vague: there was something like that. Minor.

Let's look at this problem a little differently. At the end of the Great Patriotic War, 11 thousand people deservedly received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Of these, 234 partisans. And only 130 thousand - the medal "Partisan of War" (with a total number of partisans of at least 800 thousand people).

How so?

An analysis of the contribution of partisans to the Victory shows that at least 15% of the damage to the enemy was inflicted by them. Why, when they began to present for awards, did such a thing turn out? Ivan Nikolaevich Kondrashov, whom I knew before the war, was very worried that thousands of partisans were left without awards.

Konitsky Sergey Vasilyevich, who did so much to create a sabotage service in the Kovpak unit, - has not yet been awarded.

Gnezdilov Fedor Danilovich, who in six months turned from a wounded soldier into the commander of an entire partisan regiment named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky - and this is in the first year of the war, it's time to give him a Hero! - not awarded.

Lots of names...

We had one twelve-year-old partisan boy, Tolya Zaporozhets. Nobody encouraged him. I took off my medal and handed it to him. There was another, Vitya Konyakhov, who started wrestling at the age of 14 and ended the war in Poland. Acted bravely...

Our Spanish friends who fought in the rear of the "blue division" did not receive any awards at all. They were landed so clumsily that at first they ended up in our rear. They really wanted to lay mines, but found that they were in the Vologda region. They were picked up and again thrown behind enemy lines - in winter, without skis and food! They, despite the extremely difficult situation, carried out a number of sabotage, but, in the end, were forced to return.

Let's ask why the partisans were somehow forgotten after the Victory.

Marshal G.K. Zhukov writes that when "the war was coming to an end, and there were several final operations left to be carried out, I.V. Stalin probably wanted to be the only one at the head of these operations"[149]. Zhukov made this conclusion after Stalin's proposal to transfer the leadership of all fronts into the hands of the Stavka in the future. That is: Stalin wanted his fame and authority to increase as a result of the Victory. But it is well known that the more difficult the task, the more glory will be from its solution. The higher the mountain, the more glory to conquer it. The stronger the enemy army, the more glory to its winner. And the winners, as the writer Georgy Vladimov noted, under Stalin "we only had two: one with the address - "Moscow, the Kremlin, Comrade Stalin", the other - "the great Soviet people under the leadership of their native party", and even if not with everything here we can agree that the trend of that time was noticed correctly.

Now tell me, the victory over which Wehrmacht brought more glory to the Red Army and Stalin, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - over the exhausted, decomposed partisans, as it really was, or over some mighty and hitherto invincible. When Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper and a number of other rivers, partisans provided them with crossings - but is this mentioned anywhere?

If Stalin admitted that the partisans contributed to the outcome of the war, disrupting the supply of the Wehrmacht armies, decomposing them, presenting the enemy army to the Red Army as weakened, then one would have to admit that the German army during the fighting was not as strong as he wanted to imagine.

Without partisans, Stalin, his generals and the Red Army got more glory, it was more profitable from a political point of view - the allies made concessions faster. And the partisans preferred to be forgotten.

Thinking about this today, I think that the answer to all questions lies in the famous saying of Niccolo Machiavelli: "Woe to the one who multiplies another's power, for it is obtained by skill or strength, and both of these virtues do not inspire confidence in the one who gets the power" .

## **PART IV. PARTISAN PRACTICE.**

### **Chapter 1. Exit from the environment (breaking the blockade).**

If our inexperienced partisan groups perished on their own land, then well-trained partisans operated outside the USSR in the most difficult conditions, when there seemed to be no prospects for survival. Here's what my former chief of finance said.

In October 1944, as a result of direct betrayal by the bourgeois stratum during the popular elections in Slovakia, the Slovak popular uprising (according to the proposals of the Nazis and their overseas Anglo-American patrons) was to suffer a complete failure. So it seemed at first glance: Golyan and West (the Anglo-American henchmen who led the insurgent Slovak army) gave the command to end resistance. The liberated area ceased to exist. Parts of the Slovak army, unprepared for the transition to partisan methods of struggle, surrendered in masses, the soldiers, throwing their weapons, scattered to their homes. The partisan detachments and brigades holding more than half of the front line of the liberated region were threatened with destruction by this treacherous order, because they were not warned in time about the dissolution of the army and the termination of the defense of the region. Fascist parts quickly

spread along the roads and occupied settlements in the rear of the partisans, who continued to hold the defense in the sectors of the front entrusted to them.

The destruction of the partisan detachments at that moment was prevented by the timely intervention of Comrade Gottwald, who at that time was leading the struggle of the Czechoslovak people from the Soviet rear.

The order transmitted from UShPD by radio on the transition to partisan methods of struggle began to be immediately implemented by the commanders of partisan detachments and brigades (mainly consisting of Soviet commanders).

The transition to guerrilla methods of struggle was associated with enormous difficulties:

1. The enemy, through his spies and traitors to the Slovak people, was well aware of the location, numbers and weapons of the partisans.

2. There were no pre-prepared bases for weapons and food in the mountains (with the exception of small bases laid by A.S. Egorov on his own initiative).

3. The accumulation of a large number of detachments in the areas of the former defense line made it difficult for the partisans to maneuver and made it easier for the enemy to blockade them.

To avoid defeat, the partisans had to urgently disperse their forces. The difficulty of solving this problem lay in the fact that the fascist units were located not only in front of the former defense line of the liberated region, but also went to the rear of the partisans. The encirclement ring was shrinking every day and became more and more dense.

In this situation, the brigade commander comrade. Egorov ordered his deputy for intelligence, now Hero of the Soviet Union, comrade. IN AND. Klovov to withdraw from the brigade location area (Turchansky St. Martin) to the Banovce area a consolidated detachment of 800 people. Connect with the Jan Zizka Brigade in the Banovce area and, with their assistance, move to Moravia.

Considering that the main enemy forces are concentrated to break through the partisan defenses and reach their rear, and knowing well the situation in the rear of the fascist troops blockading the liberated area, the commander of the combined detachment decided to leave the encirclement through a stabilized front.

The exit from the encirclement was scheduled for the evening of November 2, 1944.

The partisans had to pass between the enemy garrisons and cross the open valley of the river during the night. Turkish. In order not to go astray and not lose the personnel, the commander decided to build a detachment in a column one at a time, since the narrow paths did not allow two or more people to walk in a row. Guides were placed in front of the column from among proven scouts who knew the area well. The commanders went ahead of their units. Scouts who knew the area well also followed each of the commanders.

The commander of the detachment ordered the commanders, in case of detection and shelling of the column by the enemy and the impossibility of continuing the journey in one chain without responding to fire, independently go out with their units to the assembly point designated in the mountain forests on the other side of the valley. Commands to whisper along the chain.

The first halt was appointed at the river, after about 1.5 hours of movement, for reconnaissance of the crossing point.

Cold weather and intermittent rain made it very difficult to navigate the narrow and uncomfortable path. Occasionally, the moon peeped through the clouds, illuminating a long line of people walking in complete silence. However, she did not particularly interfere, since against the background of the mountains it was very difficult to notice the partisans even from close range. The partisans reached the intended halt point safely and stopped without disturbing the formation of the column.

The detachment commander was waiting for a report from the reconnaissance sent by him ahead. However, there was no report, and the unclear and difficult situation did not allow us to stay



on the spot and demanded an immediate decision to ensure before dawn the passage of the valley and access to a large forest.

Having summoned scouts and several partisans from among the local residents, the detachment commander asked them about other possible crossing points and routes to the forests and decided to cross the river ford 8 km north of the halt. I had to go through virgin soil between the river and the highway, just 300 meters from the latter.

Settlements were bypassed, in order to avoid detection not only by the enemy, but also by chance meetings with local residents.

Already at the approach of the column to the new crossing point, the commander was informed along the chain that almost half of the column had lagged behind. The scouts sent by the detachment commander returned thirty minutes later, not finding the tail of the column. Dawn was approaching and the commander decided to start the crossing without waiting for the approach of the lagging part of the column. At this time, machine-gun and mortar fire began a few kilometers behind the column. She, gradually flaring up, approached along the river to the area of the crossing. There was no time to lose, and the partisans, holding hands, crossed the river without undressing, waist-deep in icy water.

Ahead, unexpectedly, the scouts discovered posts set up by the Nazis. However, they were ordered not to get involved in the battle in any case, if they could not silently remove the post. They found a convenient passage between the posts and led the entire column through this way, unnoticed by the enemy.

The column had already traveled about three kilometers when the fascists from these posts joined the general, then subsiding, then again flaring up indiscriminate shooting throughout the valley. At the assembly point, in the forest, when the column left shortly after dawn, the

commander of the detachment, fearing that he had become known to the enemy, ordered to leave a disguised post from among the most trusted and reliable partisans, and took the rest 6-7 kilometers deep into the forest to feed people and give them rest.

Before the partisans set out, the group commander arrived at the assembly point and with him two of the scouts sent by the commander to the area of the crossing point planned before leaving. Having crossed the river, they almost stumbled upon a strong ambush. Having sent two scouts back to warn the column, the group commander moved along the river in search of a new crossing point.

In one place they were noticed by the Nazis, who opened fire on them, which the partisans heard during the crossing.

The units that broke away from the column before the crossing approached the assembly point only on the 3rd day and, together with the post that was waiting for them, a day later joined the main forces of the detachment, which by this time were already in the mountains 40-50 km from the assembly point. Later, when the detachment gathered together, it became clear from the reports of the unit commanders, intelligence reports and the testimonies of the prisoners what danger awaited the partisans, and what was the plan of the Nazis to defeat the detachment.

From the spies and traitors who got into the detachment, the Germans knew about the impending crossing of the valley and the place of the crossing. They planted large ambushes on the opposite bank for a long distance, and between them set up reinforced posts in order to press the crossing detachment to the river and destroy all the partisans. However, at first they did not know the location of the assembly point.

The Nazis managed to learn this later from a captured Slovak intelligence officer, sent by the commander of the reconnaissance group to warn the commander of the detachment about the ambush of the Nazis behind the crossing.

Having established a gathering place, the Nazis organized combing the forest. They forced the local residents, mostly women, to walk in chains through the forest and shout "to frighten" the partisans. The "brave" Nazi warriors walked in groups behind the women, threatening them with weapons.

Such round-ups and combing of the forest, carried out by the Nazis for two days, did not give them anything, but delivered many unpleasant minutes to the partisans from the post, who were waiting for the lagging behind units. During this time, they could not build a fire to dry themselves, keep warm, or cook food.

It turned out that the rupture of the column was also not accidental. This was the work of one of the traitors sent by the Nazis to the detachment, which tore apart the column and disappeared into the darkness. However, their calculation failed here as well. The Russian paratrooper commander A. Tarakanov, who was with the lagging part of the column, immediately took command and quickly led the column to the forest, but not to the starting position, where, as he expected, there was already an ambush, but 5 kilometers to the north.

He divided this part of the column into three groups of 90-100 people, and on the third day, each with its own route, crossed the valley and, using local residents as guides, reached the agreed gathering place.

The experience of this transition taught the partisans a lot. They realized that the enemy was sending enemy spies into their midst. The guerrillas increased their vigilance and exposed many of them. And, knowing this, the partisans in the future adhered to the following rules:

1. Always have a ready supply of dry food to leave at any moment, so that preparations for the transition do not declassify the moment of changing the disposition of the detachments.

2. Announce the exit 2-3 hours in advance, strengthening the surveillance of each person, with the obligatory report of the commanders on the disappearances (which often happened and forced them to change the routes and time of the exit).

3. Fully about the route and tasks should only know the headquarters; unit commanders can only know about part of it half an hour before the release. At the end of each part of the route, in the event of detachment of units, liaisons from verified local residents were left with the password for this post-appearance). This made it possible very often to sharply change the direction of movement, avoid skirmishes with the enemy on the march and maintain contact with detached units.

## **Chapter 2. Release of prisoners of war soldiers and commanders of the Red Army.**

On February 14, 1943, the command of the partisan unit M.I. Naumov, it became known that 8 km west of Veliky Istorop (Sumy region), the Nazis were escorting about 2,000 captured soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. The command of the formation decided: by a sudden raid on the convoy accompanying the prisoners of war, destroy it and free the prisoners of war.

To accomplish the task, a group of cavalry partisans was selected from the Death to Fascism, Chervony and them. Khrushchev under the command of Commissar Comrade Comrade. Anisimenko and political instructor comrade. Grishenko.

The Nazis stopped prisoners of war to rest in the village. Sumy Divination. At this time, cavalry partisans broke into the village. Sumy Vorozhba, with a sudden blow, destroyed a German convoy and freed prisoners of war. At the same time, Komsomol members Prikhodko, Sukhota, Nemolod, Drozdova, Lysenko and others showed examples of courage and courage. The partisans destroyed up to 40 Nazis and captured their weapons.

From Sumy Divination, the partisans transferred prisoners of war to Veliky Istorop. The released fighters and commanders, who, for health reasons, could carry weapons, joined the detachments of the formation, and the weak and sick were sent to the Sumy forests.

## **Chapter 3. Destruction by the Belgian partisans of bridges across the canal near Mons.**

Under the influence of the victories of the Soviet Army, by the beginning of 1944, the partisan struggle against the Nazi invaders intensified in Belgium. Belgian

partisans, based in forests, abandoned mines, relying on the active help of the underground, intensified their combat activities. In some Belgian partisan detachments there were also Soviet citizens who had fled from the Nazi death camps. So, in the partisan detachment "Free Belgium", which operated southwest of Brussels, there were 14 Soviet citizens who, in early January 1944, fled to Belgium from hard labor in Germany. The Belgian workers, who were approached by the fugitives, hid them in abandoned mines, then tied them up with the partisans. There was a Pole in the partisan detachment who knew French and Russian well. He gave French lessons to Soviet citizens. After 12 days, 7 people dressed in German uniforms came to the mine where 14 Soviet citizens were hiding. Seeing the frightened fugitives, one of the visitors said in Russian: "Don't be afraid! Everyone is here." Then he asked who owns what weapons, and was there anyone in the Soviet partisan detachments? Nobody has been before. Those who came gave everyone a pistol and 2 pieces of home-made grenades, and explained how they should be used. Then the group, together with those who came, went into the forest to the location of the partisan detachment. Soviet citizens walked with hidden weapons, as if under escort. On the way, when approaching one small bridge, the group was stopped by a sentry. One of the partisans, dressed in the uniform of the enemy, said that they were leading the bandits they had caught. The sentry blew his whistle. Three more police officers responded to his call and demanded a "pass", but apparently no one knew him. The first to break the negotiations were the Belgian partisans, who, together with the Russians, suddenly rushed to attack the enemy. The sentry and the three police officers who came out were killed. The partisans ran across the bridge and disappeared into the darkness before the policemen who were in the guardhouse could open fire.

The fire of the police alarmed the enemy garrison in the nearest settlements and white rockets appeared in the air above them. However, the partisans, apparently already accustomed to the nervousness of the invaders and traitors, carefully moving along the roads and paths known to them, they went to the location of the detachment, where the Soviet people were warmly received.

The detachment was located in small forests, often changing their bases. All materiel, with the exception of those that people could carry with them, the partisans hid in secret warehouses.

A few days later, a group of Soviet partisans participated in a raid on power plant and in its destruction.

In the second half of March, the detachment began preparations for the destruction of a heavily guarded railway bridge, important for the enemy, across the canal near Mons.

The command decided to make a sudden raid on this bridge by a motorized detachment, using for this purpose captured cars, motorcycles and the partisans' own bicycles in the detachment. It should be noted that the vehicles captured by the partisans were limited not only by the enemy's measures to protect roads possibilities use settlements, but also by fuel and lubricants, therefore, in preparation for the operation, the partisans accumulated fuel and lubricants for a long time. To capture and destroy the bridge, the following were prepared: an assault group of 60 people, a subversive group of 20 people and a combat support group of 40 people. The detachment was in a straight line 20 km from the bridge, but taking into account the detour of large settlements, it was necessary to drive about 40 km in one direction. The walking distance was over 30 km. The route ran through a densely populated area and it was impossible for a large detachment to stop unnoticed for a day. To deliver people to the facility, it was decided to use three trucks, two cars, 8 motorcycles, 3 of them with sidecars that could accommodate up to 85 people, the remaining 35 people were to ride bicycles towed outside the settlements by cars. For the convenience of towing, a rigid pairing of bicycles was used. For three days, the groups worked out the issues of movement, the fulfillment by each group of their tasks of capturing and destroying the bridge, combat support and interaction.

At 21.00 on 26.3.44, the consolidated detachment left to complete the task. All people on motorcycles and bicycles were dressed in enemy uniforms. Detachment column, leaving

on the highway, stopped and turned into an ambush with the aim of capturing the language, since without knowing the pass-password it was risky to pass through checkpoints, which were usually located in settlements and on guarded bridges. Traffic on the roads, especially at night, was sparse and the guerrillas had to wait in ambush for about 40 minutes until they saw the lights of two motorcycles. When the motorcyclists caught up with the column, they were stopped and silently disarmed. At first, they did not even suspect that they were among the partisans, and when they were asked for the password, they quickly answered and were about to leave, but the detachment commander told them that the password was invalid. They began to prove its validity and presented documents. The motorcyclists turned out to be Belgian fascists who were in the service of the Nazi invaders. Now the partisans had a password, and even two genuine documents. This got them out of trouble at the checkpoints. But even in the presence of a password, the detachment commander preferred not to drive into such settlements where there were strong enemy garrisons, but to go around them.

At about 24:00, the partisan column turned aside from the highway and soon stopped under the trees growing along the canal. The cars were deployed so that you could immediately go to the highway. A piercing northeast wind was blowing. But the partisans did not notice the cold, preparing to attack the bridge. Soon the partisans saw in the distance a train moving at high speed, but with barely noticeable headlights. There was no traffic on the highway.

The difficulty of capturing the bridge lay in the fact that the approaches to it were covered by gun emplacements located behind barbed wire, which the partisans knew from intelligence obtained by the underground.

Leaving the cars with the drivers and one support platoon, the rest of the detachment headed for the railroad. The path on the approach to the bridge was poorly guarded and the partisans, unnoticed by anyone, went to the railway about 800 meters from the bridge. Soon the faint lights of a train appeared from the side of the bridge. When the train passed by the partisans, they, using it as cover, crossed the track to the opposite side from the guardhouse and lay down along the track, watching the bridge. The commander of the detachment decided to move along the path using trains. The next train was again oncoming, and therefore, during its movement, when it prevented the sentries from viewing the path, the partisans advanced very slightly and again lay down, preparing to use the next passing train. At about 2.30 a passing train appeared. When he caught up with the lying guerrillas, they jumped up and ran first along the berm, and then along the path following the train to the bridge. However, the sentry discovered the partisans, he fired at them, rushed to the firing point, but was struck down by the partisans. The second sentry fled. The first platoon of the assault group took possession of the bridge and one squad was located in empty firing points, which were prepared by the enemy to defend the bridge. Demomen rushed to set the charges and connect them with a detonating cord. Two other platoons of the assault group laid siege to the barracks, but failed to capture it. Partisan grenades flew off the windows, which were protected by metal mesh. The enemy from the windows and the attic fired at the attackers, as well as at the demolition workers. Under enemy fire, the demolition partisans, despite the losses, nevertheless installed the charges they had brought, ignited the incendiary pipes and retreated to the opposite side, where one of the platoons of the assault group was in ambush. The detachment commander gave the order to move away from the mined bridge, continuing to shell the barracks with machine guns. The partisans began to retreat under cover of fire. At this time, a train coming from Brussels appeared, which noticeably began to slow down. Combat guards, who were on the way, ignited the incendiary tubes of the charges installed to undermine the rails and also began to retreat to the cars. Suddenly the sky was lit up with a bright flash. The guerrillas saw the silhouette of the damaged bridge and heard the sound of an explosion and the whistle of flying fragments of the farm, which collapsed into the canal. The train stopped 1 km from the bridge and in front of it began explosions of charges installed on the side of the rails. The locomotive began to give alarm signals, green and white rockets flashed above the train. From the train they fired at an invisible enemy. The partisans, carrying away the wounded, were already approaching the vehicles. When the main part approached the vehicles, the rest of the partisans were already on the opposite bank, who were taking off their clothes and, having no

crossing means, were preparing to overcome the canal by swimming. The crossing delayed the partisans for about five minutes. However, a combat support platoon on bicycles had already reached the fork in the road to secure the path for the convoy. The wounded were put into trucks and cars, the wet comrades were given dry clothes, taking them off. The enemy did not pursue the partisans, but heavily fired at the approaches to the track, where the charges exploded, which undermined the rails. This cannonade and shooting silenced the noise of the engines, the partisans safely drove onto the highway and, fearing ambushes, headed to the base by a different route and arrived there without any special incidents. The task was completed - the bridge farm was destroyed and rail traffic was interrupted, but the partisans suffered heavy losses: 16 people fell in battle with the enemy on the battlefield, 7 people died of wounds during transportation and 3 people died of wounds in the detachment, 17 people were treated in the partisan underground for a long time.

The destruction of the bridge caused a new rise in the activity of the partisans and the underground, forcing the enemy to use even more forces to protect communication lines and artificial structures.

Significant losses of the partisans are explained by the presence of nets against grenades in the windows of the barracks, which the partisans were not aware of. Strong metal nets saved the enemy garrison from being destroyed by grenades, which not only did not cause damage to the enemy, but, bouncing off the windows, on the contrary, caused damage to the partisans themselves. It should be noted that, despite the lengthy preparation, the issues of the return of groups that crossed to the opposite bank were not worked out. The plan provided for the destruction of the enemy garrison and the return of the miners through the bridge before its destruction, but the surviving enemy garrison by fire forced the partisans to refuse to return across the bridge.

Under these conditions, it would be advisable to use cumulative charges to destroy the enemy who has settled in the barracks, to blind him, smoke bombs.

Approximately half a month after the destruction of the bridge, the enemy, with forces of more than two infantry regiments, surrounded the forest, in which there were up to 900 partisans, and began to comb it. The partisans withdrew, suffering losses. The command of the partisans, before the enemy created a dense ring of encirclement, managed to send messengers to neighboring detachments. After two days of stubborn fighting, when the partisans were already running out of ammunition, two other detachments arrived to help them, who, using the form and password of the enemy, suddenly attacked him from the rear at night. The unexpected partisan attack was stunning for the enemy units and they hurried out of the forests.

The retreat of the enemy took place in the second half of the night. Panic arose in the ranks of the enemy units. The partisans found on the battlefield 42 enemy soldiers they had killed, 26 people were captured. At the same time, rich trophies were captured: 12 cars, 7 motorcycles, 27 horses, 30 machine guns, over 100 machine guns and rifles, and about 120,000 rounds of ammunition. Soviet citizens who joined the partisan detachment in January 1944 also took part in this battle.

The decisive role in the defeat of the punitive units was played by the courage of the partisans, the mutual assistance of neighboring units, which arrived at the battlefield on motorcycles and bicycles and suddenly attacked the enemy from the rear.

It should be noted the skillful use by the Belgian partisans of the form and passwords of the enemy.

The success of the fighting of the Belgian and other partisans of Western European countries is largely due to the fact that the most combat-ready enemy troops were diverted by the Soviet Army on the Eastern Front.

#### **Chapter 4 It was part of the 454th Infantry divisions.**

On the afternoon of January 19, 1944, the formation crossed the Rivne-Lvov railway through the Mirogoshcha station. The guards of the station, not accepting the fight, fled. When the tail

the column crossed the tracks, several German tanks approached the station, planes appeared in the air, but it was too late - the column had already safely entered the hilly small forests near Kremenets.

Later, the unit fought strong and continuous battles with nationalists and German troops in the area of Kunev, Ostrog, Verkhobuzh, Zalosya and Zlochev. In these areas, the formation was continuously attacked by the enemy from the air and on earth.

By April 1944, the formation had reached the foothills of the Carpathians, the Kosuv region - Mykulychyn with the task to go through the Carpathians to the Boryslav-Drohobych region.

Before that, - writes Shukaev (the author of the notes), - neither I nor my comrades - none of us was in the Carpathians and, of course, imagined gray inhospitable mountains, and not as we saw them. Especially at the first halts, the Carpathians seemed to us harsh with constantly floating shaggy clouds, when our formation was on Mount Chord, in the Mykulychyn region.

After several days of staying in the Carpathians, - Shukaev says further, - we completely ran out of food. The convoy, which the formation had, was left on the plain to connect with the Red Army. About 200 horses, taken by us under the packs, died of hunger, fell off the mountains on the move and flew down along with the packs. The villages that were close to us were all encircled by the enemy.

From hunger among the morally unstable partisans and even among some low-ranking commanders, discontent grew more and more. Some said out loud: "Where did they take us?" Indeed, the situation was very difficult. All around lay snow 50-70 centimeters deep. Desertions have begun. Fear of hunger and the lack of prospects for improving the situation in the near future more and more gripped the entire compound every day. I, - writes Shukaev, - sat for a long time over the map and looked for a solution that would preserve the main forces of the formation and achieve the goal set by the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and General Strokach - to withdraw the formation to the Borislav-Drohobych region. On May 10, almost all the horses taken with us were eaten by people.

The partisans looked for a long time in the direction where the plain was visible. On this day, - Shukaev continues, - the following conversation took place between me and my deputy major Gladilin: "What do you think, - I asked Gladilin, - will we pass through the Carpathians or not?" The major was silent for a minute, then, sighing heavily, he got up and said resolutely: "Of course, we must go through." How to get through and where to get through, Gladilin did not say. For which I was ready to kiss him. Now it was clear to me that I had like-minded people, although the vast majority of the partisans were silent.

By the evening of the same date, I ordered the entire personnel of the formation to line up and before the formation (and, moreover, the hungry formation), I made a big speech.

I spoke a lot, urging people not to lose heart, to remember the Motherland. The last words of my speech turned into a simple command: "Comrades, I am moving further along the Carpathians," I said, "whoever can go with me remains in place, whoever cannot go, get out of line!"

Leaning on a stick, with a bandaged arm that had not yet healed from a wound in battles with the Germans near Krutaya, I went around the formation and carefully looked at the people, and everyone stood silently with stern and even some kind of tense faces.

I turned all the partisans who had fallen out of line to face those who remained in place, and made another short speech. "Those who agree to go through the Carpathians to fulfill the order of the Party and the Motherland are true partisans," I said, "these are people who can endure all sorts of temporary hardships: hunger and cold.

Those who failed, I called people who accidentally fell into the partisans, cowards.

After my second speech, many partisans who did not want to go further along the Carpathians ran over to those who were willing to go further.

People who finally refused to go further along the Carpathians, I subjected each to a personal examination. As a result of such an inspection, I returned many partisans to the line, which was supposed to go with me.

The really feeble and weak, sick and completely emaciated from hunger, I expelled to join with units of the Red Army, for which I appointed a good command staff capable of leading people to join with it.

In extremely difficult conditions of mountainous terrain, in the complete absence of bread, ate horses recaptured from the enemy in an ambush on highways.

Not far from Mykulychyn, we managed to recapture several tons of potatoes from the enemy, these potatoes were divided among the partisans in equal parts, regardless of rank. After sharing, people immediately destroyed the resulting potatoes: some cooked, and some just ate raw.

Our march through the Carpathians was slow. Sometimes the connection was only 4-5 km per day. All trails and mountain roads were covered with snow. Those who walked in front, paving the way for everyone, changed every 20-30 minutes, some could not stand even these 20 minutes and fell. The column went only one at a time with long sticks in their hands, which facilitated stability especially for the weak. They often rolled down the mountain and broke their heads, faces and hands.

From the horses that we took with us to the Carpathians, by the end of the march, only two.

Only on May 23, that is, a month later, the formation reached the Borislav-Drogobych region and spread its camp on Mount Chernaya Gura. In just a month, the formation covered 250 kilometers through the Carpathians. After a short rest, the unit began active combat operations, while simultaneously receiving landings from organized partisan groups at its base.

It should be noted that there were absolutely no partisans at the time when we arrived in the Borislav region. But there were many gangs of nationalists with whom we had to fight.

During the two months of deployment of the unit in the Borislav region, partisans blew up 8 different factories, burned 104 oil derricks, burned about 10,000 tons of fuel, derailed 40 military echelons, while about 600 wagons and 31 locomotives were broken. 18 bridges were blown up, many small enemy garrisons were defeated.

During this period, the formation was subjected to complete encirclement three times and each time with little or no losses left the encirclement, inflicting great damage to the enemy in manpower and equipment.

In August of the same year, the formation entered the territory of Poland in the Sanok-Turka region, and later on the territory of Hungary. On August 26, it crossed the Czechoslovak border at Medzilabo and entered the Stropkov area.

Along the entire border of Czechoslovakia with Poland, troops were stationed, whose personnel consisted of Slovaks under the command of German generals and officers.

After some negotiations with the Slovak officers, two companies of soldiers under the command of Vladislav Kovacs and Lieutenant Bersky came over to our side with full armament.

Later, many Slovak units came over to our side, the numerical strength of which was about 4,000 people. This large group came over to our side under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jan Strelka and Captain Kielczyk. All the villages adjacent to Stropkov and Humenne were

occupied by partisans, all important roads, both railways and highways, were controlled.

From the soldiers and officers of the Slovak Army who came over to our side, I formed 12 partisan brigades, which were part of the formation of partisan detachments named after Stalin. The number of units in Slovakia reached 6,000 people. Formed by Slovak partisan brigades

commanded by Slovak officers and Soviet commissars under the general command of the headquarters of the formation of them. Stalin.

Particularly noteworthy is the active participation in the leadership of the partisan movement in Slovakia of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who, through his party organizations, expanded the partisan movement throughout the territory of Czechoslovakia, provided systematic and daily assistance to the partisans up to financing.

The joint struggle against the common enemy of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet partisans continued for six months, during these six months many of the Russians mastered the Slovak language, the attitude towards our partisans was exceptionally good. Very many residents of the Czech Republic and Slovakia were our residents and reported valuable information about the enemy.

During the stay of the connection on the territory of Slovakia, he had to visit the low and high Tatras.

With the onset of winter, many Slovak soldiers could hardly endure hardships and tests.

On the territory of Slovakia, the formation defeated many enemy garrisons, derailed 31 military echelons, blew up 24 bridges, including the bridge on the Tisovets-Brezno railway, which had not been in operation for about a month, destroyed 23 aircraft at the airfield, blown up the iron foundry in Tisovets, produced many other hostilities.

On February 26, 1945, in the Spisska Novo-Ves region of Czechoslovakia, a formation of partisan detachments left the rear of the enemy and united with units of the Red Army. Thus, during the stay behind

enemy lines, i.e. from July 18, 1943 to February 26, 1945, in the combat log of the partisan detachment unit named after. Stalin, the following is entered:

1. 206 military echelons were derailed
2. 500 different vehicles were knocked out and destroyed.
3. Motorcycles 47 pcs.
4. Aircraft 24 pcs.
5. Blown up factories 9 pcs.
6. Oil rigs burned 104 pcs.
7. 84 different bridges were blown up.
8. 10,000 tons of fuel burned.
9. 6 tanks and transporters destroyed.
10. Total sabotage carried out 803
11. Attacks on garrisons carried out 58
12. Radiograms sent to the mainland with intelligence and other additional information. 1500 pcs.

There were 22 nationalities (partisans) in the union, including the French, Poles, Hungarians, Spaniards, and others, and everyone in it fought for a single cause - the destruction of fascism.

In addition, about the role of leaders: according to my experience of military operations behind enemy lines, I can name General T.A. Strokach, who, understanding what a partisan movement is, gave it all his strength. But such a leader as General Andreev, occupying the post of chief of staff in the second half of 1944, made a number of mistakes, which resulted in the insufficient sabotage activity of our partisans in Czechoslovakia.

Lieutenant Colonel Shukaev.

March 25, 1948.

## Chapter 5



The partisan formation, commanded by the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General M.I. Naumov, repeatedly made raids and rapid transitions behind enemy lines. At the same time, the partisans skillfully changed the direction of movement and used other measures of camouflage and misleading the enemy. As a result, the enemy usually found out about the presence of partisans at one point or another only in the afternoon, and sometimes even after they left there.

During sudden raids on garrisons and various enemy targets, partisans often fell into the hands of serviceable means of telephone and radio communications, which they skillfully used to obtain intelligence data, mislead the enemy and defeat his subunits and units.

So, for example, on March 8, 1943, the unit, which by this time numbered about 700 partisans, made a swift night march and on the 9th captured the village of Krymki with a sudden raid from the move. The garrison, which consisted of a small police detachment, was killed by the partisans, capturing several policemen.

Single shots did not attract the attention of the enemy garrisons located in neighboring villages, since single shooting was a common occurrence behind enemy lines: enemy soldiers and policemen often started shooting drunk, for the sake of bragging, and often to intimidate the local population and partisans.

Thanks to initiative and decisive actions, the partisans captured the police building so quickly that the enemy did not have time to inform the neighboring garrisons about the attack by telephone. The phone turned out to be in good order and the commander decided to use it to mislead the enemy and defeat his units with an ambush attack.

To negotiate with the enemy, the partisans needed a policeman who would be known in neighboring garrisons. The head of the police detachment and his assistant were killed during the capture of the village. However, among the prisoners was a policeman, often on duty at the telephone. Many of the commandants and duty officers of the neighboring garrisons, including the garrison of the village of Aleksandrovka, where the district commandant's office was located and a large enemy garrison was located, knew him both by his last name and by his voice.

Under the threat of being shot, the policeman quickly agreed to talk on the phone in the interests of the partisans. He was instructed how to answer calls and, in addition, a second handset was attached to the telephone set to control him and the conversation. The unit commander ordered to set up small outposts at all exits from the village, and send secrets to hidden approaches, not let anyone out of the village, and also detain all those entering the village and send them to the head of intelligence of the unit.

The partisan unit was located in the village in detachments. In order to disguise the horses, they put them in barns, stables and under sheds. Unnecessary walking around the village was banned, and the patrols sat on the rubble and on benches near the huts. From the side it was impossible to assume that there was a whole partisan formation in the village.

During the night, the enemy behaved calmly - there were no phone calls. The partisans, with the help of a policeman, called three neighboring garrisons, past which the unit passed before the raid on Krymki, and asked if the partisans had appeared there. The enemy did not know anything about the formation passing by him. This circumstance greatly favored the partisans in carrying out their plan.

At about 11 am, the commandant from Alexandrovka called Krymki and demanded the commander of the police detachment to the phone. The policeman, at the direction of the commander of the partisan formation, reported to the commandant that it was calm in the village, and the commander of the police detachment went with a group of policemen to a neighboring village, where, allegedly, several suspicious persons appeared. The commandant praised the initiative of the chief of police and ordered to hand over to him upon his return - to prepare premises for quartering in Krymki by 17.00 of the company of the security battalion. Upon the arrival of the company in Krymki, the police officers will be subordinate to its commander, who is appointed head of the Krymki garrison. In addition, the commandant

conveyed that, according to the information he had, a partisan detachment had passed in the direction of the village of Krymki. He ordered to increase vigilance and report immediately by telephone when partisans appear. This conversation was very helpful, as it saved the partisans from having to call Alexandrovka themselves in order to "lure" the enemy out of there.

The commander of the partisan unit instructed the defeat of the fascists arriving in Krymki to the detachments named after N.S. Khrushchev and "Chervony", on his instructions, on the northern and northwestern outskirts of the village, from where the enemy could approach from Aleksandrovka, set up an ambush at 16. Soon, on the road leading to the northern outskirts, where the partisans were in ambush, a convoy appeared, about 20 carts. Traitors rode ahead in a good britzka drawn by a pair of well-fed horses, about 80 Nazis were sitting on the carts. Considering that there were policemen in the village, they rode calmly, although they observed security measures, sending forward policemen from among the local traitors.

Well-camouflaged partisans let the police cart through. When the convoy of the Nazis caught up with the ambush, he came under sudden fire. After a fire attack, the partisans attacked the enemy. The Nazis rushed about in confusion and could not offer any organized resistance, and the entire company of the Nazis was destroyed.

The guerrillas picked up weapons, took the documents of the dead, seized ammunition, food and uniforms.

Thus, thanks to the skillful use of communications equipment captured from the enemy, the partisans defeated an entire unit without losses on their part (except for three lightly wounded) and at the same time did not reveal themselves prematurely.

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A few days later, a detachment of them. Kirov of this compound was occupied at night by the village named after Kotovsky.

There was a working telephone in the elder's house. The commander of the detachment, Shebetun, decided to eavesdrop on telephone conversations in order to obtain new intelligence information about the enemy and the situation in the area. During the night, the enemy almost did not talk, and eavesdropping did not give anything of value, except for a few conversations, from which it became clear that the enemy did not yet know about the occupation of the village by the partisan detachment. Kotovsky.

The detachment commander immediately appreciated this and decided to use the presence of communications to capture languages. He ordered the arrested headman to be brought to him and ordered him to call the village of Miropolye, ask the gebitskommissar to the phone, report that the bread collected from the peasants in the barns began to deteriorate and ask him to send a representative for verification. The headman complied with the order and the gebitskommissar promised that the representatives would arrive soon.

By this time, the partisans had already loaded part of the bread onto carts, and the rest was distributed to the population.

Not even an hour had passed before the Gebietskommissar himself rolled into the village in two chaises with two of his assistants, an interpreter and a bodyguard consisting of four policemen.

Partisan patrols on the outskirts of the village let the unsuspecting fascists pass unhindered to the barns in the center of the village, where they were captured by an ambush set by the detachment commander without firing a shot.

In the hands of the partisans, thanks to the initiative and skillful use of communications turned out to be valuable "languages", which represented the entire administration of the district.

## **CONCLUSION.**

### **The feat of the people.**

In the previous chapters of the book, we had to talk mainly about missed opportunities in the partisan-sabotage war in the rear of the Wehrmacht. Alas, all this was: intrigues in the leadership of the partisan struggle, and zigzags, and

underestimation. The fact that we, after more than half a century, have to talk about all this is our misfortune. The real history was so redrawn by Stalin's "chroniclers" that even now, in the public consciousness, and in historiography, a certain mythological image of the Great Patriotic War is preserved. Shedding light on the real facts and events of those years is, no doubt, a noble and necessary thing. However, the restoration of historical truth is a gradual and unhurried matter. You should be aware that with such a huge amount of lies that we see in the Stalinist falsified history of our Motherland, when at times it is completely incomprehensible where the truth is and where it is not, the work of restoring real historical events should be extremely careful. After all, you can throw out the baby with water. Unfortunately, the eternal radicalism of our society has played its negative role here as well. With the collapse of the country, a cloudy stream of revelations poured on the reader (often falsifications that were cleaner than Stalin's); there was no need to talk about any careful attitude to history. And the most negative role played by these "revelations of Stalin's crimes" is the complete oblivion of the great historical role of the Soviet people (by which we mean all the peoples who lived on the territory of the Soviet Union), thanks to which victory in the battle with Nazi Germany became possible.

After all that I have told about the leadership of the guerrilla war and about the attitude of the leaders of the Stalinist training towards our saboteur partisans, it is impossible not to feel the moral need to tell about the great feat of the people in the struggle behind enemy lines, on our "second front", which contributed equally with the efforts of the allies, to achieve victory over fascism.

The main damage to the enemy in the guerrilla war was caused by specially trained formations that used sabotage equipment. But it should be noted that these formations carried out the tasks assigned to them to some extent and thanks to popular assistance and support. Soviet people who found themselves in the occupied territories, directly helping the partisans, risked much more than they did. The partisans hit, inflicted damage on the enemy - and left, but these people remained and, often, fell under the retaliatory strike of the punitive fascist detachments.

Local residents often supplied the partisans with food, providing them with shelter and shelter, and in the first year of the war they even obtained weapons for the partisans on the battlefields, i.e., in essence, they did the same for the partisans as military supplies for the soldiers of the Red Army. The Germans quite reasonably considered such people to be the same partisans as those who directly fought the hostilities - and dealt with them accordingly. Stalin, apparently, did not think so - after all, after the war, only a few such Soviet patriots who helped the partisans, risking their lives, received a partisan medal. This can hardly be considered fair. However, as I said, after the war, there was little justice for the partisans in general.

The guerrilla struggle in the Great Patriotic War in 1943 reached nationwide proportions. It was attended not only by those who ended up in the occupied territory, but also by volunteers from the non-occupied territories: Leningraders, Muscovites, Siberians and Urals. Among them, I would like to mention such as Grigory Matveevich Linkov, Ovid Aleksandrovich Gorchakov, Nina Vasilievna Moliy, Vasily Antonovich Bratus, who embarked on the path of partisan struggle, although their native places were never occupied by the enemy. But the main feature of this partisan war was that not only Soviet people took part in it; along with them, foreigners also took an active part in it.

First of all, these were the Spaniards, who entered the fight against fascism back in 1936, during the fascist uprising in Spain, and who, after the fall of the republic, managed to get into the Soviet Union. From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, they sought permission to fight the enemy in the Soviet armed forces, primarily in the rear of the invaders. It should be noted that the Spaniards, residents of a country with a warm climate, successfully participated in January-February 1942 in ice campaigns through the Taganrog Bay behind enemy lines,

acted in Ukraine, Bryansk, in the Tver and Smolensk regions, in the North Caucasus.

I would like to note that their participation in the war has so far practically not been reflected in our press. (One can only recall Serno Roque's book "The Spaniards in Russia in 1941-1945")<sup>[150]</sup>. Meanwhile, one of the main merits of the Spaniards in this war is that they generously shared their combat experience with our partisans. I would like to acknowledge the courage and bravery of Jose Vesco, Paso Sandoval Angel, Ramos del Osco, Juan Ramirez, Juan

Bravo, Rafael Estrello and many others who helped train the relevant personnel in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia and were themselves actively involved in partisan operations.

On the side of the partisans, the Slovak units that had gone over to their side fought, which the pro-German Slovak government sent to the Eastern Front. Then these Slovak partisans, together with our partisans, participated in the Slovak National Uprising. The Hungarians and even some of the Germans went over to the partisans.

Many people successfully waged guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. The path of many of them to partisans was difficult. Some, in order to survive, first entered the police formations and other traitorous organizations, and then went over to the side of the partisans. In this regard, the example of Gil-Rodionov is very indicative. On August 16, 1943, the so-called "Russian National People's Army" under the command of Vladimir Vladimirovich Gil-Rodionov, formed by the Germans from prisoners of war, passed to the partisans. This formation was called the Anti-Fascist Partisan Brigade and operated successfully until 1944, when it joined forces with the Red Army. Commissar of the brigade I.M. Timchuk was even awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union in January 1944.<sup>[151]</sup>

Here we are faced with a rather important issue, which, as I know, worries many. It can be formulated as follows: if the actions of the partisans often led to the extermination of the civilian population by the Nazis, then to what extent was their necessity justified? It would be foolish to sidestep this issue by pretending it doesn't exist. Let's try to find the answer.

The extermination part of the war was planned in advance. Numerous documents of the pre-war period convincingly testify to this. So, on March 30, 1941, at a meeting of the top generals of the Wehrmacht, Hitler declared that in the war against the USSR the struggle would be waged "to annihilate", that it would be a war of extermination in the full sense of the word. Documents such as the "Ost General Plan", "Instruction on Special Areas to Directive N\_21", dated March 13, 1941, "On Military Jurisdiction in the Barbarossa Region and Special Powers of the Troops" dated May 13, 1941, "Twelve commandments of the behavior of Germans in the East and their treatment of Russians" dated June 1, 1941 and a number of others, elevated atrocities against the civilian population to the rank of state policy."<sup>[152]</sup>

I cited this rather lengthy quote only to remind many who have forgotten what the Nazis were going to do in the occupied territories. Now this issue is somehow ignored, focusing mainly on Stalin's crimes. And this, in turn, leads to the emergence of neo-Nazi and openly fascist groups and organizations in our country. "What is Hitler to us," their ideologists say, "when Stalin repressed many more people. And nothing, the state was strong." Oh no, my dears. First, Stalin's crimes led directly to the present deplorable situation in the country; we can say that time bombs set by Stalin are now exploding. Secondly, if you look at how many years Stalin was in power, and how many - Hitler, count their victims and carry out a simple arithmetic operation - divide the number of repressed by the time, then we will see that under Stalin there was not and could not be such an orgy of destruction people, which was happening in Nazi Germany and in the territories it occupied. Stalin, of course, was not a meek lamb, but he still falls short of Hitler.

The extermination and deportation of the civilian population to hard labor by the Nazis would have begun regardless of the actions of the partisans. On the contrary, quite often it was the partisans who saved the Soviet people from the fascist warriors. Another thing is that sometimes the actions of partisans really entailed repressions against the population. However, such a reaction of the Nazis was characteristic primarily of single terrorist acts against prominent representatives of the occupation administration. This, no doubt, was unacceptable. Only when carrying out simultaneous optimally planned large-scale guerrilla operations did the enemy lose any opportunity to take out his anger on the defenseless population, since he was forced to go on the defensive. And although the guerrilla war really contributed to the large losses of the civilian population, but these victims were justified by the salvation from the destruction of

millions of people.

It should also be noted here that the training of qualified cadres of partisan saboteurs would be simply impossible without the presence of a large number of volunteers who wanted to beat the enemy in his own rear.

Without broad selfless popular support, guerrilla warfare could hardly have played such a role in achieving the Great Victory as it did. This, as in a mirror, reflected one of the main historical conclusions made by the last world war: it is not governments or state structures that win wars, as ideology drummed into us, but peoples who defend their own independence win.

Unfortunately, now people often forget about the great feat accomplished by our people, which cost a lot of effort and sacrifice, and this is our national tragedy. To remember this is our duty to ourselves, and I sincerely hope that this book will help at least some to remember this, as well as the fact that victory was not predetermined.

After all, without the memory of the past, there is no future.

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162. Partisans  
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168. Ponomarenko P.K. Partisan movement in the Great Patriotic War. M., 1943. (In Belarusian). 169.  
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208. Churchill W.S. The Second World War. M., 1998. In 6 volumes. 209.  
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#### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

VGK - Supreme Commander-in-Chief. VGIK - All-Union State Institute of Cinematography. VOSHON - Higher operational school for special purposes. VChK - All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Sabotage. GKO - State Defense Committee. GRU - Main Intelligence Directorate.  
POL - Combustive-lubricating materials. GUVVR - Main Directorate of Military Restoration Works. KGB - State Security Committee. CPY - Communist Party of Yugoslavia. LKSM - Leninist Communist Youth Union. MIA - Ministry of Internal Affairs. MZD - Delayed mine. Mongolian People's Republic - Mongolian People's Republic. MPV - Mine demolition platoons. MPS - Ministry of Railways. NKVD - People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. NOAU - People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. NRA DVR - People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic. OGPU - United State Political Administration. OMSBON - Separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes. Operod - Operational department. OTC - Operational Training Center of the Western Front. Air defense - Air defense. PMS - Starinov train mine. Red Army - Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. SNK RSFSR - Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federative

Socialist Republic. UVVR - Department of Military Restoration Works. UPA - Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Ukrainian SSR - Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. UShPD - Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement. Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U - the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. TsSHPD - Central headquarters of the partisan movement (May 30, 1942). Czechoslovakia - Czechoslovak Soviet Socialist Republic.

[1] Almanac "Vympel". M., 1997. Issue. 3.

[2] Saburov Alexander Nikolaevich (1908-1974), one of the leaders of the partisan struggle in the Great Patriotic War. Since 1938 he was in the NKVD. During the Great Patriotic War - the commander of a partisan detachment, then a unit operating in the Oryol and Sumy regions, as well as in Right-Bank Ukraine. From 1942 - member of the underground Central Committee of the CP(b)U. Chief of Staff of the partisan movement in the Zhytomyr region. Since 1944 in the bodies of the NKVD, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ed. note).

[3] Strokach Timofei Amvrosievich (1903-1963), one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War, lieutenant general (1944). In 1919-1922 he participated in the partisan movement in the Far East. Since 1924 - served in the border

troops. Since 1940 - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR. In the Great Patriotic War from 1942-1945, he was the head of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement. Since 1946 - Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR. From 1956-1957 - a senior official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Ed. note).

[4] Vyhodets Pavel Aleksandrovich (1903), one of the leaders of the partisan movement in the Great Patriotic War, colonel (1943). Fought in the Civil War. In 1943 he was appointed head of the special school of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement.

[5] Fedorov Aleksey Fedorovich (1901), one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War, major general (1943), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1942-1944). Member of the Civil War. He graduated from the construction technical school (1932). From 1938 - 1st secretary of the Chernigov (from September - underground) regional party committee. Since March 1943 - Secretary of the Volyn Regional Party Committee. Commander of the Chernihiv-Volyn partisan formation (Ed. note).

[6] Petr Petrovich Vershigora (1905-1963), participant in the partisan war, writer, major general (1944), Hero of the Soviet Union (1944). Graduated from VGIK (1938). During the Great Patriotic War - the commander of a platoon, company, battalion. Since 1942 - in the partisans. Deputy commander of a partisan unit for reconnaissance. From December 1943 commander of the 1st Ukrainian partisan division. Member of 5 raids behind enemy lines (Ed. note).

[7] Mikhail Ivanovich Naumov (1908-1974), one of the organizers of the partisan movement in Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War, Major General (1943). Since 1930 - in the troops of the OGPU and the NKVD. He graduated from the Higher School of the Border Troops (1938). With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - commander of a group, partisan detachment, chief of staff of the operational group of partisan detachments of the Sumy region, commander of a partisan cavalry unit. Made 3 raids in Ukraine and the Kursk region. He graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff (1945). After the war (until 1960) in the bodies and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ed. note).

[8] Swierczewski Karol (1897-1947), statesman and military leader of Poland. One of the organizers of the Polish Army. Member of the October Revolution in Russia. From 1918 - in the Red Army. Graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze (1927). During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) - commander of the international brigade and division (under the pseudonym General Walter). During the Great Patriotic War - the commander of a rifle division. From 1943 - deputy commander of the 1st Polish Corps. Since 1944, deputy, commander of the First and Second Army of the Polish Army. Since 1946 Deputy Minister of National Defense of Poland. Killed by nationalists (Ed. note).

[9] Members of the Home Army, formed in Poland, were called Akovtsy emissaries of the government of V. Sikorsky in London (Ed. note).

[10] Nikolai Arkhipovich Prokopyuk (1902-1975), an active participant in the partisan struggle in the Great Patriotic War. Member of the Civil War. Since 1942 - behind enemy lines. In 1944 - commander of a special partisan detachment and unit operating in Ukraine, Poland and Czechoslovakia. From December 1944 he participated in the national liberation war in China. - Ed.

[11] Vershigora's deputy at that time was Moskalenko, and Kalnitsky was the head of 3 companies of miners, captain (Ed. note).

[12] Jozef Piłsudski (1867-1935), political and military figure in Poland. Since 1926, the head of the reactionary regime, Marshal. Leader of the right wing of the Polish Socialist Party. One of the founders of her nationalist faction (1906). During World War I he commanded the Polish Legion, which fought on the side of Austria-Hungary. In 1918-1922 "head of state". In 1920 he conducted military operations against Soviet Russia. Since 1926 Minister of War and Inspector General of the Armed Forces. In 1926-1928 and in 1930, the Prime Minister and dictator of Poland (Ed. note). [13] Kovpak Sidor Artemyevich (1887-1967), one of the organizers of the partisan struggle in Ukraine during the Great

Patriotic War, twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1942, 1944), Major General (1943). Member of the Civil War. Since 1937 - Chairman of the Putivl City Executive Committee. In the Great Patriotic War - the commander of a partisan detachment, then the united partisan detachments of the Sumy region. Led 5 raids on the rear (Ed. note).

[14] Bandera - members of the military-political formations of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Western Ukraine in 1943-1947. Named after its leader S.A. Bandera. Bandera was a member of the OUN, as well as those who were in the OUN of Melnyk, the movement of T. Bulba-Borovets (the so-called "bulbovtsy") and members of Ukrainian nationalist organizations that collaborated with the fascist invaders (Ed. note).

[15] Begma Vasily Andreevich (1906-1965), one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War, Major General (1943). From 1928 -

in Komsomol, trade union and party work. In 1942-1944 - secretary of the Rivne underground regional committee of the CP(b)U. Head of the Rivne headquarters of the partisan movement.

[16] Fomin Anatoly. On the same front line with the Wehrmacht // Svobodnaya mysl'. N\_8. August. 1997, p. 109.

[17] Ibid. S. 111.

[18] Fomin Anatoly. On the same front line with the Wehrmacht // Svobodnaya mysl'. N\_8. August. 1997, p. 114.

[19] Tito Broz Josip (1892-1980), political and military leader of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, marshal (1943). In 1915 he came to Russia as a prisoner of war. In 1917 he joined the Red Guard in Omsk and fought against Kolchak. In 1920 he returned to his homeland. In 1935-1936 he worked in Moscow in the Comintern. In 1941-1945 he became commander in chief of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. In 1943-1945 - Chairman of the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia. In 1945-1946 - Chairman of the Provisional Government, Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander. After the war - the head of Yugoslavia. - Note ed. [20] Antonescu Yon (1882-1946) military dictator of Romania from 1940-1944. Since 1933 - Chief of the Romanian General Staff, Minister of Defense of Romania since 1938. Signed a protocol on the accession of Romania to the "axis" powers. On August 23, 1944, as a result of an anti-fascist armed

uprising, he was overthrown and arrested as a war criminal and executed on June 1, 1946 (Ed. note).

[21] Mihai Hohenzollern (1921), King of Romania (1927-1930, 1940-1947). During the 2nd World War, King Mihai had limited power. In fact, the country was ruled by the military dictator Antonescu. In 1941, the king, together with his mother - Queen Helena, born a Greek princess - visited Berlin. Recalling this visit, A. Hitler wrote: "Romania! If something happens to Antonescu now, who will take his place? I think about it with horror. The king is just a dirty pig; this type did not even want to help his mother get out of the car, for he fears that by doing so he will belittle his royal dignity. (Quoted by: Henry Picker. Hitler's Table Talk. Smolensk, 1993). (Ed. note).

[22] Edvard Kardelj is a prominent member of the CPY, a colleague of J. Broz Tito. [23] This

novel, titled "Not a prisoner, but a partisan" was published in the magazine "Profi" for 1997 in N\_1-2. [24] Subsequently, this unit merged with the Red Army and joined its ranks.

[25] Golikov Philip Ivanovich (1900-1980). Member of the Civil War. Until 1931 he was in party political work. Graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze. Then - the commander of a rifle regiment, division, mechanized brigade, fur. corps, commander of the Vinnitsa army, deputy chief of the General Staff - head of the Main Intelligence Directorate. Since April 1943 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR for personnel. From May 1943 - Head of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. (Ed. note).

[26] Aksenov Yu. Beyond the line of fear. Steel roads of victory. M., 1985. S. 91. [27] Railway troops in the Great Patriotic War. M., 1995. S. 154-164.

[28] Kuzin P. Memory does not die//Transport construction. 1990. N\_8. S. 54.

[29] Kukurichkin V.K. Experience in demining MZD. Collection on the exchange of experience in the restoration of railways. M., 1945. N\_8. S. 146.

[30] Ilyin D. Through minefields. Steel roads of victory. M., 1985. S. 82. [31] Railway troops in the Great Patriotic War. M., 1995. S. 170.

[32] Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky (1898-1967), Soviet statesman and military figure, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944). People's Hero of Yugoslavia. Member of the First World War and the Civil War. Since 1930 - chief of staff of the cavalry regiment. He worked in the headquarters of the military districts. Participated in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). From 1941 - commander of a rifle corps. From 1943 - Commander of the Southern, Southwestern, 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. Since 1945, the commander of the Trans-Baikal Front (Ed.).

[33] Vostrukhov Vladimir Ivanovich (1895-1971), colonel general (1945). Member of the First World War and the Civil War. Since 1921 regiment commander, teacher and head of the "Shot" courses. Graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze (1933). During the Great Patriotic War, he was deputy commander for the rear of a number of armies, and later of the Kalinin, Steppe, 2nd Ukrainian and Transbaikal fronts. - Ed.

[34] Ivan Stepanovich Konev (1897-1973), Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945), Hero of Czechoslovakia, Hero of the MPR. Member of the First World War. In Civil - the commissioner of an armored train, a rifle brigade, a division, the headquarters of the NRA of the Far East. In 1940-1941 - Commander of the Trans-Baikal Military District. During the Great Patriotic War - commander of the 19th army of the Western, Kalininsky, Northwestern, Steppe, 2nd and 1st Ukrainian fronts. Since 1945 - Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces (Ed. note).

[35] Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin (1895-1975), Soviet state, military and party leader, Colonel General (1958). From 1918 he was a member of the Cheka, from 1922 - in economic work. In 1931-1937 - Chairman of the Moscow Council. Since 1937 - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. In 1938-1941 - Chairman of the Board of the State Bank and Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. During the Great Patriotic War - a member of the Military Council of the Western, 2nd

Baltic and 1st Belorussian fronts. In 1944 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and member of the State Defense Committee (Editor's note).

[36] Blucher Vasily Konstantinovich (1890-1938), marshal (1935). Member of the 1st World War. In Civil led troops encircled in the Orenburg region. He made with them a 1500-kilometer raid across the Urals to connect with the 3rd Army of the Eastern Front. From the summer of 1919 - head of the 51st Infantry Division, went from Tyumen to Baikal. Commander of the Perekop strike group. In 1921-1922 - Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic. Corps commander-commissar, chief military adviser to the Chinese revolutionary government, assistant commander of the Ukrainian Military District. Since 1929, the commander of the OKDVA. In the summer of 1938 - commander of the Far Eastern Front (Ed. note). [37] Maslennikov Ivan Ivanovich (1900-1954). Member of the Civil War, commander of a cavalry group, regiment, brigade. Since 1928 in the border and internal troops, then in the

bodies of the OGPU and the NKVD. Graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze (1935). During the Great Patriotic War - Commander of the 29th and 39th Armies of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front, Deputy Commander of a number of fronts. From 1944 - commander of the 3rd Baltic Front. In 1945 - Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East, then commander of the Baku and Transcaucasian Military District. Since 1948 - in the service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ed. note).

[38] Khrushchev Nikita Sergeevich (1894-1971), Soviet statesman and party leader, lieutenant general (1943). Member of the Civil War. After 1920 - in economic and party work. In 1929 he graduated from the Industrial Academy. Since 1931 - at the party and economic work in Moscow. In 1935-38 - 1st secretary of the MK and MGK of the CPSU (b). From 1938 to 1947 - 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine. From 1944-47 he was also the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR. From December 1949 - Secretary of the Central Committee and 1st Secretary of the MK of the CPSU (b). Since 1953 - 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Released from duty in 1964. (Ed. note).

[39] Op. Quoted from: Gorchakov O. The Secret of Colonel Starinov // Gather in the garden. Moscow: Izvestia, 1963. S. 68-77.

[40] Mussolini Benito (Amilcare Andrea) (1883-1945), the founder of Italian fascism, head of the Italian fascist party and government of Italy in 1922-1943 and the puppet government of the so-called. Republic of Salò in 1943-1945. He was captured by partisans along with his mistress and hanged (Ed. note).

[41] Davydov Denis Vasilyevich (1781 - 1839). He received a brilliant home education. In 1807 he was appointed adjutant to Prince. Bagration. In the winter of 1808, he was in the army operating in Finland, went along with Kulnev to Uleaborg, occupied the island of Carloe with the Cossacks and, returning to the vanguard, retreated across the ice of the Gulf of Bothnia. In 1809, being under Prince. Bagration, who commanded troops in Moldova, and then, when Bagration was replaced, entered the vanguard of the Moldavian army, under the command of Kulnev. At the beginning of the war in 1812, he was a lieutenant colonel in the Akhtyrsk hussar regiment and was in the vanguard troops of Gen. Vasilchikov. Before the Battle of Borodino, he was the first to think about the benefits of partisan actions and the first to start them. His quick successes convinced Kutuzov of the expediency of guerrilla warfare, and he gave it a wider development. One of the outstanding exploits of Davydov, during this time, was the case under s. Lyakhov, where he, along with other partisans, captured the 2,000th detachment of Gen. Augereau; then, near the city of Kopys, he destroyed the French. cavalry depot, scattered the enemy detachment near Belynichi and, continuing the search to the Neman, occupied Grodno. With the border crossing, he entered the corps of the gene. Wintzingerode, participated in the defeat of the Saxons near Kalisch and, having entered Saxony with an advanced detachment, occupied the outskirts of Dresden. In 1814, commanding the Akhtyrsky hussar regiment, he was in the army of Blucher, participated with it in all major affairs and especially distinguished himself in the battle of La Rotier. In 1815 he was promoted to major general; then he took the place of chief of staff, first in the 7th, and then in the 3rd corps. In 1827 he successfully acted against the Persians, and in 1831 against the Polish rebels (Ed. note).

[42] Davydov D. Military notes. M., 1982. S. 292.

[43] Vaupshasov S.A. At dangerous intersections. M., 1971. S. 201-202.

[44] Davydov D. Experience of the theory of partisan war. M., 1821. XVI, 220 S. [45]

Golitsyn Nikolai Sergeevich (1809-1892), Russian military historian, infantry general (1880). Participated in the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829. In 1838-1847 - head of the department of strategy, military history and military literature of the Military Academy. From 1848 - director of the Imperial School of Law, editor of the newspaper "Russian invalid". In 1857-1864 he worked in the General Staff. Author of numerous works on military history (Ed. note).

[46] Carl Clausewitz (1780-1831), military writer who revolutionized the theory of war with his writings. In the campaign of 1806, he was an aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus and was captured with him. In 1810-12 he taught military sciences to the Crown Prince of Prussia. In 1812 he transferred to the Russian service. In 1814 he returned to the Prussian army. In 1831, during the performance of the Prussian troops on the Polish border, he was appointed chief of staff; died in Poznań of cholera. The most important essay "On War" (1880) Distinctive features of his works - clarity of presentation, accurate critical assessment of military events, moreover, according to his guiding view of the war ("war is a continuation of politics, acting only by other means"). He gave a wide place to the political element and seeks to find out how much the fate of the armies depends on the strength and weakness of the generals, whose characteristics are given out by Clausewitz with brilliance (Ed. note).

[47] Jomini Antoine Henri (Genrikh Veniaminovich) (1779-1869), military theorist and historian, general of infantry of the Russian army (1826). From 1798 he served in the Swiss army. In 1804-1813 - in the French army. One of the founders of the Russian Military Academy. He was involved in the planning of military operations in the Russian-Turkish war (1828-1829) and the Crimean (1853-1856) wars (Ed. note).

[48] This work was republished in the Vypel Almanac. 1998. N\_1. [49]

Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov (1730-1800), Prince of Italy, Count of Rymnik and the Holy Roman Empire, Generalissimo of the Russian Army and Field Marshal of Austria, the greatest Russian commander. As a child, he was enlisted as a private in the Semenov Life Guards Regiment. In 1745 he entered active service. In 1754 he was promoted to officer, and first entered the military field during the 7-year war. Participated in the Battle of Kunersdorf and Chernyshev's raid on Berlin. In 1761 he commanded separate detachments and distinguished himself as a brave partisan and dashing cavalryman. In 1762 he was sent with dispatches to the Empress and was appointed commander of the Astrakhan infantry regiment. Commanding the Suzdal Infantry Regiment since 1763, he developed his famous system of education and training of troops, based on the combat experiences he had taken out of the war against such a commander as Frederick the Great. In 1768 he acted against the Polish Confederates, where his brilliant talents were revealed. In 1773, he participated in the actions of the army of P. Rumyantsev against the Turks and, by his actions, influenced the outcome of the war and the conclusion of peace in

Kuchuk-Kainarji. At the end of the Turkish campaign, S. was sent to c. Panin, busy suppressing the Pugachev rebellion; but S. managed to arrive at his new destination only after the final defeat of Pugachev. Until 1779 he commanded troops in the Kuban and in the Crimea and perfectly organized the defense of the coast of the Tauride Peninsula, in case of a landing by the Turks. During the same time, he arranged the eviction of Christian inhabitants from the Crimea; the Greeks were settled along the Azov coast, the Armenians - on the Don, near Rostov. In 1779 he was given command of a Little Russian division, and in 1782 he took command of the Kuban corps. After the annexation of Crimea to Russia (1783), he had to subdue the Nogai Tatars, which he did, despite significant difficulties. In 1786 he was promoted to general-in-chief and appointed head of the Kremenchug division. With the beginning of the 2nd Turkish war of 1787-91, he was appointed head of the Kinburn Corps, which was entrusted with the defense of the Black Sea coast, from the mouth of the Bug to Perekop. His participation in the siege of Ochakov (1788) ceased due to a quarrel with Potemkin. In 1789, commanding a division in Repnin's army, he defeated the Turks at Focsani and Rymnik, for which he received the Order of St. George I Art. and the title of Count of Rymnik, and from the Austrian Emperor - the title of Count of the Holy Roman Empire. In December 1790 he took Ishmael by storm. This feat, as a result of the subsequent collision with Potemkin, did not give Suvorov a field marshal's baton: he was awarded only the rank of lieutenant colonel of the life guards. Preobrazhensky Regiment. In 1791, Suvorov was entrusted with surveying the Finnish border and drawing up a project for its fortification, an assignment that he was very burdened with. At the end of 1792, he was entrusted with a similar assignment in southwestern Russia, in view of the possibility of resuming the war with Turkey. In August 1794 he was called to the theater of the Polish war. A number of victories won by him, culminating in the capture of Prague, was awarded the rank of Field Marshal General. In 1796 he was appointed chief of our military forces in the southern and southwestern provinces, and here he developed his system of training and indoctrination of troops to the fullest. Here he gave the final edition of his military catechism ("The Science of Victory", "Active

military art"). When, after the accession to the throne of Emperor Paul, various innovations began in the troops, Suvorov openly expressed his condemnation, for which he was disgraced. In February 1797 he was dismissed from service and exiled to his estate, under the supervision of the police. This link lasted about two years, until, in February 1799, at the insistent petitions of the Vienna court, the Imperial Rescript followed, which entrusted him with command over the Austro-Russian army in the war with France. This war crowned him with new glory. Emperor Paul granted him the title of Prince of Italy and the title of Generalissimo and ordered a monument to him in St. Petersburg. The last war broke the strength of the aged commander, he returned completely ill to St. Petersburg, where he died. His ashes rest in the Alexander Nevsky Lavra (Approx. ed.).

[50] Tarle E.V. Napoleon. M., 1942. S. 43. [51]

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), French military and political figure. Promoted during the French Revolution. During the Directory he commanded an army. In 1799, having made a coup d'état, he became the first consul, and in 1804 he proclaimed himself emperor. Thanks to victorious wars, he subjugated most of the states of Western and Central Europe to France. The collapse of his empire began with the defeat in the war of 1812. - Ed. [52] Davydov D.V. Military notes. M., 1940. S. 175.

[53] Kutuzov (Golenishchev-Kutuzov) Mikhail Illarionovich (1745-1813), the great Russian commander, Field Marshal General (1812). From 1776 he served in the Crimea under the command of A.V. Suvorov. Participants of the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791. Distinguished himself during the assault on Ishmael. In 1792-1802 - ambassador to Turkey, then director of the land gentry cadet corps, commander and inspector of troops in Finland, Lithuanian and St. Petersburg military governor. In 1805 he was commander-in-chief of the Russian army in Austria. In 1806-1811 military governor of Kyiv, commander of the corps. During the Russian-Turkish war (1806-1812) he commanded the Moldavian army. During the Patriotic War, he was elected head of the St. Petersburg, and then the Moscow militia. Since August - Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army (Ed. note). [54] Tarle E.V. Napoleon. M., 1942. S. 43.

[55] Petrovich N. Defense of the rear of the army. Moscow, 1936.

P. 10. [56] Drobov M.A. Small war partisanship and sabotage//Almanac "Vypel". 1998. N\_1. WITH.  
60.

[57] Pavlov Ya.S. Lenin and the partisan movement. Minsk, 1975.

[58] Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak (1875-1924), one of the leaders of the counter-revolution in Russia, Admiral. He graduated from the Naval Cadet Corps (1894). Participated in the Russo-Japanese and World War I. In 1916-1917 he commanded the Black Sea Fleet. In 1918-1919 "Supreme Ruler of the Russian State". After the fall of the white movement, he was shot (Ed. note).

[59] Pavlov Ya.S. Lenin and the partisan movement. Minsk, 1975. Chapter "Partisan Movement in the Civil War.

[60] Denikin Anton Ivanovich (1872-1947), one of the leaders of the counter-revolution during the Civil War, lieutenant general (1916). Graduated from the Academy of the General Staff (1899). Participated in the First World War. From April 1918 he headed the Volunteer White Guard Army. After the victory of the Red Army, he emigrated (Ed. note).

[61] Shkuro (Shkura) Andrei Grigoryevich (1887-1947), one of the leaders of the counter-revolution. He graduated from the Nikolaev Caucasian School (1907). In 1918 he began an armed struggle against Soviet power in the North Caucasus. In 1919 - commander of the cavalry corps "Armed Forces of the South of Russia". After the defeat of the White Guard movement, he emigrated. In 1939-1945 he collaborated with the Nazi regime. Executed (Ed. note).

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Makhno Nestor Ivanovich (1889-1934), one of the representatives of the popular movement in Ukraine during the Civil War. In 1919-1920, Makhno entered into an agreement with the Soviet government three times and violated it three times. In 1921, his formations were defeated by Soviet troops. In 1921 he emigrated (Editor's note).

[65] Tukhachevsky Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893-1937), Marshal of the Soviet Union. He graduated from the Alexander Military School (1914). Member of the First World War. During the Civil War - military commissar of defense of the Moscow region, commander of the 1st, 5th Army, assistant commander of the Southern Front. In 1920-1921 - commander of the Caucasian, Western fronts. Participated in the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion and Antonovshchina in the Tambov province. After 1921 - head of the Military Academy of the Red Army, 1922-1924 - commander of the Western Front.

From 1925-1928 - Chief of Staff of the Red Army. From 1928 - Commander of the Leningrad Military District. Since 1931, Deputy People's Commissar for Military Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, Chief of Armaments of the Red Army. Since 1936 - 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and head of the combat training department. In 1937, the commander of the troops of the PriVO (Ed. note).

[66] Tukhachevsky M.N. Fight against counter-revolutionary uprisings//War and revolution. 1926. N\_8. pp. 4-5.

[67] It is impossible not to admire the steadfastness of the Abyssinian army, which resisted the superior forces of the aggressor not for two, as the fascist Italian command assumed, but for seven whole months.

[68] Berzin (Berzin) Jan Karlovich (1889-1938). The real name and surname is Kyuzis Peteris. Participated in the revolution of 1905-1907, the February and October revolutions of 1917. During the Civil War - the head of the political department of the division and the head of the special department of the army. Since 1921 in the intelligence department of the Red Army. In 1924-35, 1937 - head of the intelligence department. In 1936-1937 he was the chief military adviser to the Republican army in Spain. - Ed. [69] For more details on the preparation of the partisan

movement in the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s, see the next chapter.

[70] This is discussed in more detail in the first part of the memoirs.

[71] Sorel A. Partisan war of the XX century. In Spanish lang. Paris, 1970. P. 83. [72]

Anchel M. Spanish partisans in France 1940-1945. Havana, 1971, pp. 17-261 (in Spanish)

[73] Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze (1885-1925), Soviet military, state and party leader. Civil War commander and military theorist, one of the organizers and creators of the Soviet Armed Forces. He studied at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute. He took part in the revolution of 1905-1907, led the Ivanovo Voznesenskaya strike. In 1909-1910 he was twice sentenced to death for revolutionary activities, but it was replaced by life exile in Siberia. From 1910-1915 in hard labor. Ran. In World War I, he led revolutionary work in the army on the Western Front. During the October Revolution, he headed the Military Revolutionary Committee in Shuya. Participated in the elimination of the Left SR rebellion in Moscow and in the defeat of the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Yaroslavl. In 1919 - Commander of the Southern Group of Forces of the Eastern Front and the Eastern Front. From 1919 - Commander of the Turkestan Front. In September 1920 he liberated the Crimea. Authorized by the RVSR in Ukraine, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Economic Council. In 1924-1925 - Deputy Chairman and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, Deputy People's Commissar and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. At the same time he was the chief of staff of the Red Army, the head of the Military Academy and a member of the Council of Labor and Defense. Under his leadership, the military reform of 1924-1925 was carried out (Ed. note).

[74] Frunze M.V. Selected works. Moscow, 1977. P. 43. [75] Lenin

V.I. Full coll. op. T. 12. S. 181.

[76] Frunze M.V. Military doctrine and the Red Army//Selected works. M., 1977. S. 22-23.

[77] Yakir Iona Emmanuilovich (1896-1937), commander of the 1st rank (1935). During the civil war, commander of the Red Guard detachment, commissar of the rifle brigade, head of the political department of the Southern Section of the curtain detachments, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 8th Army. In 1919-1920 he was the head of a rifle division, commanded the Southern Group of Forces of the 12th Army, the Fastovskaya, Zlochevskaya, Lvovskaya Group of Forces and the 14th Army. After the war, he commanded the troops of the Crimean region, the Kyiv Military District. Since 1923 - commander and commissar of the rifle corps, head of the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army, commander of the Ukrainian Military District. In 1930-1934 he was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR (Editor's note).

[78] Vitaly Markovich Primakov (1897-1937), participant in the Civil War. In 1917, in Petrograd, he led the Red Guard detachment during the storming of the Winter Palace, participated in the defeat of the Kerensky-Krasnov rebellion. He commanded a cavalry regiment, brigade, division, corps. After the war, he graduated from the Higher Military Academic Courses of the Command Staff of the Red Army (1923). Head and military commissar of the Higher Cavalry School, military attaché in Afghanistan and Japan, commander and military commissar of a rifle corps.

[79] Vaupshasov S.A. At dangerous intersections. 3rd ed. M., 1988. P. 219. [80] For

more details see: Starinov I.G. "Notes of a saboteur"//Almanac "Vympel". M., 1997. Issue. 3.

[81] Artur Karlovich Sprogis (1904-1980), one of the organizers and leaders of the partisan movement in Belarus and Latvia. Member of the Civil Wars in Russia and Spain. Graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze (1940). During the Great Patriotic War - the head of the school for the training of partisan scouts and demolition workers, commanders of reconnaissance and partisan detachments. In 1943-1944 - head of the Latvian headquarters of the partisan movement. (Ed. note).

[82] Stalin I.V. About the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. M., 1952. S. 15.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Ponomarenko Panteleimon Kondratievich (1902), Soviet party and statesman, lieutenant general (1943). Member of the Civil War. Graduated from the Moscow Institute of Transport Engineers (1932). In 1938-1947, 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus. During the Great Patriotic War, a member of the military councils of the 3rd shock army, the Western, Central and Bryansk fronts, in 1942-1944 the head of the TsShPD. Since 1944 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Council

Ministers of the BSSR (Ed. note).

[85] Timoshenko Semyon Konstantinovich (1895-1970), Soviet statesman and military figure. Member of the 1st World War. In Civil - the commander of a cavalry regiment, brigade, division. He graduated from the Higher Academic Courses (1927). After the war, the commander of the cavalry corps. From 1933 deputy commander, from 1937 commander of a number of military districts. During a campaign in Western Ukraine (1839), the commander of the Ukrainian, and in 1939-1940 - the North-Eastern Front. As you know, after the Soviet-Finnish war in the winter of 1939-1940, K.E. Voroshilov was removed and replaced by S.K. Tymoshenko as People's Commissar for Defense. During the Great Patriotic War - Chairman of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. In July-September 1941 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Since July - Commander-in-Chief of the Western, South-Western direction. Since 1943 - the representative of the Stavka on the fronts (Ed. note).

[86] Rainbow, magazine. Kyiv, 1965. N\_5. S. 180.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Churchill Winston Leonard Spencer (1874-1965), British political, statesman and military figure. Since 1908, being a conservative, he was in various ministerial posts. One of the main initiators of the intervention in Russia in 1918-1920. In 1940-1945 and 1951-1955 - Prime Minister. During the war years, he was a forced ally of the USSR, after its end he was one of the ideologists of the Cold War. The passage quoted is taken from his book The Second World War. M., 1998. T. 3. S. 228. (Ed. note).

[89] Rokossovsky Konstantin Konstantinovich (1896-1968), Marshal (1944), Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945). Member of the First World War and the Civil War. Commander of a cavalry squadron and regiment. He graduated from the cavalry courses. Brigade commander, division. He graduated from the advanced training courses of the higher beginning. composition at the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze. Since 1936 - commander of the cavalry corps. During the Great Patriotic War, the commander of the mech. corps. From July 1941 - Commander of the 16th Army. From 1942 commander of the Bryansk, Don, Central, 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. Since 1946 - Commander of the Northern Group of Forces. Since 1949 - Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic. Since 1956 - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR (Ed. note).

[90] Bagramyan Ivan Khristoforovich (1897-1982), marshal (1955), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1977). Graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze (1934), Military Academy of the General Staff (1938). During the Great Patriotic War - Head of the Operations Department - Deputy Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff of the Southwestern Front and the headquarters of the troops of the Southwestern direction. During the period indicated by the author, he was not a marshal (Ed. note).

[91] Mekhlis Lev Zakharovich (1889-1953), Colonel General (1944). Member of the First World War. During the Civil War - the military commissar of a brigade, an infantry division and the Right-Bank Group of Forces in Ukraine. In 1921-1936 - in the Soviet and party work. Graduated from the Institute of Red Professors (1930). In 1937-1940 he was the head of the political department of the Red Army. From 1940 - People's Commissar of State Control of the USSR. During the Great Patriotic War, he was the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (until June 1942), then a member of the Military Councils of the armies of the Voronezh, Volkhov, Bryansk, 2nd Baltic, Western, 2nd Belorussian and 4th Ukrainian fronts (Note ed.).

[92] Nevsky Georgy Georgievich (1891-1961), lieutenant general of the engineering troops (1943). Graduated from the Military Engineering Academy (1918). Participated in the Civil War, first as a divisional engineer, chief of supply for the Northern and Western fronts. Since 1934 assistant inspector, senior inspector of the Department of Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army. During the Great Patriotic War - the head of the engineering troops of the South-Western direction. WITH



1942 - Deputy Commander - Head of the Engineering Troops of the Karelian Front. In 1944-1946 he was the head of the Suvorov Military School (Editor's note).

[93] Kotlyar Leonty Zakharovich (1901-1953), Colonel General of the Engineering Troops (1944), Hero of the Soviet Union (1945). Graduated from the Military Technical Academy. F.E. Dzerzhinsky (1930). From 1937 he was a control engineer at the NKO of the USSR, head of the department of engineering troops of the military district, head of the defense construction department of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army. During the Great Patriotic War - Head of the Main Military Engineering Directorate, Head of the Engineering Troops of the Soviet Army. Since 1942 he was the head of the engineering troops of the Voronezh, South-Western and 3rd Ukrainian fronts. - Note ed.

[94] Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich (1903-1950), Soviet party and statesman. Graduated from the Institute of Red Professors (1931). Since 1935 - Chairman of the City Planning Commission and Deputy Chairman of the Leningrad City Council. From 1938 - Chairman of the State Planning Committee. Since 1941 - 1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (since 1946 - the Council of Ministers). From 1942-1945 - member of the State Defense Committee (Editor's note).

[95] Semyon Ivanovich Aralov (1880-1969), participant in the Civil War. In 1918 - head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, head of the operational department of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, member of the Revolutionary Military Council. Since 1921 - in diplomatic work. During the Great Patriotic War he was in the division of the people's militia.

[96] Aralov S.I. Lenin led us to victory. 2nd ed. M., 1989. S. 43.

[97] Todorsky Alexander Ivanovich (1894-1965), participant in the Civil War. During the Civil War - commander of a brigade of a rifle corps, division, assistant commander and member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan Front. Graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze (1927). Since 1928, Assistant Commander of the Military District, Deputy Chief and Head of the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions (Ed. note).

[98] Vaupshasov Stanislav Alekseevich (1899-1976), Soviet intelligence officer, participant in the partisan struggle in the Great Patriotic War. Hero of the Soviet Union (1944). In the 20s and 30s - in intelligence work. Member of the war of the Spanish people. In 1942-1944 - commander of a partisan detachment in the Minsk region.

[99] Korzh Vasily Zakharovich (1899-1967), one of the leaders of the partisan struggle in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War. Member of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). From 1940 - head of the Pinsk Regional Party Committee. During the Great Patriotic War - the commander of a partisan unit.

[100] Orlovsky Kirill Prokofievich (1895-1968), one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Belarus. Hero of the Soviet Union (1943). Member of the 1st World War. In 1920-1925 he led partisan groups in Western Belarus. Participated in the Spanish Civil War. Since 1938 - in the organs of the NKVD of the USSR. In 1942-1943 - commander of a partisan detachment. Since 1943 - in the state security bodies of Belarus.

[101] Shchadenko Efim Afanasyevich (1885-1951), Colonel General (1942). Member of the Civil War. He graduated from the two courses of the Military Academy of the Red Army (1923). After the war - head of the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze. Since 1937 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (Ed. note).

[102] Ponomarenko P.K. All-People's Struggle in the Rear of the Nazi Invaders 1941-1944. M., 1986. S. 73.

[103] Ponomarenko P.K. All-People's Struggle in the Rear of the Nazi Invaders 1941-1944. M., 1986. C. 72.

[104] Partisan formations of Belarus. Minsk, 1983. S. 20-21.

[105] Kalinin Mikhail Ivanovich (1875-1946), Soviet party and statesman. Member of the St. Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Agent of the Iskra newspaper. One of the organizers of the Putilov workers' strike. Member of the February and October revolutions. Since 1919 - Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In 1922 - Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Since 1938 - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council. During the Great Patriotic War, he was engaged in the preparation of reserves for the Soviet Army, the evacuation of industrial enterprises.

[106] Mikhail Petrovich Vorobyov (1896-1957), marshal of engineering troops (1944). Member of the Civil War. Graduated from the Military Technical Academy (1929). Since 1932 - head of the faculty of the Military Engineering Academy, head of the military engineering school, inspector general of the engineering troops of the Red Army. During the Great Patriotic War - the head of the department and the head of the engineering troops of the Western Front. From 1942 - Chief of Engineering Troops. - Ed.

[107] Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky (1895-1977), Soviet statesman, marshal (1943), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945). Member of the First World War, the Civil War. Since 1931 - in the management of combat training of the Red Army. Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff (1937). In 1940 - Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. From August 1941 - Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (Ed. note).

[108] Voroshilov Kliment Efremovich (1881-1869), Soviet party, statesman and military leader, marshal (1935), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1956, 1968). Hero of the MNR. Member of three revolutions. One of the organizers and leaders of the Soviet Army. Since 1917, the commissar of Petrograd, together with F.E. Dzerzhinsky led the work on the organization of the Cheka. In March 1918, he led the creation of the 5th Ukrainian Army and directed its combat operations. Commander of the Tsaritsyn Group of Forces. From November 1918 People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, commander of the troops of the Kharkov Military District. In 1919 he led the defense of Yekaterinoslav and Kyiv. In 1919-1921 one of the organizers and member of the Revolutionary Military Council. In 1921 he participated in the liquidation of the Kronstadt rebellion. In 1921-1925 commander of the North Caucasian and Moscow military districts. In 1925-1934 People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. In 1934-1940 he was People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. During the Great Patriotic War - a member of the State Defense Committee, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the commander of the Leningrad Front, the commander-in-chief of the partisan movement. - Note ed. [109] CPA IML. F. 69. Op. 1. D. 795. L. 4.

[110] Ponomarenko P.K. All-People's Struggle in the Rear of the Nazi Invaders 1941-1944. M., 1986. C. 90.

[111] Klembovsky V. - general of the Russian army. A pronounced supporter of partisan actions, carried out with the initiative from the army. He did not perceive the performance of the "popular masses" as an independent force behind enemy lines, moreover, he treated this negatively. His works were repeatedly reprinted during the Civil War. Despite their apparent one-sidedness, they were systematized. The main core of the work is the controllability of a small war. In this connection, he made himself many opponents who stood up and stood for greater and even complete freedom of the partisans.

[112] Kovalev I.V. Transport in the Great Patriotic War. M., 1981. S. 312-313.

[113] Ponomarenko P.K. All-People's Struggle in the Rear of the Nazi Invaders 1941-1944. M., 1986. S. 241.

[114] People's war in the rear of the fascist invaders in Ukraine. Book two. Kyiv, 1985. S. 208.

[115] Partarhiv UF IML. F. 75. Op. 75-1. D. 3. L. 51. [116] Georgy

Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896-1974), Marshal of the Soviet Union (1943), four times Hero of the USSR (1939, 1944, 1945, 1956). Hero of the MNR. Member of the First World War and the Civil War. He graduated from the courses of the higher command staff (1930). Since 1940 - Commander of the Kyiv Special Military District. In January-July 1941 - Chief of the General Staff - Deputy. Defense Commissar. Since August 1942 - 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Deputy Supreme Commander. In 1942-1943, he coordinated the actions of the fronts near Stalingrad, to break the blockade of Leningrad, in the battles near Kursk and beyond the Dnieper. In March May 1944 - commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, and then - the 1st Belorussian Front. On behalf of and on behalf of the Council of the Supreme High Command on May 8, 1945, he accepted the surrender of the armed Nazi formations. [117] Zhukov G.K. UK. prod. T. 2. C. 99.

[118] Masharov Pyotr Mironovich (1918-1980), Soviet party and statesman. One of the leaders of the partisan movement in Belarus. Graduated from the Vitebsk Pedagogical Institute (1939). During the Great Patriotic War (since 1942) - commander of a partisan detachment, commissar of a partisan brigade, 1st secretary of the underground regional committee of the Komsomol of Belarus. Since 1946 - secretary, in 1947-1954 - 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of Belarus. Subsequently, the head of the Belarusian Communist Party. Died in a car accident.

[119] Huseyn-zade Mehdi Ganify-ogly (1918-1944), lieutenant (1942). Wounded in 1942 and taken prisoner. In 1944 he fled, joined the Yugoslav party detachment. Participated in reconnaissance and sabotage operations in Yugoslavia and Italy. Killed in battle. [120] Zhukov G.K. UK. prod. M., 1971. C. 79.

[121] Shtemenko Sergey Matveyevich (1907-1976). He graduated from the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army (1937), the Military Academy of the General Staff (1940). Since 1940 in the General Staff - Senior Assistant Chief. During the Great Patriotic War - Deputy Chief, Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. Since 1948 - Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

[122] Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war. M., 1969-1973. T. 1-2. [123] Ponomarenko P.K. National struggle in the rear of the Nazi occupiers. M., 1986. S. 72.

[124] Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. M., 1971. S. 49.

[125] Ponomarenko P.K. National struggle in the rear of the Nazi invaders. 1986, p. 72.

[126] Zaslonov Konstantin Sergeevich (1910-1942), one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Belarus. From November 1941, he led an underground group in Orsha, which carried out sabotage activities. In 1942 - commander of a partisan detachment, then a brigade. From October 1942 he commanded all the partisan forces of the Orsha zone. Killed in battle.

[127] Relations of Russia (USSR) with Yugoslavia 1941-1945. Documents and materials. M., 1998, p. 475.

[128] RTSKHIDNI. F. 495. O. 184. Incoming telegrams. 1941. D. 7. L. 456.

[129] Relations of Russia. UK. op. S. 64.

[130] RTSKHIDNI. F. 495. O. 184. Incoming telegrams. 1942. D. 4. L. 27. [131] RTSKHIDNI. F. 495. O. 184. Incoming telegrams. 1942. D. 4. L. 133-135.

[132] Appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the peoples of Yugoslavia in connection with the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union // Attitude of Russia ... S. 41.

[133] It seems to imply that explosions were carried out at these stations. [134] Ponomarev B.N. Yugoslavia in the fire of guerrilla warfare. M., 1942.

[135] Churchill, W.S. World War II: In 6 vols. T. 5. S. 295-296. [136] Dzhonlagic A., Atanaukovic J., Plencha D. Yugoslavia in the Second World War. Belgorod, 1967. S. 154-155.

[137] We also include special formations operating behind enemy lines as partisans.

[138] Seth Ronald. Undaunted. M., 1967. P. 138. [139] Calculated by the author on the basis of data from the 6-volume History of the Great Patriotic War, v. 6 "The Defeat of German Imperialism in the Second World War." M., 1960 and "Results of the Second World War", M., 1967.

[140] Engineering troops in the battles for the Soviet Motherland. M., 1970. S.358. [141] Results of the Second World War. M., 1967. S. 135.

[142] Heinz Wilhelm Guderian (1889-1954), Colonel-General of the German Army (since 1940), military theorist. Along with de Gaulle and Fuller, he was the founder of motorized methods of warfare.

[143] Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. M., 1954.

[144] Dixon Ch., Heilbrunn O. Communist partisan actions. M., 1954. S. 25. [145] John Frederick Charles Fuller (1878-1966), English military historian and theorist, Major General (1930). Member of the Anglo-Boer (1899-1902) and World War I. Since 1926 Assistant Chief of Staff. Author of the "theory of indirect actions".

[146] Fuller J. World War II 1939-1945. M., 1956. S. 332. [147] Partisan formations of Belarus during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - July 1944). Brief information about the organizational structure of partisan formations, brigades, detachments and their personnel. Minsk, 1983. S. 20-21.

[148] Stalin I.V. About the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. M., 1952.

[149] Zhukov G.K. UK. op. M., 1991. T. 3. S. 149.

[150] In Russian, this book was published under the title "Spaniards in the Great Patriotic War". M., 1986.

[151] Partisan formations of Belarus during the Great Patriotic War: June 1941 - July 1944. Brief information about the organizational structure of partisan formations (brigades), regiments, detachments (battalions) and their personnel. Minsk, 1983. S. 477.

[152] National struggle in Belarus against the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War. In 3 volumes, T. 3. S. 217.

